FOREIGN AFFAIRS

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Terrorism and the Law

Abraham D. Sofaer

The British Scene — *Geoffrey Smith*
Fundamentalist Muslims — *Daniel Pipes*
Egypt's Crisis, America's Dilemma — *Paul Jabber*

Nuclear Winter Reappraised

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Abraham D. Sofaer

TERRORISM AND THE LAW

Terrorism poses important political and diplomatic challenges. It is designed to call attention, through the use of violence, to the causes espoused by terrorists, and to bring about changes in policy favorable to those causes. The United States and its allies—and all other affected nations—must deal with this threat to civilized order with all appropriate measures, ranging from diplomatic to military.

One potential means for dealing with terrorism is law. Americans are particularly attracted to the law as a means for repressing violence, and are committed domestically and internationally to using law to control criminal conduct and to resolve disputes. They invoke the law almost instinctively, and repeatedly, assuming that it regulates international conduct and, in particular, provides a system for bringing terrorists to justice.

Recent terrorist incidents have led to many efforts to use the law, virtually all of which have failed. The law has a poor record in dealing with international terrorism. Some terrorists are killed or captured during the course of their crimes, but few of those who evade these consequences are afterward found and arrested. The terrorist who is prosecuted is likely to be released far earlier than his sentence should require, often in exchange for hostages taken in a subsequent terrorist episode.

The time has come to ask, frankly and honestly, why international terrorism is so loudly condemned, and yet so prevalent. What good is the law in fighting international terrorism? Why has it failed?

II

One reason for the law's ineffectiveness is that terrorism, in essence, is criminal activity. In applying law domestically, gov-

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Abraham D. Sofaer is Legal Adviser to the Department of State. Previously, he was a federal district judge in New York. This article is based on the Sulzbacher Lecture delivered at the Columbia University School of Law, April 5, 1986. Legal citations have not been included to facilitate ease of reading; they are available from the Office of the Legal Adviser, U.S. Department of State, Washington, D.C. 20520.

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ernments seek to punish and deter crime as effectively as possible. But they recognize that law cannot eliminate crime. They can expect even less of the law in dealing with international terrorism. The world has no international police force or judicial system.

The stock response to complaints about the law's failure to deal effectively with terrorism is that *more* laws are needed. That is a misleading answer. Important gaps do exist in the legal structure that governs terrorist acts, and the Reagan Administration is working with Congress and with other nations to close them. For example, the U.S. government lacks a domestic legal basis to prosecute the terrorists who killed an American citizen, Leon Klinghoffer, during the October 1985 *Achille Lauro* cruise ship hijacking, or the terrorists who killed four American civilians on a hijacked Trans-World Airlines flight earlier that year. The Senate has passed a statute establishing jurisdiction for terrorist murders of Americans, and its adoption by the House would be welcome. Americans must not deceive themselves, however, that new laws, closing gaps, will overcome the problems that render law ineffective. Recent events have demonstrated that, even when laws clearly govern particular conduct, they are often disregarded or otherwise fail to achieve their purpose.

The reasons for the law's failure tolerably to control terrorism go much deeper than the absence of law enforcement authority or mechanisms. International law and cooperation in less controversial areas have often proved reasonably effective. In the area of terrorism, however, the law has failed to punish and deter those who use violence to advance their political goals.

Civilized nations have tried to control international terrorism by condemning it, by treating it as piracy, by prosecuting terrorists under the laws of affected states, by creating international norms establishing as criminal certain acts wherever committed, and by cooperating through extradition and other devices in aiding nations attacked by terrorists. An appraisal of these efforts leads to a painful conclusion: the law applicable to terrorism is not merely flawed, it is perverse. The rules and declarations seemingly designed to curb terrorism have regularly included provisions that demonstrate the absence of international agreement on the propriety of regulating terrorist activity. On some issues, the law leaves political violence unregulated. On other issues the law is ambivalent, providing a

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basis for conflicting arguments as to its purpose. At its worst the law has in important ways actually served to legitimize international terror, and to protect terrorists from punishment as criminals. These deficiencies are not the product of negligence or mistake. They are intentional.

III

Americans too readily assume that others agree that at least certain aspects of international terror are unacceptable. While many fanatics obviously approve of terror, less recognized and more significant is the fact that the acceptance of terror is far more widespread. Indeed, many nations regard terrorism as a legitimate means of warfare.

The United Nations General Assembly began devoting special attention to the subject of terrorism after two especially heinous actions. On May 30, 1972, Japanese terrorists, working with the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine, attacked civilian passengers at Lod Airport in Israel with automatic weapons, killing 28 and wounding 78. On September 5, 1972, terrorists from the Black September organization murdered 11 members of the Israeli Olympic Team in Munich.

On September 8, 1972, U.N. Secretary-General Kurt Waldheim asked for inclusion in the General Assembly agenda of an item entitled "Measures to prevent terrorism and other forms of violence which endanger or take innocent human lives or jeopardize fundamental freedoms." He urged "that all concerned turn away from senseless and destructive violence," and noted that the world community should continue "to exert its utmost influence in seeking peaceful ways" to find solutions "for the problems underlying such acts of terrorism."

The secretary-general's statement evoked angry opposition, which took the immediate form of protests against considering terrorism without considering its causes. The secretary-general reiterated his request on September 20, but acceded to the pressures by adding that it was no good considering terrorism "without at the same time considering the underlying situations which give rise to terrorism and violence in many parts of the world." He assured the protesters that he did not intend "to affect principles enunciated by the General Assembly regarding colonial and dependent peoples seeking independence and liberation."

The two concessions made by Mr. Waldheim may at first glance seem innocuous. In the United Nations, however, they

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were significant. Attributing acts of terrorism to injustice and frustration obviously tends to excuse, if not justify, those acts. This is especially so when the causes are all assumed to be sympathetic. The language concerning efforts to seek "independence" and "liberation" also implied justification for terrorist acts. These concepts related to the principles adopted in previous U.N. resolutions supporting "self-determination" and wars of national liberation, in the pursuit of which oppressed people were authorized to resort to all available means, including armed struggle.

A General Committee debate on Waldheim's proposal took up the question of the causes of terrorism, as well as the concepts of self-determination and wars of national liberation. Many nations opposed adding terrorism to the agenda and strongly suggested their support for certain terrorist actions. For example, the representative from Mauritania said that the expression "terrorist" can "hardly be held to apply to persons who were denied the most elementary human rights, dignity, freedom and independence, and whose countries objected to foreign occupation." Citing situations in Africa, the Middle East and Asia, he said "such peoples could not be blamed for committing desperate acts which in themselves were reprehensible; rather, the real culprits were those who were responsible for causing such desperation."

In the General Assembly the item was amended to include Waldheim's language on the causes of terrorism and the matter was referred to the U.N. Sixth Committee, on legal affairs. There the representative from Guinea, among others, very clearly supported the right of national liberation movements "to undertake any type of action to ensure that their countries attained independence." The Cuban representative rejected any proposal of "rules for the purpose of assigning legal limits" to revolutionary armed struggle. "The methods of combat used by national liberation movements could not be declared illegal while the policy of terror unleashed against certain peoples was declared legitimate." The Madagascar representative could not have been clearer:

> Acts of terrorism inspired by base motives of personal gain were to be condemned. Acts of political terrorism, on the other hand, undertaken to vindicate hallowed rights recognized by the United Nations, were praiseworthy. It was, of course, regrettable that certain acts in the latter category affected innocent persons.

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And the Algerian representative presented the philosophical rationale used since time immemorial to justify terror:

> His delegation did not agree with the statement in the Secretariat's report that the legitimacy of a cause did not in itself justify recourse to certain forms of violence; those serving the cause in question should have a choice of the means to be used.

These assertions have been repeated in one form or another in the years since that first debate. During this period, the General Assembly passed seven resolutions on terrorism and its causes. The first, adopted on December 18, 1972, had little to say about the type of terrorism which had led to the subject's being placed on the agenda. It expressed "deep concern" over increased acts of violence that took innocent lives or jeopardized fundamental freedoms, and invited states to consider joining relevant conventions. But the resolution was a victory for those who supported the right to use all available measures to advance the ends of self-determination and wars of national liberation. The resolution in fact condemned only one thing: "the continuation of repressive and terrorist acts by colonial, racist and alien regimes."

A resolution on terrorism adopted in 1977 added another important element. It invited the Ad Hoc Committee on International Terrorism to study *first* the underlying causes of terror, and then to recommend measures to deal with acts of terrorism. A 1979 resolution for the first time condemned acts of terror, but it referred to the 1977 Protocols to the Geneva Convention, which seek to give groups fighting wars of national liberation the protection of the laws of war. Finally, in December 1985, after a further series of terrorist acts, the General Assembly adopted a resolution that "unequivocally condemns, as criminal, all acts, methods and practices of terrorism." This resolution contains several provisions calling for international cooperation against terrorism. At the same time, however, it reaffirmed each people's inalienable right to self-determination, and the legitimacy of struggles against colonial and racist regimes and other forms of alien domination. The debates preceding and following the adoption of this resolution make clear that many states continue to believe that "wars of national liberation" justify or excuse terrorist acts. For example, the Angolan representative, echoing the comments of the delegates from Algeria, Bulgaria, Kuwait and Sri Lanka, among others,

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made it clear that "acts of terrorism could not be equated, under any pretext, with the acts of those who were fighting colonial and racist oppression and for their freedom and independence."

The wide acceptance of the premise that terrorist acts can be lawful in the pursuit of proper goals is an uneasy first lesson. The United States of course also recognizes that oppressed people are sometimes justified in resorting to force, but only if properly exercised. For example, such uses of force must be consistent with the laws of war and should not be directed at innocent civilians, include hostage-taking, or involve torture. In contrast, the U.N. debates and resolutions relating to terrorism do not suggest principled limits on the use of force, or any reasoned, fair-minded basis for determining which peoples are entitled to wage wars of national liberation. The result is a clear signal to all that those groups deemed by the majority to be oppressed will be free legally to use force, and therefore cannot fairly be called terrorists. In other words, acts of terrorism by such groups are not wrong, and the law has no proper role in punishing or deterring such acts.

IV

The legitimacy of political violence is a notion that has also worked its way deep into international law enforcement. Most countries have treaties that obligate them to extradite to other states persons accused of committing, in those states, the crimes associated with terrorism, such as murder, hijacking, bombing, armed assault and robbery. Yet extradition requests are frequently refused, often because the offense is characterized as "political" conduct which the law exempts from extradition.

Some relatively recent decisions, denying extradition on the ground that the charge is a "political offense," illustrate how detrimental the law can be in the battle against terrorism. In 1972 five individuals hijacked a plane in the United States, extorted $1 million and flew to Algeria, where they were received as political militants. In 1976 they made their way to France, which refused to extradite the five, although they had presented no evidence of political motivation beyond the claim that they were escaping racial segregation in America and were associated with the "black liberation movement." More recently, the United States failed to obtain the extradition of Abu Abbas, thought to have masterminded the *Achille Lauro* hijacking, from two countries through which he passed follow-

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ing the incident (Italy and Yugoslavia). Despite U.S. assertions of their treaty obligation to hold Abbas, these states released him, Yugoslavia claiming that he was entitled to diplomatic immunity because he carried an Iraqi diplomatic passport.

Some decisions by U.S. courts are equally disturbing. In 1959 a federal court refused to extradite Andrija Artukovic to Yugoslavia for the alleged malicious murders of 200,000 Croatians in concentration camps, after determining that these murders were "political." Some 27 years later the United States successfully deported Artukovic, and he is currently standing trial in Yugoslavia. In recent cases U.S. courts have refused to extradite four alleged Irish Republican Army gunmen on the ground that an uprising exists in Northern Ireland, which makes crimes in furtherance of the revolt "political."

How did the United States get to the point of giving sanctuary to terrorists who kill people in order to get their way in a democracy such as the United Kingdom? Or to an alleged mass murderer? The story is both interesting and instructive.

The "political offense" claim as a defense against extradition has noble roots. It developed in the period of the French and American Revolutions, and reflected the value the new democracies placed upon political freedom. Thomas Jefferson commented, for example, that "unsuccessful strugglers against tyranny have been the chief martyrs of treason laws in all countries." At that time political offenses were associated with acts against the security of a state, such as treason, espionage and sedition.

The concept was soon expanded, however, to so-called relative political offenses—ordinary crimes committed in a political context or with political motivation. An important early case on this point is *In re Castioni*, decided in 1891, in which the English courts denied extradition for a killing that occurred in the midst of a demonstration against the government of a Swiss canton that refused to submit its new constitution to a popular vote. The shooting served no purpose. But the court found it "political" because it was incidental to and a part of a political disturbance. Even if an act is "cruel and against all reason," the court held, its perpetrator is protected if he acted "for the purpose of furthering and in furtherance of a political rising." *Castioni* was quickly qualified in England, when in 1894 one of the many anarchists of the period, Théodule Meunier, was extradited to France for placing bombs in a Parisian café and

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an army barracks. But it took hold in the United States and elsewhere.

In 1894, the same year *In re Meunier* was decided, a U.S. court refused to extradite high officials of El Salvador accused of murders in their unsuccessful effort to retain power (*In re Ezeta*). Relying on *Castioni*, the court held that all acts associated with an uprising were political offenses. The court accepted without discussion the premise that the doctrine was politically neutral, and that protection should be given equally to democrats and dictators. It also explicitly rejected the notion that the offender's conduct in killing noncombatants could disqualify him from the doctrine's protection. During hostilities, said the court, "crimes may have been committed by the contending forces of the most atrocious and inhuman character, and still the perpetrators of such crimes escape punishment as fugitives beyond the reach of extradition."

The ruling in *Ezeta* had some support in U.S. and foreign practice during the nineteenth century. Granting asylum to revolutionaries and victims of revolutions was seen as enlightened. That was the period during which republican government first became a widespread reality. But the political-offense doctrine has another side. Several incidents, diplomatic decisions and rulings during the nineteenth and twentieth centuries indicate that the United States and other countries have taken their particular interests and political ideals into account in formulating the doctrine's contours. This has led to certain limitations of the concept of a political offense.

A particularly dramatic instance followed the assassination of Abraham Lincoln. Despite the political nature of the crime, the United States sought and obtained assurances from Great Britain and Italy respectively for the apprehension abroad of John Wilkes Booth and John H. Surratt, one of Booth's suspected conspirators. Surratt was actually captured in Egypt and sent back to the United States on an American navy vessel. The need to protect heads of state was recognized by other nations as well, and is now a widely accepted qualification to the political-offense doctrine.

During the American Civil War the United States seized in Morocco, with the acquiescence of the Moorish governor, two Confederate sailors who had gone ashore to obtain coal. An objection was raised that the sailors should have been allowed to assert the political-offense doctrine. Secretary of State William Henry Seward rejected the argument, reasoning that the

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men were "taken in the very act of war against this government." Similarly, in 1946 France and Belgium agreed to surrender to each other individuals convicted of war-related crimes committed during World War II. One offender sought to defeat a Belgian extradition request by claiming that the spying and assassination with which he was charged were political offenses. The French courts rejected the argument because France could not be deemed a neutral on the issue: "the offense was committed in time of war both against an ally and against France, whose interests were linked."

The more recent problem of aircraft hijacking demonstrates how the doctrine can still be applied in accordance with U.S. national interests. During the 1950s, despite America's strong opposition to aircraft hijackings, the United States and its Western allies refused requests from Czechoslovakia, the U.S.S.R., Poland, Yugoslavia and other communist regimes for the return of persons who hijacked planes, trains and ships to escape. But when aircraft hijacking reached epidemic proportions in the late 1960s and early 1970s the United States determined that hijacking of aircraft carrying passengers was too serious a problem and too great a threat to the safety of innocent passengers to be tolerated. The United States reexamined its policy and "concluded that the hijacker of a commercial aircraft carrying passengers for hire should be returned regardless of any claim he was fleeing political persecution."

Thus, the United States suggested in 1969, during consideration of the Hague Convention on Hijacking, that the political-offense exception should be eliminated for that crime. The suggestion was rejected and the political-offense exception was retained, however, in both the Hague hijacking convention and the Montreal sabotage convention. Nations therefore remain authorized (though not required) to refuse, on political grounds, to extradite suspects in such universally recognized crimes as hijacking and sabotage.

For several years the United States has been prepared to revise its treaties with democratic allies to narrow the political-offense exception and make it inapplicable to crimes of violence and breaches of antiterrorist conventions. In 1983, for example, the United States signed a revised treaty with Italy that narrowed the political-offense exception to exclude, in certain circumstances, offenses covered by a multilateral agreement, such as the hostage-taking or aircraft hijacking conventions. The United States and its people are opposed to rebellions,

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revolutions and political assassination in democracies, since their political systems offer a peaceful means to seek change. Thus, revolutionaries should not be encouraged in a democracy by the treatment of their violent acts as acceptable political conduct. A doctrine born to reflect the United States' belief in freedom should not be permitted to serve the interests of those seeking to impose undemocratic views through force.

To advance this objective, the Reagan Administration recently signed a Supplemental Extradition Treaty with the United Kingdom, which narrows the political-offense doctrine to exclude most violent crimes. Similar treaties with other nations are being negotiated. But the proposed treaty with Great Britain has run into fierce opposition in the Senate. Intense lobbying and strong, emotional concern about the Irish problem may lead the Senate to refuse to ratify this treaty. That would be a grave setback. It would make the United States no better than the other nations that have their favorite terrorists. If the United States fails to reject absolutely the use of force against a democracy that is its closest ally, it will lose credibility in urging other states to cooperate in its own efforts against terrorism.

V

The law against piracy provides another illustration of how international law has failed adequately to control politically motivated crimes. The *Achille Lauro* incident presented the question whether the acts of the hijackers of that vessel constituted piracy "under the law of nations," and were therefore felonies under U.S. law. The hijackers stole money and jewelry from the ship's passengers, but their primary purposes were political. They were allegedly seeking to commit acts of violence in Israel, where the vessel was scheduled to dock, and after taking control they demanded that Israel release certain terrorists it had imprisoned. Is such an enterprise "piracy"?

The traditional law of piracy could have been one vehicle for obtaining jurisdiction over terrorists, with fewer loopholes for political crimes than recent conventions. Piracy law has long been inapplicable to state vessels and recognized belligerents when they engaged in lawful acts of war. Those who believed that belligerents should not be treated as pirates reasoned that they were the enemies only of a particular government, not of mankind. This recognized exclusion contained a crucial limitation: it applied only if the insurgents

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confined themselves to depredations against the country with which they were at war. Where individuals engaged in an insurgency attacked nonbelligerents, the exclusion did not apply and the rebels were treated as pirates.

The modern law of piracy purports to modify significantly these traditional rules. The 1982 U.N. Convention on the Law of the Sea and the 1958 Geneva Convention on the High Seas define piracy as any illegal act of violence, detention or depredation committed against a ship "for private ends." The private-ends requirement was used deliberately to exclude acts with public or political motives. The rapporteur for the International Law Commission, which drafted the Geneva high seas convention, explained that "he had defined as piracy acts of violence or depredation committed for private ends, thus leaving outside the scope of the definition *all wrongful acts perpetrated for a political purpose*."

The approach of these two conventions would substantially contract the reach of the law of piracy. The "private ends" requirement, at least as described by the rapporteur, would expand the traditional "insurgency" exclusion to cover all persons claiming to be politically motivated. Moreover, the exclusion's traditional limitation to acts committed against a country with which the insurgents are at war appears to have been either overlooked or abandoned. As a result, the conventions arguably place all politically motivated acts outside the universal jurisdiction of sovereign states.

Conceivably, the conventions could be read to cover indiscriminate attacks on civilians, or attacks motivated by race or nationality, having no ordinary relationship to an insurgency, such as the murder of Mr. Klinghoffer. But the terrorists involved in the *Achille Lauro* affair would no doubt claim they were acting politically, even in killing Klinghoffer, and hence could not be called pirates under the conventions.

The "private-ends" requirement undermines some positive achievements contained in the two conventions. The piracy provisions in the conventions were intended to confirm the existence of universal jurisdiction for any nation to capture and punish all persons who committed wrongful acts on the high seas or in the air, or in any other place where no state has jurisdiction. In fact, the conventions go further than merely permitting countries to act. Both contain an article providing that "all States shall cooperate to the fullest possible extent in the repression of piracy" and the commentary to the Geneva

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Convention on the High Seas states that "any State having an opportunity of taking measures against piracy, and neglecting to do so, would be failing in a duty laid upon it by international law." But by narrowing the definition of piracy, these conventions exclude from the international duty to repress piracy "to the fullest possible extent" all politically motivated attacks on vessels and aircraft.

VI

The exclusion of terrorist acts from the reach of legal prohibitions is not the only means by which law has been employed to legitimize terrorism. Another approach has been to secure for terrorism a legal status that obscures or denies its fundamentally criminal nature. The laws of war mark the line between what is criminal and what is an act of combat. A person who kills someone is normally guilty of homicide. If he does it during combat, however, he is a soldier and can only be held as a prisoner of war, and may be punished only if the killing violates the laws of war. Radical groups responsible for terrorist acts have long sought legitimacy by securing recognition as combatants under the laws of war.

The effort of radical groups to acquire legal legitimacy had a significant success in the Geneva Diplomatic Conference on the Reaffirmation of International Humanitarian Law Applicable in Armed Conflict, which met between 1974 and 1977. The conference, under the auspices of the International Committee for the Red Cross (ICRC), was called to improve the laws of war set forth in the Geneva conventions of 1949. It produced two additional protocols to the Geneva conventions: Protocol I dealing with international, and Protocol II with non-international, armed conflict. The United States participated in the Geneva conference and signed the protocols, but the President has decided not to seek Senate ratification of Protocol I, and has decided to seek several reservations and understandings as conditions to the ratification of Protocol II.

The ICRC and the conference developed many constructive ideas to help minimize the suffering of combatants and noncombatants in armed conflict. But from the beginning of the conference, an effort was made to extend the law of international armed conflicts to cover activities of the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) and other radical groups, many of whom were accorded observer status.

The first substantive address, by then-President Moktar Ould

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Daddah of Mauritania, urged the conference to recognize "certain values and elementary rights which went beyond the Universal Declaration of Human Rights," because millions were "still under colonial oppression in the African continent, while international Zionism had placed the Palestinian population in an impossible situation." He asked the conference to consider, not only effects, but causes as well, and to recognize "there were such things as just wars." Daddah said, "It was quite obvious that it was the Zionists who wanted to throw the Arabs into the sea. . . . National liberation movements did not want to shed blood, only to secure recognition of their rights."

The Geneva diplomatic conference adopted in its first session what is now Article 1(4) of Protocol I, with 11 of 99 nations, including the United States, abstaining, and only Israel dissenting. This article would make the laws of international armed conflict applicable to "armed conflicts in which peoples are fighting against colonial domination and alien occupation and against racist regimes in the exercise of the right of self-determination." Never before has the applicability of the laws of war been made to turn on the purported aims of a conflict. Moreover, this provision obliterated the traditional distinction between international and non-international armed conflict. Any group within a national boundary claiming to be fighting against colonial domination, alien occupation or a racist regime can now argue that it is protected by the laws of war, and that its members are entitled to prisoner-of-war status for their otherwise criminal acts. Members of radical groups in the United States have already tried to do so in federal courts.

The ICRC and most Western nations expressed no admiration for this article. Some contend, however, that as a result of the new rule humanitarian law now governs the actions of national liberation groups. While the PLO and other "freedom fighters" may now claim the benefits of the laws of war, they thereby became bound to obey these rules. This, in some eyes, is seen as an advance for humanitarian law.

In fact, radical groups rarely have the resources and facilities to provide the protections for prisoners of war required by the laws of war. Even if they had the resources, these groups have no inclination to provide such protections, or to abide by the law's limitations on the actions they may take, particularly against noncombatants. In fact, the supporters of Article 1(4), no doubt recognizing that the PLO and some other "freedom fighters" have concentrated their guns, bombs and rockets on

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civilian noncombatants, obtained an additional protection for these groups. Article 44(1) provides that, once a group qualifies as a national liberation movement, protected by Article 1(4), no conduct by individual members of the group can lead to the loss of its status as a protected organization. The rationale for this rule is that individuals should be punished separately for their conduct. The effect is to preserve the right of such organizations to be treated as combatants, even if they routinely engage in acts of terror against civilians.

The Geneva diplomatic conference went even further in accommodating the needs of radical groups, at the expense of the civilian population that humanitarian law is intended to protect. A fundamental premise of the Geneva conventions is that, to earn the right to protection as military fighters, soldiers must distinguish themselves from civilians by wearing uniforms and carrying their weapons openly. Thus, under the 1949 Geneva Convention on Prisoners of War, irregular forces achieve combatant (and, if captured, prisoner-of-war) status when they (1) are commanded by a person responsible for subordinates, (2) bear a fixed, distinctive insignia recognizable from a distance, (3) carry weapons openly, and (4) conduct their operations in accordance with the laws and customs of war. Fighters who attempt to take advantage of civilians by hiding among them in civilian dress, with their weapons out of view, lose their claim to be treated as soldiers. The law thus attempts to encourage fighters to avoid placing civilians in unconscionable jeopardy.

The terrorist groups that attended the conference had no intention of modifying their conduct to satisfy these traditional rules of engagement. Terrorists are not soldiers. They don't wear uniforms. They hide among civilians and, after striking, they try to escape once again into civilian groups. Instead of modifying their conduct, therefore, the terrorist groups succeeded in modifying the law.

Article 44(3) of Protocol I recognizes that "to promote the protection of the civilian population from the effects of hostilities, combatants are obliged to distinguish themselves from the civilian population while they are engaged in an attack or in a military operation preparatory to an attack." But the provision goes on to state "that there are situations in armed conflicts where, owing to the nature of the hostilities, an armed combatant cannot so distinguish himself." In such situations, "he shall retain his status as a combatant, provided . . . he

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carries his arms openly: (a) during each military engagement, and (b) during such time as he is visible to the adversary while he is engaged in a military deployment preceding the launching of an attack in which he is to participate." Furthermore, the section provides that "acts which comply with the requirements of this paragraph shall not be considered as perfidious"—for example, feigning protected status prior to a military engagement by using signs, emblems or uniforms of the United Nations, or nations that are not parties to the conflict.

These changes in traditional rules undermine the notion that the protocol has secured an advantage for humanitarian law by granting revolutionary groups protection as combatants. Under the Geneva conventions, a terrorist could not hide among civilians until just before an attack. Under Protocol I, he may do so; he need only carry his arms openly while he is visibly engaged in a deployment or while he is in an actual engagement.

These changes have more than merely symbolic significance. The radical groups represented at the conference lobbied hard for them and succeeded. After the vote on Protocol I, the PLO's representative "expressed his deep satisfaction at the result of the vote, by which the international community had reconfirmed the legitimacy of the struggles of peoples exercising their right to self-determination." He then specifically cited Article 1(4) as authority for the PLO's actions in Israel.

VII

Protocol I's recognition of wars of national liberation recently received rhetorical and symbolic reinforcement in what one would have thought was a most unlikely place: the U.N. Convention Against the Taking of Hostages. The convention, adopted by the General Assembly in 1979, makes criminal the taking of hostages, requires nations to enact implementing legislation, and imposes an extradite-or-prosecute obligation. Nearly 30 countries, including the United States, are currently parties to the convention. One extraordinary provision *precludes* extradition where the suspect is likely to be unfairly treated, thus providing a ready excuse for refusing to extradite. But the obligation to prosecute remains. On the whole, the convention establishes a useful scheme for combating hostage-taking by terrorists, a goal that the U.N. Security Council reaffirmed on December 18, 1985, by the adoption of a reso-

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lution condemning unequivocally all acts of hostage-taking and abduction.

A review of the negotiating history of the Convention Against the Taking of Hostages, however, reveals the deep division over the propriety of terrorist acts. The negotiations began in 1977 and were completed in 1979. At the outset, a number of countries sought to exclude from the convention hostage-taking by national liberation movements. Some states, including Libya, went further and sought not only to exempt such movements, but to define hostage-taking to include the act of subjecting persons to colonialism, racism or foreign domination. In other words, all the people living in a country determined to have a racist government would be deemed to be hostages, and the government to be a hostage-taker.

These radical proposals were eventually rejected during the 1979 session. Advocates of political violence did, however, win a significant victory. The nations that opposed excluding liberation movements from the coverage of the convention were required to accept a reference, in Protocol I to the 1949 Geneva conventions, to the treatment of national liberation fighters as combatants. This reaffirmation took the form of Article 12 of the hostage-taking convention, which provides that, to the extent the 1949 Geneva conventions and the 1977 additional protocols impose substantively identical obligations with regard to an instance of hostage-taking, the hostage-taking convention will not apply to the armed conflicts ("in which peoples are fighting against colonial domination and alien occupation and against racist regimes in the exercise of the right of self-determination") specified in Article 1(4) of Protocol I.

Article 12 of the hostage-taking convention does not, in my view, create a legal gap in coverage. All instances of hostage-taking remain subject to an obligation by the state in which a hostage-taker is found either to extradite or to prosecute. Nevertheless, the states that sought this provision succeeded in using the hostage-taking convention to achieve a rhetorical and political victory. They can now argue that the structure and language of Article 12 represent some measure of acceptance that members of national liberation movements are combatants, not terrorists, since hostage-taking by such movements are covered by the laws of war and excluded from the convention. The delegate from Yugoslavia, for instance, expressed the view that the committee considering the convention had,

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by its action, "reaffirmed . . . that the struggle of the liberation movements was legal, that it was based on provisions of international law of war and that it could not be confused with the criminal activity of irresponsible persons and terrorist groups and organizations."

It is comically bizarre to suggest, as Article 12 requires in specified circumstances, that persons like Abu Abbas must be treated as wayward soldiers, rather than as international criminals. That the laws of war and the laws against hostage-taking have been structured to permit that result reflects the strength of influence terrorist organizations and their supporters now wield in international law.

VIII

Not all diplomatic efforts to quell terrorism have been as negative as the foregoing. For example, the 1973 Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of Crimes Against Internationally Protected Persons, Including Diplomatic Agents, is generally considered a successful negotiation by the West. It is interesting, however, to examine the manner in which certain countries, after failing to change the text of this convention, managed nonetheless to obtain concessions that serve their purpose of circumventing its clear and absolute obligations.

In 1973 the U.N. General Assembly adopted the protected persons convention, and over 60 nations are currently parties, including the United States. The convention defines a class of internationally protected persons, and requires governments to make criminal certain violent acts directed against such persons or their property, and to extradite or prosecute suspected offenders found in their territory. The convention text is non-polemical, and its coverage is relatively comprehensive—not surprising when one realizes that it was drafted, negotiated and adopted by its principal beneficiaries: diplomats.

What is surprising, however, is how close the negotiations came to being derailed, and the lack of underlying consensus that the discussions reflect.

The Sixth Committee of the United Nations began considering the draft version of the protected persons convention on October 4, 1973. On November 15, when agreement had been reached on the majority of the provisions, the delegate from Mali, on behalf of a group of 36 countries, introduced a proposed additional article that caught many other delegations by surprise. The article would have made the protected persons

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convention inapplicable to "peoples struggling against colonialism, alien domination, foreign occupation, racial discrimination and apartheid in the exercise of their legitimate rights to self-determination and independence." The Mali delegate, stating a theme repeated by others, claimed the article was needed to prevent the convention from "serving as a pretext for colonial and racist regimes to intensify the suppression of the national liberation movements recognized in various United Nations decisions and resolutions." The delegate from Morocco said his delegation could not favor a convention that would protect the governmental agents of certain states "against all risks." The brutal truth is that, by implication, the proposed article advocates that the right of self-determination include the right to commit violent acts against diplomats.

This position was unacceptable to the United States as well as others. It was eventually rejected after intensive behind-the-scenes negotiations between November 15 and December 6, but on a basis that cast a pall over the exercise. The United States acquiesced in a Sixth Committee recommendation to the General Assembly that it adopt, along with the draft convention, a resolution recognizing that nothing in the protected persons convention could "in any way prejudice the exercise of the legitimate right to self-determination and independence . . . by peoples struggling against colonization, alien domination, foreign occupation, racial discrimination and apartheid." In addition, Paragraph 6 of the resolution declared "that the present resolution, whose provisions are related to the amended Convention, shall always be published together with it." While these provisions cannot be considered law, they are a clear indication of what many governments believe, and of the muscle those states were able to bring to bear in getting the resolution adopted as part of a package deal.

This put the United States on notice that, in the future, other governments may rely on the resolution to circumvent the absolute obligations of the protected persons convention itself. In fact, Burundi's accession to the convention reserved the right not to apply its terms to national liberation movements, and Iraq indicated when it acceded that it intended to accord protected status to the representatives of certain national liberation movements. In short, even so seemingly neutral an issue as the protection of diplomats failed to escape the political divisiveness that pervades the world community on questions of the appropriate use of violence.

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IX

The law's support for political violence has been manifested most recently in the efforts of some nations to establish doctrinal bases for curtailing the use of force against terrorists and their supporting states.

International law regulates the use of force by a country in the territories of other states, whether to capture or attack terrorists or to rescue hostages located there, or against the states themselves for sponsoring terrorists or conspiring with them in specific terrorist activities. In general, a nation may *not* enter upon another's territory without its consent. Similarly, a state may not stop, board, divert or otherwise interfere with another's vessels or aircraft without some adequate basis. Finally, the use of force against another country's territorial integrity or political independence is prohibited, except in self-defense, and any use of force must be both necessary and proportionate to the threat it addresses.

These principles have been respected by the United States. If they were applied, however, in such a manner as to preclude any use of force for any purpose, international law would serve to insulate the perpetrators of international violence from any control or punishment for their crimes. States could then continue using terrorism to accomplish their objectives with little cost or interference.

The principle of territorial sovereignty is not the only principle of law that must be weighed in considering objections against attacks on terrorists, attempts to rescue hostages and actions against countries that sponsor terrorism. States have duties to cooperate in preventing terrorists from using their territories in perpetrating criminal acts, and many governments have explicitly undertaken to extradite or prosecute terrorists guilty of hijacking, sabotage and hostage-taking. These obligations cannot be disregarded in evaluating the propriety of antiterrorist operations. Furthermore, under the U.N. Charter, just as under customary international law, victims of terrorism are not powerless to defend themselves. The charter reaffirms the *inherent* right to use force in individual or collective self-defense against armed attack.

Since the days of President James Madison, the United States has repeatedly acted against armed bands that attacked Americans and then fled, seeking sanctuary in neighboring countries unwilling or powerless to prevent or punish their acts. With

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the acquiescence of the harboring state, as in the case of U.S. operations in Mexico against Pancho Villa's terrorist attacks in the early part of this century, or without such permission, as in the case of Andrew Jackson's actions to stop attacks from Spanish Florida, the United States has used its forces to bring an end to terrorist attacks on American citizens and interests.

Other nations, when confronted with terrorist attacks, have defended themselves with force. In the celebrated case of the *Caroline*, the British pushed over Niagara Falls a ship carrying some members of an armed band of New Yorkers that was in the process of supporting an insurrection in Canada. While the American government thought the British had acted too harshly, both governments agreed on the law: the use of force in self-defense is appropriate so long as it is necessary and proportional. The International Court of Justice recognized this principle in the *Corfu Channel* case, where Britain had swept mines from the channel after suffering damage to its ships. In holding Albania liable for the damages, the court reaffirmed the "well-recognized" principle that every country has an obligation "not to allow knowingly its territory to be used for acts contrary to the rights of other States."

As Secretary of State George Shultz has said, in the fight against terrorism as in the struggle to deter aggression:

> The law is a weapon on our side and it is up to us to use it to its maximum extent. . . . [A] state which supports terrorist or subversive attacks against another state, or which supports or encourages terrorist planning and other activities within its own territory, is responsible for such attacks. Such conduct can amount to an ongoing armed aggression against the other state under international law.

Some public officials and international law experts have questioned the premise that harboring and supporting terrorists who attack a nation is a form of aggression. Others suggest that force may not be used against a government that sponsors terrorist acts. The United States has never accepted such a paralyzing view of the right to act in self-defense. Strong legal support exists for the U.S. position on these issues, as reflected in universally recognized principles of conspiracy and agency law and in several U.N. resolutions, including the Friendly Relations Declaration and the U.N. Definition of Aggression. Here, as in other areas, states and individuals opposed to U.S. policies, or to the use of force in general, are invoking law as a mask for their political interests.

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The U.S. bombing raid launched against Libya on April 14, 1986, illustrated the need nations sometimes have to use force against states that sponsor terrorism. After terrorists from the Abu Nidal group attacked passengers in Rome and Vienna on December 27, 1985, killing 19 civilians, including five Americans, President Reagan clearly signaled the United States' intent to rely upon its right of self-defense. He said:

> By providing material support to terrorist groups which attack U.S. citizens, Libya has engaged in armed aggression against the United States under established principles of international law, just as if he [Libyan leader Muammar al-Qaddafi] had used its own armed forces.

Despite this clear warning, Libya deliberately arranged for at least two attacks aimed at American noncombatants and U.S. interests. One plan was to fire automatic rifles and hurl grenades at civilians lined up at the U.S. embassy in Paris. French cooperation enabled the United States to thwart this plan, and several Libyans involved were deported. The United States was not so fortunate in West Berlin. Libyans at their people's bureau (embassy) in East Germany informed their home base that a planned attack would take place on April 5. A bomb exploded at a discothèque frequented by U.S. soldiers, killing Sergeant Kenneth T. Ford and a Turkish woman, and injuring over 200 persons, including 50 Americans. Shortly thereafter, on April 6, the same people's bureau informed Tripoli of the successful attack, and assured Tripoli that the bombing could not be traced to Libya.

These communications, following Qaddafi's long history of support for terrorism, and his threats against U.S. citizens, established overwhelmingly that Libya was responsible for the attack. In addition, the President was faced with strong evidence of some 30 possible impending Libyan attacks on U.S. facilities and personnel throughout the world. The April 14 strikes were to deter these and other planned attacks.

Some governments have condemned the action against Libya, claiming to disbelieve U.S. claims that Libya attacked American citizens and was planning further attacks. Others have ignored U.S. claims, and simply characterize Reagan Administration actions as "criminal" or "brutal." They oppose the use of force, even in self-defense. But no cogent argument has been made questioning the legal principles upon which the United States has relied. A resolution condemning the United

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States was vetoed by the United States, France and the United Kingdom in the Security Council on April 21. Its adoption would have given state-sponsored terrorism its ultimate legal defense, immunizing international aggression against noncombatants from the use of force in self-defense.

Law can make clear that state-supported terrorism is illicit, and may thus serve to deter it. But terrorist-supporting nations will not surrender seriously held ambitions to expand their power and influence simply because the law is against them. Legal argument alone will not protect law-abiding nations and peoples against Qaddafi or Iran's Khomeini. Nor will the prospect for peaceful settlement of disputes with such regimes be enhanced by U.S. promises to abjure force or by unrealistic limits on its flexibility. If Americans overestimate the limits of their own tolerance, they may allow U.S. adversaries to do so as well, thereby inviting reckless activity. The policeman is apt protection against individual criminals; but national self-defense is the only protection against the criminal state.

X

The law, as presently formulated, cannot reasonably be expected effectively to repress international terrorism. International terrorism is still supported by many nations as a legitimate means of struggle against regimes deemed by them to be colonial, alien or racist. At the behest of these states, and by the acquiescence of others, international law has been systematically and intentionally fashioned to give special treatment to, or to leave unregulated, those activities that cause and are the source of most acts of international terror.

The failure of international law to control terrorism is a matter of great strategic concern. Ineffective methods for dealing with terrorists through the law will inevitably lead to antiterrorist actions more primitive and dangerous than cooperation among sovereign states, including conventional military actions in self-defense, will provide. These dangers are especially heightened with terrorism that is state-supported.

Civilized nations and peoples cannot give up on law, however frustrated they may feel by its shortcomings. In fact, the point of this essay is that law is not presently being used to counter terrorism; it has been placed very much at the service of those who embrace political violence. Our challenge is to create a broader understanding among peoples and governments to bring about a shift in the objects that international law is designed to serve.

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Geoffrey Smith

THE BRITISH SCENE

For more than a quarter of a century, at least since the failure of the Suez Canal venture in 1956, Britain has been preoccupied with a sense of its national decline. To some extent the country's demise as a world power was inevitable. Britain was bound to divest itself of its empire; to have attempted to hang on against all the forces of history would have been a far worse course. Nor could Britain possibly have maintained the almost equal partnership with the United States that it thought it enjoyed when the two countries found themselves fighting side by side in the Second World War.

That such a transformation in international status has had a disorienting effect is hardly surprising. When Dean Acheson, secretary of state under President Truman, remarked in 1962 that "Britain has lost an empire and not found a role," British susceptibilities were hurt to the quick. To be attacked unfairly is one thing; to be told the unpleasant truth by an old friend is much more painful.

This fall in prestige and world power was accompanied by a drop in Britain's relative economic performance, a deterioration partially masked by a rise in absolute living standards for most of the period. Most British people, nevertheless, are uneasily aware that other countries have been doing much better. A quarter of a century ago Britain still had one of the highest standards of living in the world; now it is one of the poorer members of the European Community.

From time to time elegant arguments are constructed to suggest that the British really prefer things this way, that lower material rewards are the price for the idyllic British way of life.[1] They may be. But they are not a price that the British are happy about paying. Everything of consequence that has happened in British politics in recent years—Thatcherism, the Labour Party's lurch to the left, the birth of the Social Democratic Party, public fervor in the Falklands War, the defeat of

[1] This case was presented most powerfully by Bernard Nossiter in *Britain: A Future That Works*, Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1978.

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the 1984–85 coal miners' strike, the Westland controversy and the British Leyland fiasco—has to be seen against the background of frustration at national decline and poor economic performance. The British may have ceased to achieve, but they have not become content to fail.

II

If they were, Margaret Thatcher would never have been elected prime minister. The essence of Thatcherism, even more than its attachment to any particular political principle or economic dogma, is an instinctive resistance to national decline. Mrs. Thatcher's behavior presents a curious mixture of spirit, realism, tantrums and not infrequent errors of political judgment—but above all of spirit. She is determined that Britain should not lapse into mediocrity with graceful gentility.

Her fundamental purpose has therefore been to break away from what she judged to be the failed policies of all previous postwar governments, whether Labour or Conservative. With the sole exception of the first two years of Edward Heath's Conservative government from 1970 to 1972 (which thereafter turned full circle), all had accepted the consensus established by the Labour government of Clement Attlee immediately after the war, from 1945 to 1951.

The essential elements of this consensus were a large public sector, with most of the basic industries and services under public ownership; an extensive welfare state, with a comprehensive national health service and social insurance system; high taxation to pay for these and other benefits; respect approaching awe for the power of the trade unions; and, not least, a belief in interventionist government. Where there was a problem it was up to government to provide an answer.

Prime Minister Thatcher came to office in 1979 with the intention of reversing each of these trends. She wanted to reduce the role of the state, to return as many industries as possible to private ownership, to cut public spending, to curb the power of the unions and—to use a phrase to which she is much attached—to make people stand on their own feet.

In pursuing such a strategy she was taking the Conservative Party sharply to the right and vacating the political middle ground, in defiance of the conventional wisdom that had dominated British politics for many years. It is on the middle ground, according to traditional thinking, that elections are won and lost in an essentially two-party system.

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The Labour and Conservative Parties each have a core of loyal supporters. Between them lies the disputed territory occupied by floating voters, less passionate in their politics and more pragmatic in their desires. Conventional belief held that the party that was able to move more effectively into this territory, and so capture most of the floating voters without losing its own, would win the day.

But Mrs. Thatcher showed that it was possible to turn away from the middle ground and still win an election. This encouraged Labour's drift to the left after its defeat in 1979, but it was not the only reason.

Labour could have taken its stand on the middle ground abandoned by the Conservatives. It would have been logical and in the party's best electoral interests to have done so; under James Callaghan the party had practiced centrist policies in office. Why not continue to propound them in opposition?

But these were the policies on which Labour had just plunged to a crushing defeat. They had failed to deliver the required results, so they were discredited within the party as well as among the electorate. There was a fear that if Labour had stuck to that line it would have looked like a party peddling tired policies under tired politicians.

By the time Labour left office in 1979 it had been in government for more than ten of the previous 14 years, with the center-right in the ascendant. The party's leading right-wingers had held high office for much of that time. It was they, therefore, who were blamed for the defeat. Many of them were exhausted and all of them had run out of ideas.

That is a serious matter in a party of the left whose more ardent members expect it to pursue radical policies. They came into politics to change society, not to manage it. The right represented the old approach, the policies that had failed to arrest the comparative national decline, and was unable to offer a new momentum. The Labour right wing had, at that time, neither the appeal nor the spirit to maintain its dominance.

So there was a vacuum within the Labour Party which the far left rushed to fill. In doing so they were able to argue with some plausibility that Mrs. Thatcher had proved that a party could desert the middle ground without condemning itself to electoral defeat.

Labour's swing to the left had some far-reaching consequences. It made it virtually impossible for Labour to win the

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1983 general election. It provoked bitter dissension within the party, partly because of the far left's bullying and undemocratic tactics and partly because a number on the right were not prepared to accept without protest policies which they believed to be nationally damaging and electorally suicidal. Labour's leftward lurch also provided both a motive and an opportunity for some right-wingers to break away altogether. Believing that the battle for moderation was lost within the Labour Party, and seeing the middle ground of British politics unoccupied, they created the Social Democratic Party in March 1981.

The principal leaders of the new party, who became known as the Gang of Four, were Roy Jenkins, David Owen, Shirley Williams and William Rodgers. All of them were former cabinet ministers; Jenkins and Owen had held high office—Jenkins, chancellor of the exchequer and home secretary as well as president of the European Commission in Brussels, and Owen as foreign secretary.

As always on such occasions, there was a mixture of personal and political reasons why some Labour right-wingers went with the new party and some stayed with the old. Different people respond differently to the tug of party loyalty and obligations. Callaghan would no doubt have felt it invidious to have left Labour so soon after being party leader and prime minister. Denis Healey had just been elected deputy leader. There was also a difference of judgment, which has persisted to this day, as to whether the Labour Party was truly a lost cause for people of moderate opinions.

Soon after the SDP was established it came together with the small but long-established Liberal Party to form the Alliance—a strange political entity that is more than a pact but less than a merger. While they remain two separate parties, with their own leaders, they fight elections as if they were a single party and are committed to form a joint government if they win sufficient seats in the House of Commons.

These various developments transformed the British political scene. No longer is it a two-party system. The Alliance would claim that it is now a race among three parties. Perhaps it would be more accurate to describe it as a two-and-a-half party system. While either the Conservatives or Labour are regarded as capable of winning an overall majority of seats, only the most intensely partisan Social Democrat or Liberal believes that there is the slightest chance of the Alliance doing so in the near future.

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Yet the old simplicities have gone. The next election offers other possibilities beyond the familiar choice between a Conservative or Labour government.

The birth of the Alliance offers dissatisfied Conservatives and disillusioned Labour supporters the opportunity of casting a serious vote for a different party without having to go right across to the traditional enemy. The Liberals had long been there, of course, but since the 1920s they were so weak that they were never able to overcome the taunt that a vote for them would be wasted. It is not so easy to make that charge stick against the Alliance that won nearly 26 percent of the total votes cast in 1983, only two percent behind Labour—though the British electoral system puts th rd parties at such a disadvantage that the Alliance captured only 3.5 percent of the seats in the Commons against 32 percent for Labour.

The effect of this new lineup is to make British politics more volatile and prediction more hazardous. British politics used to be noted for the discipline of its parties and the loyalty of its voters. Even before the arrival of the Alliance, that loyalty had been breaking down. The propensity to vote for smaller parties and to switch loyalties between the two main parties had already increased markedly by the late 1970s. But the occurrence of this phenomenon has been increased significantly by the presence of the Alliance.

Within a changing political system the policies of the individual parties have changed as well. For most of the past five years only the Alliance has been able to lay any credible claim to the middle ground. But that is a limited advantage when the territory is still associated with the failed policies of yesterday.

Both the other parties deliberately sought fresh approaches. In the case of Labour the swing to the left was signified at the 1983 general election by the party's program in the critical fields of economic, industrial and defense policy. It did not ask the voters simply to be allowed to continue where Callaghan's Labour government had left off in 1979.

But it is naturally the change in the role of the Conservatives that has had most impact on Britain, because they have been in power for the past seven years. Traditionally they have been a pragmatic party that has prided itself on managerial efficiency. They were the people who knew how to govern. Suspicious of dogma, eager to prevent any fashionable doctrine from being taken too far, they specialized in improving British society but not in transforming it.

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III

Under Prime Minister Thatcher the Conservatives have become a party of radical reform. She has not wanted just to manage the status quo, because she associates it with decline rather than stability. Britain has evidently appeared to her rather like a person sliding slowly downhill with arms and legs bound together. The bonds have to be broken before anything else can be done.

This is what she has been trying to do: free the economy from unnecessary restraint; allow market forces to operate; make industry more competitive; offer greater incentives; make the blood flow in limbs that have been unused for too long. Such a regime must by its nature be uncomfortable—rather in the way that no good football coach offers his team a quiet life. But the relationship works well only when the coach and team are equally motivated.

That is why, no matter how long she remains prime minister, the Falklands War of 1982 will always be seen as her finest hour. It was not only that her nerve withstood the ordeal—a more severe test than is remembered now, for when the naval task force sailed from Portsmouth the success of such an operation 8,000 miles from home was by no means assured—it was also that prime minister and country saw the challenge in the same light and with the same intensity. The Argentine invasion of the islands they call the Malvinas provoked such strength of feeling in Britain because it was interpreted as a challenge to national pride and as an opportunity to prove that Britain was not really in decline. The test was almost welcomed, because it was tangible. At last there was once again a commonly recognized threat and a national purpose.

Against less dramatic challenges, the government's record in arresting national decline has been more mixed. That is so partly because of the difficulty of achieving economic reform in the midst of the world recession that coincided with the government's early years in office, partly because of the innate British resistance to sudden change, and partly because Mrs. Thatcher is an instinctive politician who does not always work out how to give practical effect to the dictates of her instincts.

The government has received most criticism for the record level of unemployment, running, according to the British method of calculation, at 3.2 million or 13.3 percent of the working population. Much of Britain's unemployment can be

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attributed to international conditions, but some of it is also a measure of British industry's failure to compete. Because unemployment has been so high it has been all the more difficult to curb public spending. But that is not the only reason why government expenditure now represents just as high a proportion of the national income as it did when the Conservatives came into office in 1979.

Direct taxation has not been cut by as much as the prime minister would have wished because she has time and again found her cabinet colleagues unwilling to curb public spending sufficiently to do so. They have resisted sometimes from conviction, sometimes to suit their own convenience as departmental ministers, but often because they realiz that public opinion is more concerned with the quality of public services such as schools, hospitals and roads than with paying lower taxes.

If public expenditure had been controlled more stringently, it would have been possible to cut the rates of direct taxation more sharply, while still keeping within the government's targets for public-sector borrowing. Even as things stand, the rates have been cut substantially for the highest taxpayers. In the budget announced in March 1986, Chancellor of the Exchequer Nigel Lawson was also able to announce the second reduction since 1979 in the basic rate of income tax—down altogether from 33 to 29 percent.

But the government has not as yet managed to cut income tax rates as much as it had hoped. This year its plans were destroyed by the collapse of oil prices. The overall effect of lower oil prices may be healthy for the British economy if it prompts sufficient international expansion. But the immediate consequence for an oil-producing country such as Britain is to reduce the government's expected revenue for the coming year by £5 billion or more (approximately $7.5 billion), so as to remove the possibility of the kind of tax concessions that the chancellor had intended. Perhaps his full expectations will be realized at last next year; for the moment the record on direct tax cuts is one of partial achievement and frustrated hope.

The Thatcher record on inflation is also mixed. If one looks at the situation in Britain alone it is a success story: from ten percent when the Conservatives took over in 1979, it rose to 22 percent a year later but was down to 5.5 percent at the end of last year, with the chancellor predicting a further fall to 3.5 percent in 1986. But this is still higher than the rate in most of Britain's principal competitors. West Germans, for example,

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are wondering whether it will be possible, with the fall in oil prices, to bring inflation down below one percent this year.

The rate at which the British economy is now growing compares favorably with that of other countries. In 1985 output rose by 3.5 percent, which was the highest rate of growth in the European Community and higher than in the United States—though such percentages disregard the fact that Britain was expanding from a smaller base. The rate of improvement in productivity is also encouraging. Since 1979 productivity in manufacturing industry has gone up at an annual average rate of 3.5 percent, which has been second only to Japan among the leading industrial nations. Once again, though, one should remember the point from which such comparisons start.

The principal economic achievements of the Thatcher government cannot, however, be measured by such statistics. It is impossible to quantify the effect of changes in structure and attitude, but they can transform the conditions in which industry and commerce are operating. They, therefore, are at the heart of the Thatcher program for national regeneration.

In privatization the government has been even bolder than it initially promised. More than 12 state companies have had 50 percent or more of their shares sold to private ownership—among them such major companies as British Aerospace and British Telecom, as well as specialist manufacturers such as the Jaguar automobile company.

British Gas and British Airways are among those state companies that are expected to be privatized before the next election. It has been calculated that if the government maintains its schedule, the proportion of the gross domestic product provided by state industries will by then have dropped from 10.5 to 6.5 percent.

The criticism that is heard most frequently from those who do not disapprove of privatization on principle is that the government is not increasing the level of competition correspondingly. In the case of British Telecom already, and of British Gas in due course, public monopolies are simply being converted into private monopolies. The same stricture would apply to the British Airports Authority and the water industry.

Yet even a transfer of monopoly ownership from public to private hands may significantly increase the number of individuals holding shares. That was certainly the effect of the British Telecom sale. This accords with another of the prime minister's

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purposes, what she terms "popular capitalism." First the government enabled tenants of municipal housing to buy their property at advantageous prices. Now it is taking various steps to encourage wider share ownership.

With the United States in mind, the government believes that when more people have a stake in the capitalist system there will be more incentive to profit, and Britain will become a more competitive society. But the fruits of such a trend will inevitably take some time to emerge.

IV

More immediate results are evident from the most dramatic change that Mrs. Thatcher has brought about: the diminished power of the trade unions. This has been achieved partly by legislation and partly by defeating the miners' union in the crucial strike that lasted a full year from the spring of 1984.

This victory was of great symbolic as well as practical importance. For at least a decade every British government had run scared of the trade unions in general and the miners in particular. The last Conservative government, under Edward Heath, was brought down by a miners' strike in 1974. One of the principal reasons for Mrs. Thatcher's election victory in 1979 was that the country had been disrupted by a series of industrial disputes under the Callaghan Labour government, during what became known as the Winter of Discontent. Early in 1981, even she had compromised rather than confront the miners.

So when a pitched battle with the miners did at last take place it was seen as a test case of the government's resolve and of union power in the new industrial climate. Even then the government might not have won but for the changes that had been made in the meantime in the law governing trade unions.

These changes required a union to hold secret ballots among its members before it was legally entitled to call them out on strike, and for the election of senior union officials. Restrictions were imposed on picketing during a dispute and on secondary action against anyone not directly involved in a particular industrial conflict. Teeth were given to this legislation by enabling the courts to sequester union funds if the law were violated.

These legal changes and the defeat of the miners have between them gone a long way to shift the balance of power between unions and employers in other industries as well. Given the inhibiting effect that the unions had been exercising

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on managerial initiative, this new trend is an essential step along the path to Britain's economic regeneration.

One of the most critical questions now is whether this trend will last. It could not have developed at all without a new spirit of realism within the unions as well as in the country at large. What nobody at this stage can know for sure is how much of this realism within the unions has been engendered by high unemployment. Will the spirit of moderation last when, as everyone hopes, the level of joblessness is brought down to more acceptable levels?

There certainly is a greater sense of realism in the country now than when Mrs. Thatcher came to power. The change in the tone of public debate has been in some ways her most important though least tangible accomplishment. There is more appreciation of the need for competitive efficiency, for industry to make profits and for money to be earned before it is spent.

There is less patience with abuses of trade union power. The miners had much less public support this time than in their dispute with the Heath government in 1974. Opinion polls on the later occasion consistently showed substantial majority backing for the government, even though there was some impatience toward the end when many people felt that a settlement was being delayed unnecessarily.

V

Altogether, then, we see in Britain a more tough-minded approach. But this does not mean that public opinion has accepted the whole Thatcherite prescription. Nor has there been a full resurgence of national self-confidence. Dramatic demonstration of the doubts that remain came recently in two episodes which in turn dominated British politics for months: the protracted political battles over whether American companies should be allowed to control Westland, the only British-owned helicopter manufacturer, and British Leyland, the last major British-owned automobile manufacturer.

Both disputes aroused such passion because they related to much deeper issues than the ownership of two companies: issues about Britain's place in the world, British industrial vulnerability and the proper relationship between government and industry. Both controversies have been widely interpreted as demonstrating the strength of anti-American sentiment in

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Britain. That is mistaken. They revealed not British dislike of Americans but British fear of American strength.

In a recent opinion poll, as many as 66 percent agreed that they liked Americans, while only 16 percent disagreed. But substantial majorities thought that American influence was too great on British industry, the British economy, defense policy and television. Even British morality was thought to be too much under American influence.[2]

The fear of being overwhelmed by American industrial power was at the heart of the Westland crisis, which provoked the most open running battle between British cabinet ministers within memory and led to the resignation of two of them, Michael Heseltine, secretary of state for defense, and Leon Brittan, secretary of state for trade and industry.

The point at issue was whether Westland should be rescued from the threat of bankruptcy through a substantial minority shareholding by the American company Sikorsky, in association with Fiat of Italy, or by a consortium of purely European companies. The Westland board had itself approached Sikorsky and continued to believe that this deal was the best available commercially. The European consortium, however, was not inspired by simply commercial considerations. The companies—Messerschmitt-Boelkow-Blohm of Germany, Aerospatiale of France, Agusta of Italy, British Aerospace and the British General Electric Company—were persuaded to join by their respective defense ministries, who feared that if American manufacturers once got a foothold in the European helicopter market they would soon be dominating it. In a spirit of self-defense these ministries reached a tentative agreement to coordinate their military helicopter requirements, which would then be met only by helicopters produced and designed in Europe.

This agreement to establish a blatantly protectionist cartel was not confirmed by the British government, and the future of Westland was finally determined in February 1986 with the victory of Sikorsky. On practical grounds the government had chosen the American rather than the European route in a contest that had come to assume a symbolic significance for many people. It represented the conflict that has been taking place within British minds and hearts for the past quarter of a

[2] Conducted by Market and Opinion Research International (MORI) and published in *The Sunday Times* (London), Feb. 23, 1986.

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century between the continental European and the American relationship. One of the principal reasons why Britain is still not quite sure of its role in the world is that it has yet to resolve this conflict or to balance these relationships.

The military helicopter cartel remains the policy, however, of the German, French, Italian, probably the Dutch and possibly the Spanish governments. Although Heseltine overplayed his hand politically as defense secretary when the crisis developed, his argument in support of the European consortium received a good deal of support. It was widely believed that Britain could not stand up to the might of American industry without special defensive measures.

A reasonable argument could be made for regarding Westland as an especially difficult case, because the American market in defense procurement is so highly protected. Free-market forces can hardly be expected to operate in defense procurement within NATO on one side of the Atlantic but not the other.

No such consideration applied, however, in the controversy over the future of British Leyland that came to torment the government almost as soon as the Westland issue had been settled. The government would like to sell BL, which is publicly owned, as part of the privatization program. It therefore opened negotiations with Ford over the automobile section of BL, Austin-Rover, and with General Motors over the other parts of the BL empire, the trucks division and Land Rover.

As soon as these negotiations became public knowledge there was an outcry in which a good many Conservative members of Parliament joined. The Ford negotiations were swiftly terminated. The economic case for a deal with Ford was open to argument because it might have restricted competition in automobile manufacturing within Britain. But that argument was an excuse rather than the real reason for pulling out of the negotiations so abruptly. The negotiations with General Motors also broke down because the government was not prepared to give the company control, or the promise of control, of Land Rover. Deals that the BL board and most informed outside opinion believed were in the best interests of the company and its employees fell through because of public fear of British industry being overrun by the Americans and reduced to the condition of mere "metal-bashers," with design, research and effective control all passing across the Atlantic. So political anxiety triumphed over economic logic.

The episodes were revealing in a number of ways. They

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indicate the defensiveness of spirit that remains one of the weaknesses of Britain even after seven years of Thatcherism: in these instances, the desire to retain British control of a troubled company rather than concentrate on seeking an expanded role in the international market.

VI

Prime Minister Thatcher's personal authority has been damaged. Without the earlier Westland fracas she would probably have managed to drive at least the General Motors negotiation through a reluctant cabinet and party.

Yet only a few weeks later she was prepared to put her authority on the line by giving practical support to the United States in its bombing of Libya. More than any other incident of recent years, this decision and the reaction to it illustrated the ambivalence of Britain's position in the world today.

The British government was not consulted by the Reagan Administration as to whether it would be wise to bomb Tripoli and Benghazi in response to acts of terrorism committed on the instructions of the Libyan regime. Six days before the raid of April 14, Mrs. Thatcher was given a message from President Reagan informing her of the intention and requesting permission for American F-111 bombers based on British soil to be used in the operation. Under the terms of the agreement by which American forces are based in the United Kingdom, British approval was required before these jets could be brought into action.

The prime minister immediately consulted the foreign secretary, Sir Geoffrey Howe, and defense secretary, George Younger. All three of them had initial doubts, which were resolved only after Washington had given full replies to detailed questions on the purpose and method of the operation.

There were political risks involved. Not all members of the British cabinet agreed with the decision when they were informed. British public opinion, as revealed by a succession of opinion polls, was immediately and overwhelmingly critical both of President Reagan's decision to bomb and of Prime Minister Thatcher's decision to cooperate. And Britain was alone among the European allies in supporting President Reagan's mission.

The prime minister and her colleagues gave their approval for three reasons. They knew that the raid would go ahead anyway, and they were persuaded that there would be less loss

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of life if the F-111s carried it out because they were the American bombers most accurate in pinpointing their targets. They felt that Britain had an obligation to the United States for help in the Falklands conflict. But above all they wished to avoid American disillusionment with its ally.

For the British government the choice was not so much about Libya as about its special relationship with the United States and the cohesion of the Atlantic alliance. Once again when it came to the point, Britain was more prepared than any of the other European allies to take the American line. It was an act of solidarity and an acknowledgement of an alliance that means more to Britain than to any other European country.

But the criticism and resentment within Britain at being drawn along in the slipstream of the United States suggest that it cannot be taken for granted that Britain will always prefer the Atlantic to the European connection. In taking her decision, Mrs. Thatcher was hazarding her authority at home.

At the 1983 general election her authority was a major asset for the Conservatives. It does not look like being so at the next election, which must be held by June 1988 at the latest. She remains a formidable politician and the sheer force of her personality may be decisive when the time comes. But she would by then have been prime minister for nine years, more than long enough for a modern electorate to tire of its leader.

She will be challenged by a younger and personally attractive Labour leader, Neil Kinnock, who replaced Michael Foot and has shown courage in standing up to the far left. He has been trying to bring most of his party's policies back toward the mainstream of British politics. Beneath the surface Labour remains deeply and bitterly divided, but the leadership has been adjusting its style as well as its policies so as to make the party appear less threatening. Thus, it will be harder at the next election for the Conservatives to frighten the electorate with the prospect of a Labour victory. The Alliance also has young and personable leaders in David Owen of the Social Democrats and David Steel of the Liberals. They have an obvious appeal for wavering Conservatives. The government's vulnerability was demonstrated dramatically in early May when the Conservatives lost one safe seat in a parliamentary by-election, almost lost another, and did badly in local government elections.

All of this explains why it is difficult at this stage to predict the outcome of the next election; it by no means guarantees

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that the Conservatives will lose. They seem in many ways likely to be fighting the election against a favorable background.

If the drop in oil prices leads to two or three years of international economic expansion, the British economy will continue to grow and unemployment might fall. The increasing anxiety about violent crime should be helpful to a Conservative government because few people believe that Labour would be tougher on law and order issues. The Conservatives remain the most convincing on defense, where their general approach is most closely in touch with public opinion. Above all, the Conservatives still appear to be the party most determined to resist the decline of Britain.

Against these considerations must be set the boredom factor that attends the longevity of Mrs. Thatcher's government and a political insensitivity that has characterized that government's second term. Its sense of strategy is better than its sense of tactics. It seems more likely to be defeated by time or by itself than by the positive merits of its opponents.

What would a change of government mean for the Atlantic alliance and for Britain's place in the world? Any alternative government would keep Britain in NATO; that is the declared policy of both Labour and the Alliance. But there is a serious risk that a Labour government might pursue defense policies that would undermine NATO, and continuing uncertainty as to precisely what defense policy the Alliance would practice if it were in office.

It is the government's policy to maintain an independent British strategic nuclear deterrent. To keep this at an effective level, that is, capable not of winning a nuclear war with the Soviet Union but of inflicting an unacceptable degree of damage upon its territory, the government intends to replace the present force of Polaris submarines in the mid-1990s with four submarines equipped with the Trident II D-5 missile system. The submarines are to be built in Britain and the missile system purchased from the United States.

This policy would not be pursued if Labour were to be returned to office. Defense is the one field where Mr. Kinnock has been making no effort to pull Labour back toward the center. He is a true believer in unilateral nuclear disarmament; it is Labour policy to abandon the British nuclear deterrent, scrap the Trident submarine program, decommission Polaris, get rid of cruise missiles from British soil and negotiate the withdrawal of American nuclear bases.

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Most members of a Labour cabinet would be unhappy about closing American nuclear bases and giving up Polaris immediately, regardless of whether any concession could be obtained from the Soviet Union in return. Already Denis Healey, who would probably be Labour's foreign secretary, has shown much ingenuity and subtlety in seeking to reinterpret these commitments. So there is always the possibility that a Labour government would not actually carry out the defense policy on which it was elected. It would not be the first time. Labour was elected in 1964 with a commitment to abandon Britain's independent nuclear deterrent which, of course, it did not do. But there must be the risk that this time a Labour government would do what it said, and the very threat would inevitably create tensions within NATO.

The defense policy of the Social Democratic and Liberal Alliance is still more difficult to predict because this is the area in which there has been most disagreement between the two parties. Officially they both want to stop the Trident program. But the Social Democrats wish to keep an independent deterrent and would regard Trident as negotiable if they were forming a coalition government with the Conservatives. The Social Democrats would keep cruise missiles in Britain—though they would prefer dual British and American control of them—while the Liberals are deeply divided on the issue. In general the Social Democrats are the more robust of the two on defense, so much might depend on which party was stronger within the Alliance in the next Parliament.

No other British government would be as dependable a NATO partner as the present one. Probably no other would be so close to the United States. None would take Britain out of the European Community; an Alliance government would make Britain a more enthusiastic member than it is now, and Labour less enthusiastic. What will be at stake in the next election will not be British membership in any alliance or international grouping, but British strength and zeal.

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Daniel Pipes

FUNDAMENTALIST MUSLIMS BETWEEN AMERICA AND RUSSIA

> America is worse than Britain; Britain is worse than America. The Soviet Union is worse than both of them. They are all worse and more unclean than each other! But today it is America that we are concerned with.
>
> —Ayatollah Khomeini, October 1964[1]

When President Reagan and General Secretary Mikhail Gorbachev met in Geneva last November, the fundamentalist Muslim rulers of Iran devised their own interpretation of the summit conference. "The biggest worry of the two superpowers," Radio Teheran announced, "is neither the 'star wars' nor the speedy buildup of nuclear weapons, but the revolutionary uprising of the world's Muslims and the oppressed." Iran's President Sayed Ali Khamenei asserted that the two leaders, fearful of revolutionary Islamic ideology and the disturbing effect it has across the Third World, met to figure out "how to confront Islam."[2]

The rulers of Iran are convinced that the United States and the Soviet Union conspire together to keep Third World peoples in line. President Khamenei believes that the superpowers have already divided the world between them and disagree only on the exact disposition of territories. The summit, in this view, provided a convenient occasion for them to negotiate their small differences.

Muslim fundamentalists offer a most peculiar interpretation of superpower relationships, derived from an awareness of what many in the West overlook: cultural similarities between the United States and the Soviet Union far outweigh the differences between them. By looking beyond political disagreements, fundamentalist Muslims see how much the two

[1] Imam Khomeini, *Islam and Revolution*, trans. Hamid Algar, Berkeley, Calif.: Mizan Press, 1981, p. 185

[2] Radio Teheran, Nov. 17, 1985; Islamic Republic News Agency, Nov. 17, 1985.

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share. If American and Soviet citizens alike have difficulty recognizing themselves—or, for that matter, each other—as they are portrayed by fundamentalist Muslims, this eccentric assessment motivates a significant body of opinion through the Muslim world.

One might expect the fundamentalists' views to imply equal antipathy to the two superpowers. But this is not the case: even a cursory review of their news reports, commentaries, speeches and sermons reveals a preoccupation with America that borders on the obsessive. Although a good word is rarely said about the Soviet Union, neither is much said that is negative; it receives but a small fraction of the hatred and venom directed at the United States.

If the two superpowers hatch joint conspiracies and work together to oppress the Third World, why this imbalance? If the two states are so similar, why does America attract so much more abuse? Is there anything the United States can do to direct more of the fundamentalist hostility toward the Soviet Union?

II

From the point of view of culture, the differences between the United States and the Soviet Union have only secondary importance in the eyes of fundamentalists. (For simplicity, "the United States" here includes America and its allies; "the Soviet Union" includes the entire Soviet bloc.) Knowledgeable Muslims note that both cultures inherited the legacies of Greece, Rome, Christianity, Humanism, the Enlightenment and nineteenth-century rationalism. They recognize the common European origins of American liberalism and Soviet Marxism.

The two Western cultures are alike—and different from Islam—in many ways. Men wear pants, women wear skirts, and everyone sits on chairs. The intelligentsia in both countries listen to the same classical music, attend the same plays and admire the same oil paintings. Of special importance is the similarity in customs relating to the sexes—all of them rejected by fundamentalist Muslims: female athletics, coeducation, female employment, mixed social life, mixed swimming, dancing, dating, nightclubs, and so on.

Both powers are perceived as having similar plans for imperial expansion, continuing the scramble for colonies among the European states a century ago. "Before, it was the British that brought us misfortune," says Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini;

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"now it is the Soviets on the one hand, and the Americans on the other."[3] American and Soviet forces exist for the same purposes; their tanks, ships, planes and missiles look the same. Thus, the multinational peacekeeping force maintained in Lebanon from 1982 to 1984 was seen as an army of occupation no less than the Soviet troops in Afghanistan. The United States Central Command, established in 1983 to deter Soviet attacks in the Persian Gulf, looks to Muslim fundamentalists like mere camouflage for putting the instruments of American military expansion in place.

Arguments between the two powers over freedom, equality, democracy and so on have little relevance to fundamentalist Muslims. As an Egyptian member of the Muslim Brethren commented to me in 1971, "Capitalism and Communism are not our concern; let the Christians fight these matters out on their own." The superpowers appear to share the belief that Western civilization is superior to all others, and fundamentalists sense strong elements of anti-Muslim sentiment among Americans and Russians alike. It hardly matters, therefore, who wins the superpower contest, for both sides aim to destroy Islamic culture and end Muslim independence. Ideally, the two giants will turn against each other and mutually exhaust themselves, thereby posing less of a threat to other peoples.

Fundamentalists rejoice in being the objects of superpower hostility, regarding this as proof of their independence. They argue that Muslims should avoid close cooperation with either power: no economic concessions, political deals or intelligence agents, much less foreign soldiers or bases, should be permitted to compromise the Islamic identity. Umar at-Talmasani, an Egyptian fundamentalist, advises Muslims to "give up the United States and Russia and gird your loins. . . . We condemn the U.S. and Russian attitudes to us and we will reject, resist, and use every means to preserve our rights."[4] Iran's negative neutrality is summed up by the oft-repeated slogan, "Neither East nor West."

As Talmasani implies, violence is a legitimate tactic for preventing close relations with either superpower. Fundamentalist Muslims overthrew the shah's pro-Western government in Iran, then held American diplomats hostage for over a year. They assassinated Anwar al-Sadat in Egypt for his close ties to

[3] Khomeini, *op. cit.*, p. 221.
[4] Umar at-Talmasani, *Ash-Shab* (Cairo), July 9, 1985.

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the United States. The Soviet Union also feels fundamentalist opposition. Many of the mujahadeen troops battling the Soviet forces in Afghanistan are fundamentalist inspired. Former President Jafar al-Numeiri of the Sudan applied the Islamic law while persecuting Sudanese communists, sparring with Soviet friends such as Ethiopia and Libya, and reducing relations with Moscow to a minimum. Syrian fundamentalists mounted a campaign of assassinations against Soviet personnel in Syria during 1979–80. Fundamentalists in Lebanon took four Soviet diplomats hostage in 1985, killing one of them.

Fundamentalists monitor closely the relative strengths of the Soviet Union and the United States in any given time and place, and respond accordingly. The greater its military, economic and cultural presence, the more the superpower attracts the brunt of fundamentalist hostility. The fundamentalists' approach appears evenhanded: they opposed the Soviet presence in Egypt before 1973 as they opposed the American presence thereafter. Saudi relations with the United States are condemned just as those between Libya and the Soviet Union. Even when a superpower helps Muslims in wars against non-Muslims, fundamentalists suspect its motives. Soviet aid to the Arab struggle against Israel and American aid to the Afghan rebels are seen with suspicion: the two powers, pursuing their own struggle, are only exploiting Muslims.

III

Fundamentalist Muslims base their views on public and private life, indeed their entire existence, on the sacred law of Islam, the Shari'a. This massive body of regulations, drawn from precepts found in the Koran and other Islamic writings, covers everything from the most public aspects of life—a penal code based on corporal punishment, taxes in accordance with Koranic levies, second-class citizenship for non-Muslims living under Muslim rule—to the most intimate, such as personal hygiene and sexual relations.

Full implementation of this law has always eluded Muslims, and the disparity between its norms and the realities of public life has brought schism. Traditionalists accepted this disparity; their flexibility does much to make Islam an immensely appealing religion to peoples of many backgrounds. Then, over the past century or so, secularists have come to believe that success in the modern world requires discarding anything that stands in the way of emulating the West. Reformist Muslims

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have tried to interpret the Shari'a in such a way that its precepts could be made compatible with Western ways.

Fundamentalists, however, became convinced that the law of Islam can and must be implemented in its every detail. For them, the exact fulfillment of God's commands in the Shari'a is a duty incumbent on all believers, as well as the Muslims' principal source of strength. The law is as valid today, they insist, as in past centuries. Fundamentalist Muslims contrast the splendor of medieval Islamic civilization with the backwardness and poverty of twentieth-century Muslims, and blame this degeneration on the influences from Europe.

Although the fundamentalist outlook has existed in Islam since the seventh century, and even gained some early political successes, it became a powerful force only in the 1920s. While modern Muslim elites typically respond to encounters with Europe by experimenting with secularism and reformism, the masses prefer fundamentalism. Fundamentalism offers them an instrument with which to fend off frightening European influences and preserve accustomed ways. Hashemi Rafsanjani, speaker of the Iranian parliament, has stated what every fundamentalist believes: "Islam is important because it is capable of defeating Western culture."[5]

Although fundamentalists think they are returning to well-established ways and recreating an ancient way of life, in fact they espouse a radical program that has little precedent. While a fundamentalist like Ayatollah Khomeini is often seen as "medieval," he is actually unlike anyone who lived in past centuries. He responds to the specific challenges of the twentieth century with modern solutions, such as placing theologians in positions of political power and imposing an Islamic economy. To view Khomeini as medieval is to misunderstand how profoundly he is a creature of his time.

If secular and reformist Muslims, experimenting with a diversity of political viewpoints, may feel attracted to one or another of the superpowers, fundamentalists are fervent in their hostility to both, as well as to all Western ideologies.

As increasing numbers of Muslims are attracted to European ways, winning them back to the Shari'a and keeping others from straying becomes the fundamentalists' preoccupation. They portray Western civilization as aesthetically loathsome, ethically corrupt and morally obtuse. They whisper dark ru-

[5] Islamic Republic News Agency, Aug. 10, 1985.

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mors of conspiracy, claiming that the West spreads its culture to weaken the Muslims and steal their resources. They ignore the West's economic and cultural achievements, harping on its unemployment and pornography. To discredit secularist and reformist Muslims, fundamentalists call them lackeys of the Western powers.

But denigrating the West is not enough. To attract lapsed Muslims, fundamentalists must imbue Islam with some of the same features that Western civilization offers. Specifically, they transform the theology and law of traditional Islam into a modern ideology, a set of economic, political and social theories. They contend that Islam contains a systematic political program comparable to, but better than, those originating in Europe. For them, liberalism leads to anarchy, Marxism to brutality, capitalism to heartlessness, socialism to poverty. In the succinct words of the Malaysian leader Anwar Ibrahim: "We are not socialist, we are not capitalist, we are Islamic."[6] Making Islam into an ideology endows the religion with unprecedented bulk and authority. In the famous declaration by Hasan al-Banna, founder of the Muslim Brethren organization, "Islam is a faith and a ritual, a nation and a nationality, a religion and a state, spirit and deed, holy text and sword."[7]

Differences in sect and location hardly affect the fundamentalist viewpoint. Communal disagreements aside, Shi'ite and Sunni fundamentalists hardly differ in goals or methods. Though resident in different parts of the Muslim world—West Africa, the Middle East, Central Asia and Southeast Asia—fundamentalists everywhere resemble each other. When in opposition, they all pressure governments to reject Western influences; when in power they attempt to extirpate Western ways directly.

Differences that do exist reflect varying levels of commitment. The conservative fundamentalists promote their ideals in peaceable ways, through missionary work, education and personal virtue. They believe in evolutionary change. Though inclined to blame current problems—poverty, military defeat, injustice, moral laxness—on the state's divergence from the sacred law, they do not rebel against the authorities. To enhance their popularity, shaky rulers sometimes appeal to con-

[6] *The New York Times,* March 28, 1980.

[7] Hasan al-Banna, *al-Mutamar al-khamis,* p. 10, quoted in Richard P. Mitchell, *The Society of the Muslim Brothers,* London: Oxford University Press, 1969, p. 233.

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servative fundamentalists by applying the Shari'a where it can be done conveniently.

If conservative fundamentalists fear that the enormous appeal of Western culture erodes Islamic customs and laws, radical fundamentalists worry about the very survival of Islam. A key radical thinker, Sayyid Qutb, wrote in 1964 that the modern age presents "the most dangerous *jahiliyya* [anti-Islamic barbarity] which has ever menaced our faith." For Qutb, "everything around is *jahiliyya*; perceptions and beliefs, manners and morals, culture, art and literature, laws and regulations, including a good part of what we consider Islamic culture."[8]

Radicals attack their governments for ignoring the Shari'a, and claim power for themselves on the grounds that they alone aspire to implement the whole body of Islamic precepts. Extreme danger justifies extreme action; radicals pursue revolutionary change through violence.

Although far less numerous than the conservatives, radical fundamentalists have a greater political impact. Their well-articulated program sets the agenda and their extensive infrastructure of mosques and Sufi brotherhoods poses the most acute challenge to governments. A proven willingness to use violence and a determination to succeed frequently make them invulnerable to conventional security measures. Like communists, radical fundamentalists form fronts to use others; they themselves, however, are hardly ever used or co-opted. Radicals succeeded in overthrowing the government in Iran; they present significant challenges to the authorities in Morocco, Tunisia, Nigeria, Egypt, Syria, Saudi Arabia, Malaysia and Indonesia.

Numerically, fundamentalists constitute a small minority in most Muslim societies and they are embattled. Implementing the Shari'a arouses strong opposition among non-Muslims and secularist and reformist Muslims. It also alienates those other fundamentalists who would apply the law differently or want power for themselves. Meeting as they do with massive resistance, fundamentalists who achieve power suspect their opponents of the worst motives and respond with repression. This has been the pattern in the Sudan, Iran and Pakistan.

Because they are primarily concerned with a matter internal

[8] Sayyid Qutb, *Maalim fil-Tariq*, quoted in Emmanuel Sivan, *Radical Islam*, New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 1985, p. 25.

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to Muslim society—the application of Islamic law—fundamentalists have limited interest in non-Muslims. Notwithstanding their long-term plans to convert infidels and spread the rule of Islam, fundamentalists are, in the short term, defensive. Christians, Hindus and other non-Muslims are of concern only to the extent that they obstruct efforts to live by the Shari'a: culturally, by enticing individual Muslims from the law; politically, by depriving Muslim states of their independence. Fear is the key to fundamentalist attitudes toward non-Muslims; the greater they perceive a threat, the more intense their hostility.

While the threats of culture and power come from many quarters, the superpowers present them most acutely. If, in fundamentalist eyes, the United States and the Soviet Union "aim to destroy the Islamic culture"[9] and jeopardize the independence of Muslim countries, fundamentalist Muslims direct special hostility toward these two countries.

IV

The United States is a far bigger worry for fundamentalist Muslims than the Soviet Union; its cultural and economic influence far exceed the Soviets', its ideology is more threatening, and its intentions are seen as more hostile. In short, America presents the greater set of obstacles to life under the Islamic law.

In cultural matters, the world largely ignores the Soviet Union. Who uses the Cyrillic alphabet, learns Russian, listens to Radio Moscow, watches Soviet films or vacations in the Crimea? The dreary state culture of the U.S.S.R. has virtually no impact on the Muslim world and its vibrant dissident culture does not reach there. Only pre-revolutionary culture has a presence outside the Soviet Union.

America and its allies, however, have an immense cultural impact. The Latin alphabet, English language, the BBC, Hollywood and the Riviera have a near-universal attraction. Whatever Americans and their government do exercises a deep fascination. American television programs and films are regularly discussed and decried. U.S. domestic issues, especially racial, criminal and economic problems, are known in detail. America's popular music, video games, comics, textbooks, literature and art reach throughout the Muslim world. Its cloth-

[9] Sheikh Muhammad Mahdi Shams ad-Din, vice chairman of the Supreme Shi'ite Assembly of Lebanon, Islamic Republic News Agency, Nov. 16, 1985.

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ing, foods, household items and machines are found in towns and villages. Most Western sexual customs, such as mixed dancing, exist in the Soviet Union as well as the United States, but they are known to Muslims around the world from the latter; some abhorred practices, say pornography or beauty pageants, exist only in the United States.

American influence also touches Muslims in more profound ways. In the delicate area of religion, America exports both Christianity (the traditional rival of Islam) and secularism (its modern rival). Christian missionaries—all but forgotten in the United States and Western Europe—loom large for the fundamentalists, who see them as leaders of a systematic assault on Islam. Fundamentalists discern a strong crusading component to U.S. foreign policy. "The U.S. attitude is motivated by several factors, but the most important, in my view," writes Umar at-Talmasani, the Egyptian fundamentalist leader, "is religious fanaticism. . . . This attitude is a continuation of the crusader invasion of a thousand years ago."[10]

Ironically, anti-religious ideas also come from the United States. Although Moscow, not Washington, aggressively sponsors atheism, its heavy-handed, doctrinaire approach carries little weight beyond the confines of the Soviet bloc. Freethinkers, anti-clerics and atheists the world over get their inspiration from America.

This points to a yet greater irony: Marxism itself comes to Islam mostly from the free world. Marxist thought in America and Western Europe is dynamic and in tune with new intellectual developments, whereas the version purveyed by the Soviet government is hidebound and dull. Worse, because the Soviet authorities constantly bend their ideals to meet the practical needs of being a superpower, these lack intellectual honesty or even consistency. The prison writings of Antonio Gramsci have infinitely more appeal than the speeches of Brezhnev. Students sent to study in Paris, not Moscow, become the fervent Marxists. Even on the Soviet Union's own ideological turf, then, America poses the greater challenge.

Fundamentalist Muslims are convinced that journalists from both the Soviet Union and the United States try to weaken Islam by spreading misinformation about their religion. A Reuters correspondent was expelled from Iran for filing

[10] Umar at-Talmasani, *loc. cit.*

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"biased and at times false reports" in May 1985.[11] Again, while the suspicion is addressed to both camps, it is the American journalists who matter, not their Soviet counterparts. News judgments are made in New York City; the international prominence of an event depends on the emphasis given it by the editors of the major wire services, newpapers, magazines and television networks. Accordingly, Muslims know the news as it is generated in New York; they are almost oblivious of how the Soviet media cover the news.

Foreign schools are perhaps the greatest threat of all, taking impressionable young Muslims, teaching them Western languages and infecting them with alien ideas. The prominent role Christian missionaries have played historically in education makes this issue all the more alarming. Again, it is Khomeini who best expresses the fundamentalists' concern: "We are not afraid of economic sanctions or military intervention. What we are afraid of is Western universities."[12] That which Americans see with special pride—the spread of advanced education—fundamentalist Muslims see as exceptionally dangerous.

In sum, the more attractive an alien culture, the more fundamentalist Muslims fear it and fight it. A leading Iranian mullah declared that the main objective of the Islamic revolution is to "root out" American culture from Muslim countries.[13] He probably never thought of Soviet culture as a comparable threat.

In the realm of economics, should fundamentalist Muslims wish to seek a scapegoat for their poverty, the vast financial, industrial and commercial influence of the United States provides the obvious target. America's economic institutions cast a long shadow. Its oil producers, multinational enterprises, transportation networks and banking institutions dominate their fields. American corporations beckon ambitious Muslims with lucrative jobs. The dollar is the international currency, U.S. government paper is the single greatest instrument for short-term investments, and Wall Street offers the largest capital market. The International Monetary Fund and the World Bank are widely perceived as American-dominated.

[11] Islamic Republic News Agency, May 23, 1985.
[12] Quoted in Shaul Bakhash, *The Reign of the Ayatollahs,* New York: Basic Books, 1984, p. 122.
[13] *The New York Times,* Jan. 29, 1984.

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Consistent with their fear of the West, fundamentalists regard foreign economic activity in their countries as exploitative. They make quasi-Marxist arguments, claiming that the United States owes much of its prosperity to cheap labor and resources (especially oil) from the Muslim world. Foreign investments and multinational corporations are accused of skimming off the most valuable assets of Muslim countries with the help of local governments and elites. Fundamentalists even see U.S. aid to Muslim countries as proof of a sellout by their own governments; this became especially clear in post-1979 Egypt.

In contrast, the Soviet Union has negligible economic influence. A moribund Soviet economy inspires no one to adopt its version of state capitalism as a model. The ruble has no international role. The U.S.S.R. hardly participates in the oil trade with Muslim countries and its other trade is marginal. It has almost no money to invest outside its satellites. Conversely, foreigners cannot invest in Latvian industry or Siberian mines. That the Soviet Union has so little presence in the world economy insulates it from blame; fundamentalists cannot make it the cause of their tribulations.

The presence of large numbers of Americans and West Europeans in Muslim countries exacerbates fundamentalist sensitivities. Tourists gawk, trample through sacred sites and behave immodestly. Foreign residents infect the local population with non-Islamic practices. Except for hippies, anthropologists and volunteers—each objectionable in its own way—Americans live in the best parts of town, enjoying facilities beyond the reach of most Muslims, indulging in activities forbidden by Islamic law. Soviet tourists are virtually nonexistent outside the Soviet bloc, while Soviet residents in Muslim countries are few in number, are rarely seen, and travel in tightly supervised groups.

America is ubiquitous. As he walks through the modern section of almost any town, a fundamentalist Muslim would encounter—and object to—most of what he sees: signs in English and French, glossy advertisements promoting Marlboro cigarettes, Coca Cola and electronic imports; theaters showing American feature films; kiosks carrying *Time* and *Newsweek*; luxury hotels housing American tourists; radios blaring rock music. By contrast, Russian influence derives almost exclusively from its military prowess; take that away and the Soviet international presence is very small indeed.

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v

The U.S. government represents liberal values, the Soviet government stands for Marxism as interpreted by Lenin. From the fundamentalist Muslim's point of view, these American and Soviet ideologies are about equally irreconcilable with Islamic tenets and about equally obnoxious. But, like the everyday cultures, the two ideologies are not equally threatening.

At first glance, liberalism appears preferable. Like Islam, it respects religious faith, the family unit and private property. Marxism, of course, abolishes these and replaces them with dialectical materialism, the state and communal ownership. A closer look, however, reveals the shallowness of this reading. Marxist attacks on the family belong to the distant past and no longer have real force. And while the Marxist rejection of private property goes much further than any views of fundamentalist Muslims, many of the latter believe in severely restricting the right of private property as a means to achieve social justice. Muhammad Baqir as-Sadr, the Iraqi thinker whose book on economics has greatly influenced the Iranian government, argues that ownership of property in Islam should be neither wholly private nor entirely public but a mix of the two.[14]

In one key area—religion—most fundamentalists reject Marxism, but even here the difference can be reduced. Marxist theory requires atheism, but socialism as such need not. Believers can redistribute wealth as well as atheists. Some Muslims inject God into Marxism, others produce hybrid theories of "Arab socialism" or "Islamic socialism." Fundamentalists are hopeful that Marxists will see the error of their doctrine on this point. For example, Hashemi Rafsanjani noted recently that "as a result of the achievements of the Islamic revolution in Iran, Marxist theorists and among them Cuba's Fidel Castro, have been gradually reviewing their academic outlooks on religion and abandoning their judgment of religion as an 'opium of the masses'." Rafsanjani quoted Castro as saying that religion could serve as a revolutionary drive for the masses.[15]

If fundamentalist Islam has few conflicts with Marxism, the areas of agreement between these two ideologies are numerous, especially when they are contrasted to liberalism.

[14] Muhammad Baqir as-Sadr, *Iqtisaduna*, 3d ed., Beirut: Dar al-Fikr, 1969, pp. 257–268.
[15] Islamic Republic News Agency, Nov. 15, 1985.

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Authoritative founding scriptures. The Koran and the works of Marx and Engels constitute bodies of unalterable but highly malleable doctrine. Comprehensive written theories take precedence over experience and common sense. The assumption that truth is knowable permeates fundamentalist Islam and Marxism. Liberalism has no writ, no dogma, no authoritative interpreters.

Highly specified patterns of behavior. All-embracing systems provide guidance on a wide variety of matters, great and small. Fundamentalist Islam begins with the private sphere and then extends to control the public, while Marxism moves in the other direction, but in the end both regulate private and public affairs alike. Specific regulations in the two systems differ profoundly, of course, but details matter less than the fact that each of them aspires to regulate the whole of life. Liberalism leaves its citizens alone as much as possible.

Pervasive government involvement. In the ideal Islamic or Marxist society, no activity takes place without reference to the guiding philosphy: education, art, literature, economics, law, warfare, sexuality and religion all have political significance. And if theory has something to say about every aspect of life, the government cannot be far behind. Because fundamentalist Muslims and Marxists have specific goals which require that the government shape its citizens, government becomes an instrument for molding society. Their codes incline them toward authoritarianism (government control of politics only) and even totalitarianism (government control of all aspects of life). Only a minority of fundamentalist Muslims and not all Marxists go in this direction, but the totalitarian temptation exists in both ideologies.

Anti-individualism. Fundamentalist Muslims and Marxists share a distaste for what they view as the decadence and crass materialism of Western life. The self-indulgent and individualistic features of contemporary American life are especially worrisome. Dismissing the philosophical and political rationales behind the freedom of expression, both condemn its manifestations and, to a surprising degree, find the same manifestations most loathsome. Fundamentalist Muslim and Marxist visions of a structured society contrast with the free-wheeling, undisciplined, open way of life in America and Western Europe. Individualism threatens the stability of the fundamentalist and Marxist orders in equal measure and is anathema to both. Both

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emphasize community needs over those of the individual and place a higher priority on equality than on freedom.

Ambitious programs. Fundamentalist Muslims and Marxists have noble-sounding visions of society that they seek to impose on their citizens. The brotherhoods of Muslims and workers should transcend geographic, linguistic, ethnic and other differences. Islam prohibits war among Muslims; Marxism demands total allegiance to the class. Islam outlaws the charging of interest on money and Marxism prohibits private profit. Islam prescribes very low taxation rates; Marxism calls for massive income redistribution. Islam calls for a society in harmony with God's laws; Marxism envisages a society in accord with "scientific" principles. Both scorn the modest, realistic expectations of liberalism, choosing to pursue higher standards.

Inability to fulfill goals. Each system requires an impossible transformation in behavior; humans cannot live up to divine or scientific standards. Muslims and socialists alike have long clashed among themselves, starting with the Battle of the Camel in A.D. 656 (for Muslims) and the First World War (for socialists). The current division of the world into national states frustrates fundamentalists as much as Marxists.

Discouragement of dissent. Anyone living in a fundamentalist or Marxist order who proceeds his own way can expect to meet severe punishment. Why should those who know total truth tolerate dissent? Freedom of expression makes no sense to fundamentalists and Marxists, who discourage divergent ideas. In contrast, the liberal governments of the United States and Western Europe allow each citizen to live as he wishes (within obvious limitations) and to attempt to convince others of the truth of his ideas.

For these many reasons Muslim fundamentalists, when they think about it, find the Soviet ideological program less alien than the American. Finally is the fact that Muslims and Marxists alike see themselves as successors to Western civilization and have mounted its only sustained challenges. Islam claims that Muhammad's revelation replaces Christianity as the final religion; Marxism claims that socialism succeeds capitalism as the final stage of economic evolution. In the face of these ambitions, the continued prosperity and power of America riles both fundamentalist Muslims and Marxists and stimulates bonds between them, for all their differences.

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VI

In political and military terms, one might expect fundamentalist Muslims to see the Soviet Union as their greatest threat. After all, Muscovy was already conquering Muslim lands in the fourteenth century; the Russian territorial push at the expense of Muslims continued under the tsars until the 1880s, with the conquest of Muslim territories in the Caucasus and Central Asia. Although the Bolsheviks before 1917 promised independence to these regions, once in power the communist government devoted enormous resources to securing its hold on the tsarist colonial territories. The Soviet Union today includes within its state frontiers nearly 50 million Muslims, the only large body of Muslims still governed by a European power. The long-term conquest of Muslim lands resumed in late 1979 with the invasion of Afghanistan.

As the following commentary on Iranian radio makes clear, fundamentalist Muslims know the Soviet record:

> Tsarist aspirations concerning the [Persian] Gulf region did not change in the era of the socialist October Revolution. Soviet policy adhered to the same aspirations concerning the Gulf region, its warm waters, and its strategic oil resources and the huge reserve that the region has in this respect. When the Red Army invaded Afghan territory in 1979, Moscow covered another section of the way to the region with the hope of extending it in the future.[16]

The American record could not differ more. While Moscow assembled an empire stretching from Germany to Mongolia, the United States encouraged the disbanding of European empires. From Woodrow Wilson's Fourteen Points in 1918 to Dwight Eisenhower's handling of the Suez crisis in 1956, American leaders pressured the British, French and other West European states to withdraw from Muslim lands.

Yet American anti-imperialism seems to be forgotten when the fundamentalists examine the world around them. America's close relations with Great Britain and France make it, in the eyes of many Muslims, heir to their imperial mantle. Close relations with Israel anger them. And the United States is held responsible even for Soviet activities: when the Soviet Union established diplomatic relations with several Persian Gulf states

[16] Teheran International Service, Nov. 16, 1985.

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in 1985, Iranian officials interpreted this as an American ploy. "Washington is doubtlessly in the picture and background of these developments, since the U.S. monopoly of influence, in any case, leaves no room for Soviet infiltration. . . . [Perhaps] there is a tacit agreement between Washington and Moscow to defend the region vis-à-vis a third party [i.e. Iran] that threatens the interests of both sides."[17] Iranian fundamentalists blame Washington for the expansion of Moscow's influence! However dangerous the Soviet Union, the United States always looks worse.

Khomeini's pungent anti-Americanism sets the tone for the Iranian government and affects the views of fundamentalist Muslims world wide. Khomeini believes that the United States wishes to take economic control of Iran: "Everything in our treasury has to be emptied into the pockets of America."[18] He interprets Iraq's attack on Iran in September 1980 as an American plot and ascribes Iraq's continued resistance to American assistance. Iranian commentaries accuse the United States of deploying its finest "resources in the fields of politics, military and culture" against Iran.[19] For all these reasons, Khomeini concludes, "Iran is a country effectively at war with America."[20]

He sees U.S. aggression toward Iran as part of a larger pattern: America "has appointed its agents in both the Muslim and non-Muslim countries to deprive everyone who lives under their domination of his freedom." Make a single mistake and the Americans will pounce: "The danger that America poses is so great that if you commit the smallest oversight, you will be destroyed." In short, "America plans to destroy us, all of us."[21] The United States is largely successful, too, at least in regard to the places Khomeini cares most about: as he stated in September 1979, "Today, the world of Islam is captive in the hands of America."[22]

The Soviet danger is not unimportant: "We are at war with international communism no less than we are struggling against the global plunderers of the West . . . the danger represented

[17] *Ibid.*
[18] Khomeini, *op. cit.*, p. 221.
[19] Radio Teheran, Oct. 30, 1985.
[20] Khomeini, *op. cit.*, p. 305.
[21] Khomeini, *op. cit.*, pp. 214, 286, 306.
[22] Radio Teheran, July 31, 1985.

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by the communist powers is no less than that of America."[23] Khomeini hates the Soviet Union (a "concentration camp") as much as the United States ("a brothel on a universal scale").[24] But Iran maintains better relations with the Soviet Union.

Fundamentalist Muslims believe they see eye-to-eye with the Soviet Union on the question of colonialism, as well as its alleged successor, neoimperialism. More important, after World War II, the Soviet Union provided a useful balance to America's preponderant power. As Sayyid Qutb of Egypt wrote in 1951, the Muslims "are in temporary need of the communist power."[25] For similar reasons, the Iranian foreign minister today calls for improved political, trade and scientific relations with the U.S.S.R.

Russia's empire is as obscure as the films it produces: continuing efforts at the absorption of tens of millions of Muslims into Soviet society are virtually invisible. The invasion of Afghanistan attracted some attention, but only a small fraction of what a comparable American military effort would. Moscow's colonial-style control of South Yemen goes almost unnoticed. The global influence of American news media has the effect of exaggerating Washington's role and diminishing Moscow's.

In Khomeini's eyes, the Russian record of expansion against Iran over the past 250 years pales in comparison with the U.S. role during the 25 years before the Islamic revolution. As he sees it, the United States put the shah in power in 1953 and kept him there through 1978. Khomeini believes that Iran in that period had become "an official colony of the U.S."[26] The Soviets may loom across a long border, but the Americans have already ruled the country, as the fundamentalist leadership sees it, and are planning to do so again.

Less challenged by or aware of the Soviet Union, radical fundamentalists fear it less. In more positive terms, they slightly but consistently favor the Soviet Union over the United States. So long as America and its way of life attract traditionalist, secularist and reformist Muslims, fundamentalists will direct most of their hostility toward the United States.

[23] Khomeini, *op. cit.*, p. 286.
[24] Quoted in Amir Taheri, *The Spirit of Allah: Khomeini and the Islamic Revolution*, Chevy Chase, Md.: Adler & Adler, 1986, p. 298.
[25] Sayyid Qutb, *al-Salam al-Alami wal-Islam*, Cairo, 1951, cited in Richard P. Mitchell, *op. cit.*, p. 271.
[26] Khomeini, *op. cit.*, p. 215.

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VII

This analysis has several major implications. Of the four main reasons why fundamentalist Muslims are more anti-American than anti-Soviet, three are fixed. The cultural influence, economic dynamism and alien ideology of the United States will remain as they are, no matter who the American leaders are or what course their policy takes. No specific action will make the country less objectionable to fundamentalists. Conversely, nothing the Soviet Union can do will win it a cultural, economic or ideological role comparable to America's.

In other words, what America is, not what it does, constitutes its greatest challenge to fundamentalist Muslims. Little can be done to avert collisions between America and the fundamentalists. Were the U.S. government willing to take every step to appease the fundamentalists, most problems would remain. Disclaiming the Carter Doctrine, disbanding the Central Command, renouncing Israel and supporting fundamentalist forces in Lebanon and Afghanistan would still leave the advertisements, ideologies, schools and multinational corporations that attract Muslims. Ultimately, Washington can do very little to reduce the fears of fundamentalists.

There remains one positive step open to the United States: to attempt to convince fundamentalists that with regard to the fourth factor, the political-military threat, the Soviet Union threatens them more. The fundamentalist view that the United States presents the main threat to Muslim independence is simply wrong: in fact, the Soviet Union does. Reminding the fundamentalists of basic facts—who rules 50 million Muslims in the Caucasus and Central Asia, who controls South Yemen, who has troops in Afghanistan—might increase their attention to Soviet behavior. The goals of such an effort would be modest; the point of directing attention to the Soviet empire is not to make friends for the United States, but to impress upon the fundamentalists the real nature of the dangers they face.

The American government has many means for making fundamentalist Muslims (and others) more aware of the Soviet threat: speeches by leading politicians, Voice of America programs, statements at the United Nations and other international forums, and so forth. Making the Soviet threat to Muslims a major theme would almost certainly provoke international discussion and would be much to America's benefit.

For American policymakers, the problem of dealing with

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fundamentalist Muslims arises in three situations: when they oppose pro-American governments, when they oppose pro-Soviet governments and when they control governments.

Tempting as it is to rush in and assist a friendly Muslim ruler facing powerful fundamentalist opposition, this often proves counterproductive. When embattled rulers accept American aid they become more vulnerable to accusations of selling their independence to Washington. The fundamentalist Muslims' extreme sensitivity to even the slightest hints of dependence on a superpower renders the dilemma of helping one's friends without arousing more opposition especially acute.

To make matters worse, Muslim rulers sometimes refuse to acknowledge the full danger of arousing fundamentalist anger. The shah of Iran associated too closely with the United States; the same was true of Sadat. As secularist or reformist Muslims, these leaders were so oriented to the West that they consistently underestimated the problem of foreign contamination and the power of fundamentalists. Sadat became so absorbed by his reputation in the West—the Nobel Peace Prize, ovations from the U.S. Congress—that he lost touch with his own power base, the Egyptian military. (This problem plagues the Soviet Union and its Muslim clients as well. In Afghanistan, Nur Muhammad Taraki and Hafizullah Amin underestimated their Islamic opposition as badly as any American allies; likewise, the Soviet Union misunderstood the depths of resistance to their invasion.) Friendly Muslim leaders cannot be allowed unilaterally to expand their relationship with the United States: Americans must take part in this decision.

In assessing ties to friendly Muslim countries, caution must be exercised not to make the United States unnecessarily the focus of fundamentalist anger. Fundamentalists attack what they see with their own eyes. Importing wheat prompts less animosity than the import of films and clothes. American soldiers isolated from indigenous populations pose less of a problem than soldiers stationed in cities. Quiet cooperation with a friendly government provokes less opposition than open declarations of support at public meetings. Strong relations need not have a high profile: ideally, they are almost invisible.

When communist or pro-Soviet forces threaten, pro-American regimes are tempted to promote fundamentalists as a counterweight, or even to bring them into the government. But this tactic involves great danger. The Tunisian and Egyptian governments encouraged fundamentalists in the early

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1970s, only to lose control of those movements by the end of the decade. Secularist politicians in Turkey and the Sudan formed coalitions with fundamentalists in the mid-1970s, then had to accede to fundamentalist efforts to impose the Shari'a. And, when a non-fundamentalist like the late Zulfikar Ali Bhutto of Pakistan tries to win fundamentalist support by imposing Islamic law, distrust remains.

Imposition of the Shari'a creates three sources of tension with the United States. First, Americans have difficulty supporting a government that flogs alcohol-drinkers, cuts off the hands of thieves and stones adulterers. Abhorrent to Western morals, these practices create American ill will. Second, widespread opposition to the fundamentalists' version of the law leads to an upsurge of repression and instability, and this in turn leads to anti-Americanism. Third, the strengthening of some of America's most profound antagonists inevitably sours relations with the United States.

In one way, conservative fundamentalists threaten American interests more than the radicals, for they can make their influence felt within regimes friendly to the United States, while radicals oppose the authorities too much to be tempted into a coalition. Ultimately, however, radical fundamentalists are the real danger. As even more profound enemies of the United States than Marxists, their ascension to power almost always harms the United States and its allies.

Should the United States be invited to counsel Muslim allies on the question of cooperating with the fundamentalist opposition, its advice should be straightforward. Unless special circumstances dictate otherwise, it opposes application of the Shari'a and discourages enhancing the power of fundamentalists. The United States should neither assist fundamentalist movements that oppose friendly governments nor encourage its friends to appease them. Contact with radical fundamentalists is necessary, of course, to understand their views and to monitor their influence, but no assistance should be provided.

In the case of fundamentalist Muslims opposing governments allied with the Soviet Union, the United States is naturally tempted to provide aid to the fundamentalists. But this should only be done with extreme caution, if at all, and with full awareness of the perils involved. Even short-term aid can have dangerous consequences. Support for fundamentalists might make them the only alternative to communists; the United States can inadvertently strengthen the two extremes against

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the middle, squeezing out its natural allies between Soviet clients and fundamentalist Muslims. The moderates, whose views more closely correspond to America's, might be destroyed in the process.

Noting these dangers, fundamentalist Muslim groups should receive U.S. aid only when two conditions are met: the government they oppose creates very major problems for the United States; and the fundamentalists make up the only non-communist opposition.

Libya, Syria and Afghanistan all meet the first criterion. But fundamentalists are only a minor element in the opposition to Muammar al-Qaddafi's regime; American aid should therefore go only to the non-fundamentalist opposition. In Afghanistan too the second condition is not met, for non-fundamentalist mujahadeen groups are active both in the fighting in Afghanistan and in refugee politics in Pakistan; these deserve military, political and financial support from the United States. In Syria, however, the second condition is met. The Muslim Brethren constitute the only serious opposition to the regime of Hafiz al-Assad, and they have shown determination and resourcefulness. There being no moderate force to support, Syrian fundamentalists could properly receive U.S. aid.

As for fundamentalists in power, they divide into two types, conservatives and radicals. The former usually seek good relations with the United States and, keeping the profound differences between their goals and those of the United States in mind, ties should be cultivated. Disagreement on long-range goals means that cooperation with a superpower is limited to tactics. Pakistan resembles China in the way it works with the United States against the Soviet Union: both countries take money and aid without giving friendship. The application of Islamic law creates human rights problems, so the United States cannot become too closely associated with fundamentalist leaders, as it did with Jafer al-Numeiri in the Sudan.

Radicals have terrible relations with the United States, and for obvious cultural, economic and ideological reasons. Notwithstanding their fears of Western civilization, the United States should do its best to make the Soviet danger to Muslim independence better known. Even so adamant an opponent as Khomeini is likely to dwell less on America as he becomes more aware of Soviet expansionism.

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Paul Jabber

EGYPT'S CRISIS, AMERICA'S DILEMMA

Egypt faces daunting challenges in the period immediately ahead. After several years of relative stability, both economic and political trends have turned ominous, as this largest and most important of Arab states presses against the outer limits of its resources. Negative developments in recent months affecting tourism, oil revenues and remittances from millions of expatriate workers in oil-rich Arab states have aggravated the tenuous situation. For President Hosni Mubarak's government an economic crisis is almost inevitable in the near term, and a major political explosion only slightly less likely.

For the United States, impending events will put to a severe test the special relationship that has bound Egypt to this country since the mid-1970s, when the Camp David peace process began. Without careful and attentive management by both Congress and the Administration, this relationship could be entirely swept away, destroying in the process a keystone of U.S. diplomacy in the Middle East. Given the centrality of Egypt to the politics of the region, the consequences would seriously damage U.S. interests in the Arab-Israeli arena, North Africa and the Persian Gulf.

Overpopulated and resource-poor, Egypt has teetered on the brink of financial insolvency for decades. What makes the present situation particularly threatening? Why is America's position so precarious, given the tremendous Egyptian dependence on U.S. aid, which this year alone will exceed $2.7 billion, and has totaled some $18 billion over the past decade? What steps can the United States take to better serve its interests?

II

Nowhere are politics and economics more intertwined than in present-day Egypt. Although heavy military spending and

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runaway population growth have compounded the country's difficulties over the past 20 years, the day of reckoning has been staved off so far by sharp increases in foreign exchange revenues witnessed from 1975 to 1984. This was a windfall, resulting mainly from remittances of expatriate workers, capital inflows from oil-rich Arab neighbors, and Egypt's own oil exports.

Over the past year each of these revenue sources has declined significantly, with no respite in sight. In addition, the recent upsurge of terrorism in the Mediterranean, and the American response, have hit the growing Egyptian tourist industry particularly hard. Overall, external revenues are expected to drop by nearly one-third from last year to this.

TABLE 1
FOREIGN EXCHANGE EARNINGS
(US$ billions)

	1985	*1986*
Worker Remittances	3.3	2.2
Oil Exports	2.6	1.2
Other Exports	2.1	2.0
Suez Canal Dues	1.0	.9
Tourism	.6	.3
Total	9.6	6.6

The country's solvency was already in doubt even before this catastrophic shortfall. Last year, an emergency supplemental American grant of $500 million averted default in the repayment of official debt to the United States. Both the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund (IMF) warned Cairo that its budget deficit and export-import gap had reached unsustainable levels. With the foreign debt crossing the $30 billion mark, even short-term lending by international banks was becoming less available.

In these deteriorating circumstances, the limited economic reforms that Mubarak and his newly appointed premier, the respected economist Ali Lutfi, have gingerly introduced over the past year are woefully inadequate. As the economic crisis forces the government to institute tougher belt-tightening measures, the stage is set for a social and political eruption of a magnitude to threaten the regime.

This, in turn, will severely strain the special relationship with the United States. In the minds of Egyptians, their socioeco-

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nomic crisis is inescapably bound up with the question of peace with Israel and the tight U.S. embrace. The late President Anwar al-Sadat had sold his Open Door and Camp David policies to the public as avenues to a new era of prosperity and development. In return for peace with Israel, Egypt would also recover all its national territory, and the Palestinians would gain their autonomy in the occupied territories. Yet, years after the flag of the Star of David was hoisted in Cairo, Egyptians are galled that a portion of land they consider to be theirs—the beachfront sliver of Taba—remains under Israeli control, that more occupied Arab land has been annexed by Israel (in East Jerusalem and the Golan Heights), that Lebanon was invaded, and that Egypt remains ostracized by most of the Arab world. Never broadly popular in Egypt, the separate peace has now come to be regarded as a national humiliation.

In this charged atmosphere, made more volatile lately by repeated use of Israeli and U.S. military power against a widening range of Arab targets, any serious program of economic retrenchment—while absolutely necessary and long overdue—will be interpreted as final proof of the failure of the Sadat policies. The hardships of austerity are certain to generate strong pressures for a reorientation away from the United States and Israel.

Egyptian officials are quick to admit that any resulting cut-off or major reduction in U.S. assistance would greatly complicate the economic problems urgently confronting them. This, however, should be no cause for complacency in Washington, where over the past several years Mubarak's Egypt has been taken somewhat for granted. The argument that Cairo has nowhere else to turn is spurious, even if Arab petro-wealth is on the wane and the Soviet economy is in very poor shape. Change could be forced by passions and needs that do not respond to calculations of foreign-aid optimization, and that are stronger and far more widely shared than those of the dwindling government, military and private sector elites that remain staunch supporters of close ties with the United States.

III

A peculiar phenomenon on the current Egyptian scene is a widespread sense of nostalgia for the Nasserist era, when Cairo was indisputably the political fulcrum of the Arab world and cast a long shadow in world politics as a proud leader of the

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emergent Third World. Ironically, the economic distress facing the country today is in large measure the legacy of that era.

For nearly two decades after Colonel Gamal Abd al-Nasser's coup of July 23, 1952, Egyptian policy was dominated by the drive for pan-Arab unity. In the Third World the 1950s was a decade of struggle against the remnants of the European colonial presence, and Cairo moved aggressively to assert its leadership in the three areas it defined as its overlapping spheres of influence: the Arab lands, the Islamic nations and Africa.

For a time it appeared as if Nasserism was the wave of the future and Egypt indeed would prove to be the Prussia of the Arab world. Beyond the Middle East, Cairo cemented its international standing by becoming a recognized leader of the Nonaligned Movement, and later of the Organization of African Unity. Beginning in 1955 Egypt became a major recipient of Soviet military and economic assistance, including massive aid for the construction of the Aswan Dam.

But active pan-Arab leadership led almost inevitably to policy choices that were ultimately to prove far more expensive than Egypt's limited resources could accommodate on a sustained basis. Such a role required championing Arab rights in the Palestinian issue, and this led to military confrontation with Israel through four wars in 19 years. It encouraged heavy military buildups—fueled by arms races with Israel as well as other Arab states, and by the military character of Nasser's regime—which at their peak in the mid-1970s consumed almost a third of the gross national product. The arms buildups produced intense intra-Arab conflicts, impelled by competing claims to bloc leadership or self-protective measures on the part of threatened governments; the most damaging was the Yemen war, fought by Egypt and Saudi Arabia in 1963–67 at enormous cost to Cairo in both blood and treasure.

Egypt's bid for hegemony began meeting resistance by the turn of the 1960s. With access to Arab resources blocked for the time being, Nasser moved to bring domestic wealth under centralized state control; fearing the West's hostility, he also sought to reduce Egypt's dependence on the international capitalist system. Beginning in 1961, a sweeping wave of socialist measures soon transformed the Egyptian economy. These measures included massive nationalizations, land redistribution, tariff barriers and other import restrictions, and severe limitations on capital movements and foreign exchange

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transactions. The direction of trade shifted strongly toward the Eastern bloc, and Soviet aid soared. Rapid industrialization and import substitution under comprehensive centralized planning became the key programs of Egyptian economic policy.

Egypt's isolation from the West became almost total in June 1967 when diplomatic ties with the United States, Britain and France were severed during the Arab-Israeli Six-Day War. Coming after the hemorrhage caused by the Yemen adventure, the closure of the Suez Canal—the main foreign exchange earner at the time—and the enormous military burden left the economy incapable of coping with the demands of a three-percent annual population growth. The occupation of Sinai was followed by six years of total stalemate and intermittent high-intensity combat in the Suez Canal zone. Whatever slim chance existed that state capitalism would prove to be the answer to Egypt's resource scarcity dilemma was dashed.

By the time Sadat had consolidated his hold on power in mid-1971, following Nasser's death the previous September, the Egyptian economy was at a breaking point. While much of the Arab world was ushering in the era of petro-wealth, Egypt found itself locked into the most virulent conventional arms race worldwide, and in a stalemated military confrontation with a superior opponent. Foreign investment was minimal, and Moscow seemed unwilling or unable to deliver either decisive military help or sufficient economic assistance. If total collapse was to be avoided, a radical change in structural economic conditions was imperative; this could only come with an equally radical overhaul of foreign policy orientations and commitments.

IV

Sadat reached for both of these goals in October 1973. He launched a risky war with limited military objectives and a strictly political purpose: to create the conditions for breaking the Arab-Israeli diplomatic log jam by frightening the United States into action, shaking Israel out of complacency, and restoring a psychological equilibrium to the Arab-Israeli power balance without which necessary concessions by both sides would not have been feasible. A creditable Arab performance in the war, and American responsiveness in the form of Secretary of State Henry Kissinger's "shuttle diplomacy" in 1973–75, led to a dramatic shift in Egypt's foreign policy toward the West. By decade's end, Cairo was in virtual alliance with the

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United States, relations with the Soviets were in a deep freeze, and a peace treaty with Israel had returned to Egypt substantially all of its national territory.

The shift in domestic policy under Sadat was equally dramatic, with the adoption in 1974 of the policy known as *Infitah*, the Open Door. Initially, this was designed to create conditions attractive to foreign investment capital. Subsequent legislation and government practice have expanded the strategy to encompass extensive liberalization of the economy as a whole. Almost all fields were opened to both foreign and Arab investment, protection was provided against nationalization and confiscation, and tax exemptions were granted. Laws passed in 1975–77 provided additional incentives and opened new opportunities for private Egyptian capital.

According to figures issued by Egypt's Investment Authority, projects worth $4.4 billion had been approved by the end of the 1970s. Interestingly, it was Egyptian private capital that provided the bulk of the investment (63 percent), followed by Arab (13.2 percent), European Economic Community (6.1 percent), and U.S. (5.5 percent) sources. Few of these projects were actually under way, however, a fact that reflects the continuing obstacles posed by structural shortcomings.

Perhaps more important than the inflow of private investment capital was the psychological and political impact of the Open Door policy on Egypt's major aid donors. Economic liberalization complemented Sadat's post-1973 foreign policy in reassuring the Western world, as well as the conservative Arab governments, that the confrontationist, revolutionary, pro-Soviet politics of the Nasserist period were not likely to recur.

From 1973 to 1976, Egypt received some $5.1 billion in bilateral aid from Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, the United Arab Emirates and Qatar. An estimated additional $400 million was provided by multilateral Arab funds. The U.S. contribution was $1.6 billion, while the IMF, other international institutions and various industrialized countries provided some $1.1 billion. These amounts reflect published statistics only, and undoubtedly underestimate the volume of funds that in fact entered the economy. Also, they do not include the substantial amounts secretly provided as military assistance by Arab oil producers, which have been estimated at $1 billion annually.

In the 1977–78 period, which preceded the general cutoff of diplomatic and economic relations between Egypt and the

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Arab world precipitated by Sadat's unilateral overtures to Israel, the major item of Arab aid was $2 billion in budgetary support granted to Cairo by the Persian Gulf states. Bilateral Arab assistance fell sharply from 1976 on, however, as donors became disenchanted with the seeming inability of the Egyptian bureaucracy to use available resources effectively, and troubled by signs of mismanagement and illicit diversion of funds. The slack was taken up by Western aid sources, the United States in particular. American aid, funneled mainly through the Agency for International Development (AID), mounted from $370 million in 1975 to $950 million in 1979, and has averaged just over $1 billion annually in the 1980s. Military assistance did not begin until 1976, when it amounted to only $68.5 million, but it increased rapidly after the conclusion of the Camp David accords, and has averaged $1.3 billion in recent years.

As these figures suggest, *Infitah* and its associated foreign policies succeeded in producing substantial capital inflows. Whether these funds have helped create a sound basis for Egypt's economic regeneration is another matter. For the fact is, by and large, Cairo failed to put these large capital inflows to productive use. With continued high military spending, the consumerist outburst caused by the sudden liberalization and the flow of foreign investments primarily into real estate and financial services, only a small proportion went into productive investments in industry, agriculture and infrastructural development. Despite a good performance in terms of growth in GNP (averaging seven percent annually in 1975–83), this new wealth has remained largely inaccessible to the mass of the population.

Politically, the positive initial impact of Sadat's initiatives for the stability of the regime had dissipated by the late 1970s. Most damaging was Egypt's isolation from the rest of the Arab world as the unilateral approach to Israel took hold. Whatever public acquiescence in this bold move existed was due to high expectations of the economic benefits that peace would bring, expectations that Sadat persistently encouraged. As these hopes faded, criticism mounted from Egyptian Islamic fundamentalists, the left, the Nasserists and even from prominent politicians and opinion-makers within the ruling establishment. The harsh political repression that followed set the stage for Sadat's assassination by a group of religious extremists in October 1981.

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V

Sadat was succeeded by his vice-president and political heir apparent, former air force commander Hosni Mubarak. In a smooth transition, Mubarak was immediately elected to a full six-year term by the People's Assembly.

Although the new leader left unchanged the fundamental tenets of Sadat's program, including the Open Door, close ties to the United States and continued honoring of the peace treaty with Israel, he gained a significant measure of public support in his first year in office. This resulted from several policy adjustments, begun almost immediately, which foreshadowed the modified course Mubarak would take over the next several years.

Normalization of relations with Israel was reduced to the minimum consistent with the letter of the peace agreement—a task made easier by the Israeli invasion of Lebanon in June 1982. Conciliatory steps were taken to mend relations with the Arab states and the Palestine Liberation Organization. The close embrace of the United States was loosened somewhat, at least in its atmospherics. A tentative relationship with the U.S.S.R. was reestablished by allowing in some 60 Soviet technicians, later followed by an exchange of ambassadors and increased trade flows. Domestically, political controls over the opposition were relaxed, the press was granted more freedom, and some measures to curb corruption were instituted. Most importantly, Mubarak gave credible indications of a serious intent to deal with the perennial economic crisis.

During the past four-and-a-half years, however, it is in this crucial realm of economic policy that Mubarak's tenure has proved most disappointing. There is no doubt that the government is highly conscious of the need for urgent rationalization of spending. Belatedly, some limited steps have been taken, including a reduction in energy subsidies and a tax increase for higher income earners. But there is little indication so far that the president will muster the political courage to launch fundamental structural reforms, which will require, in the apt words of the latest IMF mission report, "the prompt adoption of a strong adjustment package that will be sustained over the years." Such a package would include large cuts in government subsidies and public sector spending, import restraints and unification of exchange rates. In a culture that expects strong personal leadership and visionary inspiration from its rulers,

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Mubarak's administration has been marked by overcautiousness in policymaking, and a marked lack of dash in style.

Severe structural problems are partly accountable for the crisis that now looms: inadequate communications and transportation facilities, an antiquated industrial plant, inefficient and overgrown bureaucracies, desperately overburdened municipal services, shrinking agricultural acreage due to urban sprawl—the list seems endless. Whatever momentum may have been generated by favorable GNP growth rates has been offset by population increases. From 22 million Egyptians in 1952, there are now 50 million, and there will be 70 million by the year 2000. A net food exporter in 1972, Egypt today imports more than half its requirements.

A significant share of the blame for Egypt's predicament is the stubborn persistence of the philosophy of statism, of centralized economic planning and management, first implemented in the 1960s. An inefficient and unprofitable coterie of public sector institutions has come to dominate the heights of the economy. The government became the guaranteed employer of last resort. A pervasive system of price controls and state subsidies for consumer goods and services was instituted that includes practically every product purchased by the average Egyptian. An economic safety net was thereby erected under the entire population, but at the cost of spiraling deficit spending. With investment capital, both foreign and domestic, discouraged by these barriers to competitiveness and profitability and frustrated by overwhelming red tape and infrastructural deficiencies, reliance on massive annual infusions of foreign aid has become endemic.

In addition, a sizable foreign debt has accumulated since the economic opening to the West began in 1974; its servicing is today a major additional drag on the economy. Total debt was estimated at $34.5 billion at the end of 1985, of which some $9.2 billion was for military purposes and owed mainly to the United States. The nonmilitary debt service last year soaked up almost 32 percent of the country's foreign exchange revenues. This could rise to more than 50 percent in 1986, if oil prices remain at or below the $15 per barrel level for the remainder of this year.

The looming foreign exchange shortfall comes at a particularly bad time, for Egypt is going through a turbulent period. To its credit, the Mubarak government has allowed a substantial measure of political liberalization, freedom of the press and

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TABLE 2
FOREIGN DEBT BURDEN
(US$ billions)

	1979–82 (average)	*1983*	*1984*	*1985*
Total Debt	21.1	27.7	31.0	34.5
Civilian	16.5	20.3	22.5	25.3
Military	4.6	7.4	8.5	9.2
Total Debt Service	2	3.2	3.3	3.3
Principal	1.2	1.9	1.9	1.7
Interest	0.8	1.3	1.4	1.6

multiparty democracy after 30 years of authoritarian rule. It continues to uphold its peace policy with Israel in the face of heavy opposition from the rest of the Arab world and of mounting military tensions in the region over terrorism and the Palestinian issue. Furthermore, the regime is attempting moderate economic reforms while still retaining a strong measure of social equity between income groups.

Any *one* of these tasks could seriously test the stability of the current system. The likelihood that the regime can pursue all three without major disruption is low. Cairo's fears of unleashing social unrest if austerity measures were to be introduced are both understandable and justified, since the average Egyptian lives barely above the subsistence level. Bread price increases decreed by Sadat in January 1977 had to be hastily reversed after rioting broke out in several urban areas, and both Tunisia and Morocco have suffered similar bouts of unrest in the past two years. Potentially uncontrollable trouble could be triggered by religious turmoil, by further reductions in subsidies for food, energy or transportation, or if the authorities resort (as in similar past instances) to increased repression in order to curb opposition groups.

The past several months have seen violent demonstrations protesting price hikes, as well as clashes between Muslims and Christian Copts. Another ill omen was the costly rioting in March of this year by thousands of security police conscripts distressed by the miserable conditions of their livelihood and rumors of an extension in their forced tour of duty. The government was at pains to prove that no foreign hand or organized agitation by domestic opponents was behind the police riots. Their spontaneous character is strong evidence of

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the smoldering potential for social self-combustion existing in Egypt today.

VI

Is a bold reform program possible without political chaos? Several important elements work for stability, and should not be overlooked. The homogeneity and cohesiveness of Egyptian society are steadying factors, as are the pervasive bureaucratization of state institutions and the traditional political apathy of the bulk of the population. About 25 percent of the work force is employed in the public bureaucracy, including state enterprises. Its inefficiency and ponderousness are legendary but, given its sheer size, as an employer of last resort the bureaucracy serves as a useful instrument of social and political control for the regime.

Moreover, a strong executive, with power and policy initiative concentrated in the hands of the top leader, has remained central to Egypt's political culture. Except for brief transitional periods, national leadership has been strong, popular, able to govern effectively and generally unchallenged in its legitimacy. The present constitution, enacted in 1978, reflects this. Finally, an omnipresent, well-trained and well-equipped internal security apparatus has helped keep the lid on social unrest.

In practice, however, the president cannot rule without the continuing sanction of the armed forces. With 445,000 men under arms (320,000 army, 80,000 air defense, 25,000 air force, 20,000 navy), in addition to 139,000 paramilitary personnel, the military continues to be the mainstay of the regime. Strong, well-organized, generally conservative in outlook, they are also heavily politicized in the sense that they regard themselves as active guardians of the current political and social order. In or out of uniform, military officers continue to be the "ruling class" in contemporary Egypt. Not only do they provide the top echelon of political leadership, including President Mubarak, Defense Minister Abu Ghazala and Interior Minister Zaki Badr, but also a large proportion of the managerial and technocratic elite that runs the public sector, and a growing percentage of the more prosperous entrepreneurs in the burgeoning private sector.

The military continues to support the general lines of Mubarak's current policies, although there have been rumblings of discontent among younger officers over Egyptian passivity in the face of seemingly provocative policies from Israel in the

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past few years, and over the impact of inflation on their standards of living. Mubarak—like Sadat before him—has been very careful not to harm the military's interests. Despite the peace with Israel there have been no major cuts in force levels or overall military spending, and advanced weaponry from the United States is flowing in at the rate of $1.3 billion annually. Egypt's own arms industries are being revamped, with ambitious hopes for large-scale coproduction of weaponry with U.S. and European firms for export to the Arab states and Africa.

As the overall economy continues to lumber along, the military is purposefully striving toward self-sufficiency. The proceeds of military exports—which in 1983 amounted to over one billion dollars from Iraq alone—are kept within the defense establishment, with no apparent incorporation into the national accounts and no reporting to the parliament. At Sadat's initiative, and with Mubarak's subsequent blessing, the armed forces have undertaken a number of "civic duty" tasks, from engineering and roadbuilding to shoemaking, farming and bakeries. Military sources estimate that roughly 60 percent of all the military's needs are currently produced at their own installations. While this carries some benefits in terms of turning the burden of military preparedness to social use, self-sufficiency also furthers the separateness of the soldiers from the rest of society and encourages an already strong propensity on their part to set themselves up as omnipotent referees of the political system.

Finally, the "new class" fathered by the Open Door policies is an additional important base of support. As a social group, these newly wealthy may be relatively small in number, but they have accumulated much economic and political power over the past decade, and have an enormous stake in the survival of the present system. This group consists mainly of the entrepreneurs, professionals and high-salaried employees of the private economy, and their numbers are growing. They are being joined by members of the pre-1952 *ancien régime* who have resurfaced to claim their old privileged social and economic status, and by the military-technocratic elite of the Nasser/Sadat era, who have used their establishment links—and at times their official positions in the bureaucracy and government—to great profit in the newly liberalized economy. Among organized political groups, the main parliamentary opposition party, the liberal right-of-center New Wafd Party,

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best represents this constituency, though many members of the ruling National Democratic Party are also representative of this class.

VII

Public opinion is tilting heavily away from the basic policies of the regime, however. It is not coincidental that with growing economic and social problems has come a resurgence of Islamic fervor among the urban poor and the lower middle class (including a majority of university students) and an increasing willingness on the part of fundamentalist religious leaders to challenge the writ of the government and the legitimacy of present institutions. The Islamic revival phenomenon in evidence throughout the Middle East since the mid-1970s is a direct response to the cultural, social and economic dislocations that have accompanied the process of rapid modernization in recent decades. Where rapid population growth, massive urbanization and gross accumulations of wealth by the elite have coincided with a strong identification by the rulers with what is perceived as the alien and culturally intrusive West, fundamentalism has found fertile terrain for growth. Iran under the shah, and Egypt and Tunisia today, best fit this description.

Although deeply religious, Egyptians are a basically tolerant people, with no history of religious extremism. The overwhelming majority are Sunni Muslims—upwards of 80 percent, most of the rest being Coptic Christians—and the religious establishment, which runs the prestigious Al-Azhar University and the religious endowments, is just another state bureaucracy firmly under government control. Yet fundamentalism is a growing force, and the only one that may be capable of challenging the regime successfully in the years ahead. It feeds primarily on the alienation induced by economic penury, and by the social and cultural stresses caused by *Infitah*. It appeals mainly to the teeming masses of despairing unemployed and underemployed in the urban centers, to restless university students, and to the white-collar salaried class at the lower end of the pay scale. Decrying corruption, Westernization and materialism, fundamentalists call for a radical restructuring of society according to the Shari'a (Muslim law), a turning away from reliance on foreign powers and any special outside relationships, and a recommitment by Egypt to militant struggle for restoration of Jerusalem to Arab control.

The number of religious activists, generally estimated at

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10,000, is not high, but the attentive audience is in the millions. The main group is the Muslim Brotherhood, *Al-Ikhwan*, formed in 1928 and long influential in Egyptian politics. It provided men and ideas for the "Free Officers" coup of 1952 that brought Nasser to power, but its influence waned under Nasser's secular nationalism. Although not allowed to organize as a political party, the Brotherhood is represented in the People's Assembly by a handful of deputies elected in May 1984 through an electoral coalition with the New Wafd center-right party. It proselytizes through a number of associations and several publications, of which *Ad-Dawah* ("The Call") is widely read. While it professes to eschew violent action as a means to power, it has a history of political assassinations and secret networking.

A coterie of militant religious groupings known collectively as *Al-Jama'aat Al-Islamiyyah* proliferated in the 1970s on college campuses and quickly gained control over student organizations. Their momentum has been checked somewhat in recent years by forceful government intervention. Internal security organs again are heavily present in the universities, and many *Jama'aat* activists have been jailed. Nationwide student organizations were banned in 1979, and local bodies were brought under the control of university presidents. However, the overcrowded, understaffed campuses remain hotbeds of opposition to the regime, which could easily spill over into the streets.

Among the extreme religious groups, two are particularly worthy of mention. One, supported by Libya, was *At-Takfir Wal-Hijrah*, which gained notoriety in 1977 when it kidnapped and subsequently assassinated a former minister of religious endowments. It has since been involved in intermittent shootouts with the police and rival organizations. The other is *Al-Jihad*, which organized Sadat's murder and fought pitched battles with the security forces in the city of Asyût, apparently in hope of starting an insurrection in October 1981. It is important to note, as an index of the potential seriousness of the challenge that fundamentalism poses to the current system, that among the hundreds of *Al-Jihad* militants who were put on trial in 1981 could be found members of the presidential guard, military intelligence and security services, municipal civil servants, employees of radio and television stations and telephone facilities, as well as students and teachers from at least eight universities.

In its campaign against the policies of the Sadat and Mubarak governments, the Islamic tendency has found ready support

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among Egyptian leftists. The left in Egypt today is relatively weak, continues to suffer from the traditional split between Marxists and nationalists, and—as in other Islamic countries—has been forced onto the defensive by the religious revival. Its main asset is that it is the inheritor of Nasserist ideology—still an important legitimizer—and therefore finds its main constituency among those who depend for their livelihood on the state-run industries, the educational system, the bureaucracy and other components of the public sector economy. Unlike the entrepreneurial and service sectors, these groups have seen little benefit from the new economic policies. Because of inflation, many see themselves as worse off. Their resentment is further fueled by the conspicuous consumption of the new *Infitah* class and the relative prosperity of the lucky few who have found employment in the oil-rich states.

Disaffected intellectuals with strong Arab nationalist and/or socialist leanings, who also opposed the separate peace with Israel and close ties to the United States, are in the vanguard of the leftist opposition. The leading organization is the National Progressive Unionist Grouping, also known as the *Al-Tagammu* party. Headed by Khalid Mohieddin, one of the Free Officers group that carried out the 1952 coup, it advocates renunciation of the separate peace with Israel, a quick return by Egypt to the Arab fold, socialist economic policies, and closer ties with Moscow. Other self-avowed neo-Nasserist parties are in the process of formation. The Egyptian Communist Party is banned, however, and there are regular roundups of suspected members and sympathizers.

To the extent that the left has made common cause with the fundamentalists in opposition to the government's foreign and economic policies, it is engaged in a very risky gamble. Overestimating its popular appeal, and misjudging the temper of the times throughout the Islamic world, the left may judge itself capable of prevailing in a secular nationalist Egypt that has turned its face eastward again. But the precedent of the Iranian revolution of 1978 suggests an altogether different fate for secularist nationalism.

VIII

All this is not to suggest that an Iranian-style revolution by Islamic radicals and/or the left is impending in Egypt. The power of the state is too vast, the society's political culture is not hospitable, and the religious establishment is overwhelm-

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ingly a part of the system. Rather, by channeling, articulating and exploiting the grievances of the vast majority of underprivileged Egyptians in a time of crisis, these forces may well be in a position to bring sufficient pressure upon the regime to force it to make major changes in its economic philosophy, institutions and foreign policy orientation. The critical threat is of widespread social upheaval that, at best, might lead to indefinite postponement of desperately needed economic rationalization policies, but also could prompt an end to the liberalizing trend of the past decade in both politics and the economy.

In the period ahead, a spiraling of civil unrest in the cities (where more than half the country's population now resides) could induce the military to seek a more direct role in the running of the country's affairs. This may well be the case if it finds itself repeatedly involved in the protection of civil order, as it did during the police riots earlier this year.

A return of the military to the forefront would open a Pandora's box, since a major imponderable is the extent to which the Islamic revival movement in particular, and the malaise currently affecting Egyptian society in general, are at work within the armed forces. A substantial number of middle- and senior-ranking officers have been forced into early retirement over the past several years, reportedly in most cases because of suspected ties to Islamic radicals. Nor should one underestimate the soul-searching and national guilt felt by many officers after the separate peace with Israel. These sentiments are further stirred by what many see as a relinquishment by Egypt of its rightful role as the natural leader of the Arab world.

It would not be surprising if a new military leadership with strong religious leanings and the support of the Muslim Brotherhood should come to power before the end of this decade. Either under Mubarak or a successor regime imposed through political turmoil, Egypt is very likely to be compelled to make major changes of direction. Driven by the need to husband dwindling foreign exchange resources and tap the holdings of the private sector, the Open Door may close, with a return to more tightly centralized neo-Nasserist economic management. Disengagement from the special relationship with the United States, cold war with Israel and a return to the Arab fold would likely follow.

Clearly, the Mubarak government will resist any such drastic

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lurch, but the critical variable will be Washington's behavior; both Congress and the Reagan Administration will soon be faced with difficult choices. While the burden of aid to Egypt is extremely heavy for the U.S. taxpayer and still growing (over $2.7 billion in the current fiscal year, including the $500 million supplemental grant for emergency aid made this past summer), the political rewards are steadily dwindling. Ironically, anti-Americanism in Egypt is growing in parallel with U.S. aid. Yet Washington's willingness to provide even higher levels of economic aid with less conditionality and more U.S. sensitivity to the delicate course Cairo must tread in its inter-Arab relations are likely to prove indispensable for the maintenance of "Sadat's legacy."

IX

Several major sources of friction between Egypt and the United States have developed in recent years. The way the U.S. economic assistance program is managed by AID is a major irritant. The origin and intent of the aid package was explicitly and purposely political: to reward Egypt for its commitment to the peace process and help its leaders maintain popular support for a pro-American orientation. Its magnitude, approximating that of U.S. aid to Israel, was intended to demonstrate American evenhandedness. However, Jerusalem receives its share in the form of a direct cash transfer while much of Cairo's share is obligated to specific programs subject to AID approval.

Given the tremendous sums involved, a large number of multiyear projects must be identified and managed. According to U.S. General Accounting Office reports, as of fiscal year 1984, 77 different projects were under active AID management in such diverse fields as electric power generation, telecommunications, birth control, finance and investment, representing an outlay of over $4 billion. To administer this mammoth program, AID's mission in Cairo has grown to become the largest in the world, with some 400 employees and contract staff, in addition to hundreds of additional consultants and other support personnel. Yet a backlog of over $2.2 billion in undisbursed aid, some of it dating back several years, has accumulated as a result of project delays, intricate approval procedures and frequent discord between the AID mission and the Egyptian bureaucracy over the character and objectives of specific projects. Some of these projects, by AID's own admission, have been approved less because of their potential contri-

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bution to sound economic development than because their large size made it easier to complete the obligation of funds available and less burdensome to monitor than if the same moneys had been allocated to a number of smaller projects. Several of the more serious disputes have involved high-level Egyptian officials who have complained that forcing the pace of economic reform under AID pressure might precipitate domestic political instability. The large portfolio of ongoing projects has also created many opportunities for graft and abuse on the part of contractors and others, since sufficient hands-on monitoring cannot be provided.

The upshot of all this is that the original political intent of U.S. assistance has been vitiated, perhaps to the point where the aid program may have even become counterproductive for the United States. Many in the Egyptian elite have come to resent the American role as a multi-strings-attached Trojan horse from which a horde of American proconsuls have emerged to reshape Egypt's economy to their own designs. The high profile of the American presence in Cairo, and the ostentatious life-style of the "new class" that has emerged in a private sector naturally invigorated and supported by U.S. aid policy, are additional liabilities that could prove seriously damaging in a political crisis.

Granting that AID's guidelines and the advice of World Bank economists are what is best for Egypt's long-term economic development, does the program's continuance in its present shape make political sense if it is also fostering anti-Americanism? This is Washington's first dilemma.

The heavy debt burden created by the military component of the aid package has become another source of contention. Underlying Egypt's close ties to the United States since 1977 was a convergence of strategic perceptions and substantial agreement on Egypt's regional role. Particularly under Sadat—only slightly less so, and more quietly, under Mubarak—both governments identified Soviet expansionism as the major external threat, and the militarily weak and politically vulnerable oil-producing countries of the Arabian Peninsula as principal Soviet targets. While the possibility of a direct Soviet attack in the Persian Gulf could not be dismissed—particularly after the invasion of Afghanistan in 1979—internal subversion and cross-border offensives by regional allies or client states were seen as more likely contingencies. The activities of Moscow's closest associate in the Arab world, the People's Democratic

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Republic of Yemen (South Yemen), over the past decade exemplified the threat. Aden's support of an extended Marxist insurrection in Oman and its invasion of the Yemen Arab Republic (North Yemen) in February 1979 posed serious challenges to the political status quo in the oil regions. Closer to home, Cairo has perceived an additional range of threats to Egypt proper—all abetted by Soviet arms and encouragement as well—whether in the Arab-unionist zeal and personal animosity of Libya's Muammar al-Qaddafi, in the opposition of the Arab "rejectionists" to Egypt's independent policy toward Israel, or in Marxist Ethiopia's grievances against the neighboring Sudan.

Needless to say, for Washington the survival of the current Egyptian regime has been a primary concern, not only because of its role in the search for a Middle East settlement, but also because of the broader stabilizing impact on the region of a moderate, pro-Western government in the largest Arab state. Egypt's willingness to act beyond its borders was also particularly well received after the United States had lost in Iran the mainstay of its regional defense structure for the Gulf. Arguably, Egypt is better suited to the part of regional watchdog and potential interventionist force than the shah ever could have been. Its traditional stature within the Arab world and the legitimizing agency of pan-Arabism provide it with foils for the exercise of a regional policing function denied any non-Arab power such as Iran.

Cairo thus has perceived U.S. military aid as the basis of a strategic partnership based on common interests, in the context of which it has provided facilities for the use of U.S. forces in Lebanon and the Gulf, participated in joint military exercises with the U.S. Central Command on Egyptian soil, and helped channel U.S. military equipment to American clients in the Afghan conflict and elsewhere. The purpose of this assistance all along has been to strengthen Egypt's security and consolidate the special relationship. Sympathy with the economic plight that has affected both Egypt and Israel, partly as a result of defense spending, did lead Washington to convert all military aid to grants beginning in fiscal year 1985. But the burden of servicing the roughly $4.5 billion in military debt to the United States that accumulated in 1977–84, and which this year may amount to some $560 million in interest payments alone, jeopardizes Egypt's economic stability and possibly the very survival of the regime. Given the strong likelihood of

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default this year, the country's creditworthiness is threatened. Clearly, a long-term solution must be fashioned without delay, yet budgetary constraints in the United States present major obstacles to congressional approval of debt relief. This is Washington's second dilemma.

Perhaps the most important threat to the U.S.-Egyptian relationship, however, is one that transcends its bilateral confines. It flows from the persistently destabilizing effect of regional conflicts—such as the Arab-Israeli dispute—on inter-Arab affairs, the relations of individual Arab countries with the United States and the very character of the American approach to the Middle East. The intractable Palestinian issue is particularly insidious and presents the U.S. government with a third dilemma, clearly the most perplexing. It is the only issue that can unite Arab ranks regardless of differences in ideology or regime type, and it alone is capable of mobilizing public opinion throughout the region—and in most of the non-Arab Islamic world as well—around a common theme. Yet it is also an issue on which the United States, with strong links to Israel forged by history, culture and domestic political imperatives, has found it most difficult to satisfy Arab expectations and demands.

Given this reality, the broad strategic, economic and commercial purposes of the United States in the Middle East can be safeguarded over the long haul only by persistent diplomatic containment of this stalemated dispute, pending its eventual resolution by compromise and negotiation among the principal parties. The current war on terrorism launched by the Reagan Administration, with its resort to military force against Arab targets, only complicates the task of American diplomacy.

In an increasingly hostile regional setting, Egypt remains friendly to the United States—and committed to promoting democratic values and economic liberalism—while coping with a set of extraordinarily difficult challenges, many brought on by developments beyond its own control. For the Mubarak government to weather the growing crisis without sustaining crippling damage to the special relationship between Egypt and America, it is essential that Washington take several immediate steps:

—*More flexibility in adapting the U.S. aid program to Egypt's immediate economic needs.* This requires a larger infusion of cash for budget support, job creation and debt relief. It could be accomplished without a major increase in

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current legislated aid levels, through a massive reobligation of undisbursed project-related aid, and conversion of most, if not all, of next year's economic assistance package to a cash transfer. As an added benefit, such a conversion would facilitate the withdrawal of a large number of American AID officials currently stationed in country.

—*A large-scale reduction of the burden of servicing the military portion of the debt owed to the United States.* This debt was largely contracted in 1979–84, at market interest rates significantly higher than those available today. A refinancing vehicle could be constructed that would reduce Cairo's interest payments without risking the unwanted precedent of retroactive debt forgiveness or the near certainty of default.

—*A more coherent Middle East policy for the United States that is sensitive to the domestic political threats affecting pro-American governments.* A forceful stance toward declared enemies of U.S. regional interests—such as Libya's Qaddafi or Iran's Ayatollah Khomeini—is entirely appropriate. If the United States is not to defeat its own purposes, however, a commensurate regard for preserving a congenial political environment within which these interests can be pursued is essential. For starters, this requires a far more active search for a comprehensive Arab-Israeli peace settlement than the minimalist approach adopted by the Reagan Administration since its Lebanon misadventure, and abandonment of the will o' the wisp of unilateral military solutions to the scourge of terrorism.

These measures should not be regarded as a panacea for Egypt's deep-seated economic ills, nor would their implementation guarantee that the position of strength that America has enjoyed in Egypt for a decade will survive the turbulence ahead. Their purpose is more realistic and hard-nosed: to optimize the political returns to the United States from its second largest foreign aid package, in light of a changed political and economic environment.

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Starley L. Thompson
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NUCLEAR WINTER REAPPRAISED

Apocalyptic visions of the environmental effects of nuclear war have been a part of our popular culture for decades.[1] But apart from appreciating any entertainment value, the cognoscenti of nuclear war have regarded the doomsday predictions as ignorant at best, or dangerous propaganda at worst.

The potential global environmental effects of nuclear explosions that were known before 1982—radioactive fallout and the destruction of the stratospheric ozone layer—were almost universally accepted in the strategic weapons community as being far short of true doomsday proportions. Indeed, for the combatant nations, such uncertain "secondary" effects were thought to pale before the assured direct effects of blast, heat and local radioactivity. From a scientific standpoint, this skepticism of environmental doomsday effects was probably justified in the sense that a large nuclear war would have been more devastating to the superpowers than any known indirect effects. The discovery of "nuclear winter"[2] has challenged this skepticism because it has been much more compelling scientifically than the earlier predictions of global environmental effects. It has even been referred to[3] as an inadvertent mani-

[1] For example, Nevil Shute's novel, *On the Beach*, New York: William Morrow, 1957; and Jonathan Schell's *The Fate of the Earth*, New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1982.

[2] The theory was made public at the "World After Nuclear War" conference held Oct. 31 to Nov. 1, 1983, in Washington, D.C. The principal scientific results were first published several weeks later (Richard Turco, O. Brian Toon, Thomas Ackerman, James Pollack and Carl Sagan, "Nuclear Winter: Global Consequences of Multiple Nuclear Explosions," *Science*, Dec. 23, 1983, pp. 1283–92).

[3] Carl Sagan, "Nuclear War and Climatic Catastrophe: Some Policy Implications," *Foreign Affairs*, Winter 1983/84, pp. 257–92. See Spring 1984 issue for commentary, pp. 995–1002.

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festation of Herman Kahn's "doomsday machine."

The nuclear winter hypothesis, stated simply, contended that the smoke and dust placed in the atmosphere by a large nuclear war would prevent most sunlight from reaching the earth's surface and produce a widespread cooling of land areas. The first two climatic conclusions of the theory were the most important: effects would be severe (weeks of sub-freezing temperatures), and effects would be widespread (at least hemispheric in scale). These grim scientific conclusions gave rise to two unique implications: the possibility of human extinction, and the potential suicide of an attacker even without retaliation by the attacked party. These implications, if confirmed, would indeed approach the definition of the traditional doomsday machine.

Another assertion was added to the hypothesis in the form of a scientific judgment: namely, that a "threshold" existed above which the climatic effects of a nuclear attack would become catastrophic.[4] Thus, this doomsday machine did not possess a hair trigger, and would allow nuclear wars to be fought at some level substantially below the destructive potential of the current nuclear arsenals without global climatic catastrophe.

An additional major scientific conclusion closely followed the announcements of severe and widespread effects, but it initially received much less attention. Despite early suggestions that a nuclear winter was quite probable as long as a substantial number of large cities were attacked, many scientists concluded that the magnitude of effects would indeed be strongly dependent on uncertain, or even unknowable, factors.

The severe conclusions about nuclear winter provoked a broad spectrum of suggested responses for strategic policy. For many who took nuclear winter seriously, a perceived solution was a drastic reduction of nuclear arms to a level no greater than that necessary to constitute a minimal deterrent.[5] On the other hand, the U.S. Department of Defense—which accepted the possibility of nuclear winter—argued that strengthening deterrence, combined with more research into nuclear winter,

[4] Carl Sagan succinctly summed up the three major implications: "There is a real danger of the extinction of humanity. A threshold exists at which the climatic catastrophe could be triggered. . . . A major first strike may be an act of national suicide, even if no retaliation occurs." *Ibid.*, p. 292.

[5] *Ibid.*, p. 284.

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would be the best response.[6] Thus, the potential for nuclear winter effects was used by the Department of Defense as another reason to support the continued modernization of U.S. strategic forces with smaller, more accurate warheads, and to pursue the Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI). Moreover, it was suggested that the ongoing modernization of strategic doctrine—expanded kinds of options for nuclear strikes and options for "limited" strikes—would reduce the probability of nuclear war by providing a more credible deterrent.[7]

Cynics and agnostics were also well represented in the policy debate. Many considered the conclusions drawn from the nuclear winter theory, especially the early ones, to be too uncertain to provide the basis for any discussion of policy implications.[8] Others pointed out that the horrible effects of nuclear war for combatant nations were already widely accepted,[9] that any environmental or indirect effects on noncombatants would not further motivate the superpowers to seek arms control, and that additional bad effects would only add marginally to an already strong mutual deterrence.

We intend to show that on scientific grounds the global apocalyptic conclusions of the initial nuclear winter hypothesis can now be relegated to a vanishingly low level of probability. Thus the argument that nuclear winter provides the sole basis for drastic strategic arms reductions has been greatly weakened. But, at the same time, there is little that is thoroughly understood about the environmental effects of a nuclear war. In particular, we do not think that all environmental effects should once again be considered as "secondary." Important

[6] Caspar W. Weinberger, *The Potential Effects of Nuclear War on the Climate*, a report to the U.S. Congress, Department of Defense, March 1985.

[7] Assistant Secretary of Defense Richard Perle in testimony before the U.S. Senate Committee on Armed Services, Oct. 3, 1985. See also Albert Wohlstetter, "Between an Unfree World and None: Increasing Our Choices," *Foreign Affairs*, Summer 1985, pp. 962–94.

[8] For example, Edward Teller has said: "Highly speculative theories of worldwide destruction—even of the end of life on Earth—used as a call for a particular kind of political action serve neither the good reputation of science nor dispassionate political thought." *Nature*, Aug. 23, 1984, p. 624. An opposing view was expressed by Paul Warnke: "My discomfort changes to dismay when I read critics of the 'nuclear winter' hypothesis who argue that this phenomenon should not have been reported until all the uncertainties were significantly reduced." Hearings before the Subcommittee on International Trade, Finance, and Security Economics of the Joint Economic Committee of the U.S. Congress, July 11, 1984.

[9] Then Assistant Secretary of State Richard Burt stated on the ABC News program "Nightline," Nov. 1, 1983, that "This might be one issue where the public, the politicians, the diplomats . . . may be ahead of the scientists." And Brent Scowcroft has noted: "The awesomeness of nuclear war has been apparent in political circles for a long, long time. And what we are talking about are *degrees* of horrendousness." American Association for the Advancement of Science Annual Meeting, May 1984.

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environmental and widespread societal effects of nuclear war remain quite probable and do suggest further scientific and policy considerations. Our current understanding of environmental effects will be reviewed and then used to bolster arguments for strengthened strategic stability, not necessarily excluding newer strategic systems, but at significantly reduced levels of arsenals.

II

It is reasonable to ask why the scientific basis of the theory of nuclear winter still provokes such divergent scientific opinions. The answer involves both the complexity of the problems and the severity of predicted effects. It is important to remember that the widespread radioactive fallout and ozone effects, although substantial, were never really thought by knowledgeable researchers to have a doomsday potential. In contrast, the original nuclear winter results showed truly catastrophic consequences arising from general war scenarios in the best available calculations. Thus, this new hypothesis could not be readily dismissed. Moreover, the problem of nuclear winter involves more scientific disciplines and more crucial areas of uncertainty than the earlier environmental problems. In particular, estimates of smoke production cannot be made from old nuclear test data and cannot be well bounded theoretically.

Initially, the scientific basis of nuclear winter rested exclusively with the TTAPS group and their first calculations.[10] After the original discovery that smoke could pose the most serious environmental threat of a nuclear war,[11] the TTAPS group began to use a computer model to study the effects of war-generated smoke and dust on the earth's climate. The model was one-dimensional; that is, it did not take into account north-south and east-west directions, but instead treated the earth as a homogeneous all-land sphere having a temperature that

[10] TTAPS (pronounced "taps") is the acronym composed of the initials of the researchers in the group (see footnote 2 for names). Preliminary TTAPS results were made available to a consultative group of physical scientists and biologists in the spring of 1983.

[11] Paul Crutzen and John Birks were the first to recognize quantitatively that climatically significant amounts of smoke could be produced in a nuclear war. Their work, "The Atmosphere After a Nuclear War: Twilight at Noon," *Ambio*, Vol. XI, No. 2–3, 1982, pp. 114–25, catalyzed all subsequent research on the nuclear winter problem. It should be noted, however, with perhaps some embarrassment to the scientific and military establishments, that a remarkably accurate qualitative description of the phenomenon was given by Christopher Anvil in his short story "Torch," which described the climatic aftermath of a nuclear explosion that ignited an oil deposit. *Astounding Science Fiction* magazine, April 1957, pp. 41–50.

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depended only on the up-down direction (atmospheric altitude). Thus, the model had no geography, no winds, no seasons, instantaneous spread of smoke to the hemispheric scale, and no feedback of atmospheric circulation changes on the rate of smoke washout by rainfall. Despite these limitations, the TTAPS calculations did offer state-of-the-art estimates of the sunlight and infrared radiation absorption of a *given* amount of smoke and dust in a vertical column of the atmosphere.

The TTAPS study included numerous war scenarios that were used in simulations of climatic effects. The curve marked in Figure 1 (p. 994) shows the time evolution of land surface temperature produced by the TTAPS nominal, or "baseline," case in which a 5,000-megaton nuclear war was estimated to produce 225 million metric tons of smoke and 65 million tons of small-size stratospheric dust. Many other war scenarios generated catastrophic coolings of varying severity, but the TTAPS authors responsibly cautioned that the weaknesses of the model would have to be addressed before the calculations could be treated as conclusive for any given war scenario.

By the summer of 1983 the major areas of uncertainty in the nuclear winter problem were generally recognized even though public announcement of the theory was months away. Since that time increasing numbers of researchers have been steadily improving our understanding of these critical areas. Excluding various war scenarios, the most crucial nuclear winter uncertainties were thought to be: (1) the amount and "blackness" of generated smoke, its initial altitude distribution and its removal by rainfall in clouds associated with the fires; (2) the degree to which smoke might spread globally and how fast it would be further removed from the atmosphere; and (3) the detailed regional and seasonally dependent pattern of weather and climatic effects. Significant progress has now been made in research in each of these areas, especially the prediction of global climatic effects given a scenario of smoke in the atmosphere.

III

As noted above, one of the most controversial concepts to emerge from nuclear winter research was the notion that a threshold amount of smoke could trigger catastrophic climatic

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effects.[12] This notion was based on a number of simulations in the TTAPS study, but was primarily founded on a hypothetical "100-megaton war" in which 100 major cities were targeted exclusively. The smoke so generated was sufficient to cause northern hemispheric land surface temperatures to drop well below the freezing point in the one-dimensional model.[13] Ignoring for the moment the question of whether such a "city-busting" war scenario is plausible, we can use it to illustrate why the strategic implications of the threshold concept caused it to be widely debated.

One bizarre implication of the threshold theory was that a sharp threshold might tempt an attacker to use up the entire "quota" of smoke production, leaving little alternative to the side considering retaliation but to trigger nuclear winter or do nothing.[14] Furthermore, it was suggested that a well-defined threshold might encourage the fighting of "small" nuclear wars.

In response to these sorts of criticisms Carl Sagan replied, quite sensibly, that it would be dangerous to gamble that the spiral of escalation in the wake of a sub-threshold attack would remain safely below the level necessary to create serious climatic effects. Indeed, this danger is what led to the most visible and controversial aspect of Sagan's strategic policy conclusions: the imperative for reducing the world's nuclear arsenals to a level safely below that sufficient to trigger nuclear winter. Given that the total yield of 100 megatons could trigger nuclear winter, the implication was that the level of superpower arsenals would have to be reduced to about one percent of their current value. (We will refer to this degree of nuclear arms reductions as "drastic cuts.") Thus, the call for a policy of drastic cuts in strategic arsenals was directly linked to the threshold concept.

If one accepts the idea of a threshold for nuclear winter for

[12] Sagan, quoted in Paul Ehrlich, Carl Sagan, Donald Kennedy and Walter Orr Roberts, *The Cold and the Dark: The World After Nuclear War*, New York: W.W. Norton, 1984 (proceedings of conference cited in footnote 2), pp. 26–27; and Sagan, "Nuclear War and Climatic Catastrophe," *op. cit.*

[13] All TTAPS temperature estimates that we discuss here refer only to the cases done for a completely land-covered planet. The complementary case, the ocean-covered planet, produced very little temperature effect due to the large heat capacity of the oceans.

[14] Richard L. Wagner, Jr., assistant to the secretary of defense for atomic energy, in hearings before the Subcommittee on International Trade, Finance, and Security Economics of the Joint Economic Committee of the U.S. Congress, July 12, 1984. This idea was also touched on by Sagan, "Nuclear War and Climatic Catastrophe," *op. cit.* Wagner also stated: "I doubt that it will turn out that there will be a sharp threshold" and "I think it is a tremendously speculative thing."

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the sake of strategic argument, then the question of how to quantify it becomes important. Given the substantial uncertainties in defining a threshold, and the potentially grave consequences of exceeding it, the argument was made for deriving a threshold based on a worst-case smoke-producing assumption of targeting. Taken in this light, the strategically dubious "100-megaton war" can be seen as a worst-case assumption serving to delineate a prudent threshold. The 100-megaton scenario used 1,000 warheads, but it was never suggested that the threshold would be very well defined. For example, in his *Foreign Affairs* article, Sagan set a crude threshold of around 500 to 2,000 warheads, primarily attributing the uncertainty to assumptions of targeting and weapon yields.

Ironically, just when the strategic implications of the threshold concept were starting to be debated in the strategic policy community, the strongest scientific arguments against the concept emerged. To understand why the threshold concept is not scientifically persuasive, one must be aware of the limitations inherent in the models that do not take account of geography.

It is tempting to interpret a calculation in which surface temperature is represented as a single global number in terms of a dramatic physical threshold, e.g., the freezing point. But such calculations cannot capture the true geographical and seasonal heterogeneity of climate. A global model developed at the National Center for Atmospheric Research studied the inclusion of north-south and east-west dimensions and how such improvements would modify the results of one-dimensional models.[15]

We found that the oceans, with their vast storage of heat, would reduce the magnitude of average continental cooling by a factor of two in the summer, compared to the cooling calculated by assuming a land-covered planet. The estimated cooling effect in winter was smaller by a factor of ten than the TTAPS annual estimate, because northern hemisphere mid-latitude land areas are already cold in winter. Even when we assumed a uniform smoke cloud to exist over the middle part of the northern hemisphere, the surface temperature reduction was unevenly distributed—much less along western coasts and

[15] Curt Covey, Stephen Schneider and Starley Thompson, "Global Atmospheric Effects of Massive Smoke and Dust Injections From a Nuclear War: Results From General Circulation Model Simulations," *Nature*, Mar. 1, 1984, pp. 21–25. These results were publicly presented by Schneider on Nov. 1 at the "World After Nuclear War" conference (see footnote 2).

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even more than one-dimensional model results in some mid-continental cold-weather fluctuations in summertime.

In short, simulations using geographically realistic models produced such a wide range of consequences for any given war scenario that it became clear that the elegant and strategically compelling idea of a threshold was an artifact of a simplified model.[16] This observation remains true. Hence, it is questionable to predicate any strategic policy options on the existence of a nuclear winter threshold, even a "fuzzy" one.

IV

Although the bulk of the news media coverage of the nuclear winter debate in late 1983 concentrated on the more dramatic conclusions and criticisms of the theory, there was some press attention to the increasingly complex scientific research efforts that were under way. As these scientific efforts intensified in 1984 and 1985, however, popular interest in nuclear winter appeared to have decreased. On the other hand, interest in the scientific community picked up momentum as the issues became more complex and thus more scientifically exciting.

In 1982, after the discovery of the smoke problem, an international group of scientists began to plan a major study of the environmental consequences of nuclear war under the auspices of the Scientific Committee for Problems of the Environment (SCOPE)—a subgroup of the well-respected International Council of Scientific Unions. The SCOPE findings were released in two volumes in September 1985, the first covering physical effects and the second biological and other environmental effects.[17] Also in 1982, a group of U.S. scientists at the National Academy of Sciences (NAS) realized that a reassessment of the atmospheric effects of nuclear war was needed, particularly since a previous academy study published in 1975 ignored the importance of fires and smoke. This new NAS study, co-chaired by Harvard's George Carrier and retired

[16] One of the authors, Stephen Schneider, put the issue this way: "I view the climatic aftereffects issues as a continuous spectrum with decreasing probability of increased consequences, that is, random quick freezes at the low consequence end of the spectrum, and global-scale, long term nuclear winter at the other." Quoted in Ehrlich *et al.*, *op. cit.*, p. 107.

[17] A. B. Pittock *et al.*, *Environmental Consequences of Nuclear War, Volume I: Physical and Atmospheric Effects.* New York: John Wiley and Sons, 1986, 359 pp. M. A. Harwell and T. C. Hutchinson, *Environmental Consequences of Nuclear War, Volume II: Ecological and Agricultural Effects.* New York: John Wiley and Sons, 1985, 523 pp.

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Vice Admiral William Moran, was released in December 1984.[18]

Both studies of physical effects stressed the same two themes. First, that there remained great uncertainties—some that could never be resolved—over every link in the chain of phenomena leading to the two roughly defined phases of environmental effects: "acute" (one to 30 days) and "chronic" (months to years). Second, despite the cascading uncertainties, both reports concluded in strong language that very large climatic effects were possible and should not be ignored. Not surprisingly, these scientific committees emphasized that accelerated scientific research to reduce the uncertainties should be a high priority.

It is noteworthy that both studies examined war scenarios that were not based on either worst-case assumptions or most likely scenarios.[19] Instead, "baseline" cases were considered that were believed at the time to be plausible examples of a large general nuclear war. The NAS committee in 1983 adopted a baseline scenario that placed 180 million metric tons of moderately dark smoke in the atmosphere within a few days of the start of a 6,500-megaton nuclear war. This scenario became the basis for many subsequent analyses of nuclear winter through 1985. In a sense, these reports—especially NAS which was available months earlier than SCOPE—helped to legitimize nuclear winter as a scientific research topic in general, and the use of mathematical climate models as appropriate tools for prediction in particular.

The SCOPE effort went further than the NAS report because it included a study of biological effects. The U.S. interagency research effort in nuclear winter deliberately downplayed biological research as premature, given the many uncertainties in

[18] National Research Council, *The Effects on the Atmosphere of a Major Nuclear Exchange*. Washington, D.C.: National Academy Press, 1985.

[19] There are two philosophies regarding the choice of scenarios in scientific studies of the nuclear winter problem. One, represented by Carl Sagan, considers the use of clearly stated near-worst-case scenarios to be essential to elucidating risks as apocalyptic as those associated with the original nuclear winter findings. The opposing philosophy has been expressed by George Rathjens and Ronald Siegal: "Individual and public policy views should be based . . . on a best estimate of the probability and severity of nuclear winter effects, taking into account all the attendant uncertainties. . . . [Difficult trade-offs] should *not* be made on the basis of the possibility that nuclear winter cannot be excluded." G. W. Rathjens and R. H. Siegel, "Nuclear Winter: Strategic Significance," *Issues in Science and Technology*, Winter 1985, pp. 124, 127. The relative acceptability of either of these views should depend on the perceived probability and severity of effects; e.g., if the probability of climatic catastrophe were shown to be one-in-ten, then even costly policy responses to the threat could be defended much more cogently than if the same consequences had chances of one-in-a-hundred.

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the physical sciences still to be resolved.[20] Nevertheless, consideration of the biological consequences was appropriate for two basic reasons. First, if a global "deep freeze" scenario is considered, then it is rather obvious that the biological consequences would be catastrophic to both natural and agricultural systems worldwide. But by late 1984 it was becoming increasingly apparent that such global freeze scenarios were of exceedingly small probability, and that the response of vegetation to coolings of less intensity and shorter duration needed to be assessed. This, of course, is a more challenging scientific problem than simply observing that everything would freeze; thus, assembling an international group of biologists to think about such issues was sensible.

The second reason to consider biological consequences before all the physical facts were confirmed is simply that it is important for physical scientists to know what variables are of greatest importance to estimating biological damages from low temperatures, radioactivity or other factors. Therefore, having some idea of what was important to the biologists could help the physical scientists choose their approaches to atmospheric research questions.

Finally, the SCOPE biological report was important for what it did—and did not—say. It did not discuss the plausibility of human extinction as a result of nuclear war, thus implicitly rejecting the notion that extinction was a "real possibility." It did, on the other hand, follow up on the indirect global societal effects of nuclear war that had been known for decades but never treated in a very quantitative manner. For example, the SCOPE biologists calculated that at least hundreds of millions of people could die of starvation in noncombatant nations from disruption of food trade alone, even if no smoke, dust or radioactivity entered their territories. Any comprehensive assessment of the indirect consequences of nuclear war clearly needs to consider not only environmental effects, such as atmospheric changes and radioactive fallout, but disruptions of basic societal functions as well (e.g., trade in basic commodities such as food, fertilizer, medicine, spare parts and fuel). Thus, even if further research substantially reduces the probability of environmental effects, the examination of global societal

[20] Richard Perle noted in testimony before the U.S. Senate Committee on Armed Services on Oct. 3, 1985, that "I do not believe that it is, given all the other priorities of research, that it is vital that we study second and third order biological consequences of nuclear war."

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effects undertaken by the SCOPE biologists should be a very high priority for further study.

Let us sum up: despite the continued potential for serious nuclear winter effects, there does not seem to be a real potential for human extinction; nor is there a plausible threshold for severe environmental effects. Thus, the two unique conclusions of the original nuclear winter idea with the most important implications for policy have been removed.

V

There remains the question of the extent to which the indirect environmental effects will be significant compared to the direct effects of nuclear war. To make such an assessment requires an accounting of the state-of-the-art research on nuclear winter. The following discussion describes our current understanding of the physical effects of a nuclear winter, a substantial portion of which has been developed after the publication of the most recent general assessments, the SCOPE reports, which include material up to the summer of 1985.

Given a plausible war scenario, perhaps the single most uncertain area of the nuclear winter problem is the determination of how much smoke would be produced, how "black" the smoke would be, and how much would be rained out immediately. Studies are in progress now to narrow these uncertainties. One recent estimate indicates that the amount of smoke initially produced in a major nuclear war may have been overestimated by roughly a factor of two to four in the NAS report.[21] The blackness of the smoke (determined by the percentage of black carbon soot in the smoke), however, can be just as important as the amount of smoke in determining atmospheric effects. Indeed, an effective amount of smoke can be defined as the product of the total amount of smoke and the smoke blackness. It is possible that current appraisals underestimate the blackness of typical smoke from urban fires. This potential error could substantially compensate for a downward revision in estimates of total smoke produced.

Potential rainout of smoke near the fires (like the "black rain" that followed the atomic bombing of Hiroshima and the subsequent conflagration) controls the amount of smoke that can eventually spread and cause climatic effects. The estimates

[21] George Bing, "Estimates of Total Combustible Material in NATO and Warsaw Pact Countries," Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory Report UCRL-93192, 1986.

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of rapid rainout of smoke in large thunderstorms associated with city fires are very problematic, but ambitious recent calculations indicate that even under ideal rainout conditions a substantial amount of smoke would probably remain in the atmosphere.[22]

State-of-the-art assessments of the climatic effects of nuclear winter are based on results from fully three-dimensional models that simulate the evolving patterns of global weather on an earth having realistic geography.[23] The simulations recently performed at the National Center for Atmospheric Research have used a model which resolves the atmosphere from the surface to about 30 kilometers altitude (the middle stratosphere) and which resolves geographic features at about 5° latitude by 7° longitude resolution.[24] The model includes transport by winds, removal of particles from the atmosphere by rainfall and other processes, and detailed calculations of sunlight transmission and infrared "greenhouse" effects—all for both smoke and dust, although smoke is by far the larger

[22] William Cotton, Greg Tripoli and Chiang Chen, "Recent Results of Convective Response to Fire Storms," paper presented at the Defense Nuclear Agency Global Effects Program Technical Review at Ames Research Center, Moffett Field, Calif., Feb. 25, 1986. This study found that removal of smoke in thunderstorms could range in efficiency from a few percent up to 80 percent, depending on two different sets of extreme assumptions regarding the properties of smoke particles. If fresh smoke particles are not readily coated by water to form cloud droplets, then a reasonable estimate of the fraction of smoke removed in a firestorm rain cloud might be ten percent (Richard Turco, personal communication). For comparison, the NAS report assumed, essentially as a guess, that 50 percent of the generated smoke would be removed in a day or so in rainstorms associated with the fires. National Research Council, *op. cit.*

[23] Major global modeling efforts have been undertaken at the Computing Center of the U.S.S.R. Academy of Sciences (V. Aleksandrov, "Update of Climatic Impacts of Nuclear Exchange," presented at the International Seminar on Nuclear War, Fourth Session, The Nuclear Winter and the New Defense Systems: Problems and Perspectives, Erice, Italy, Aug. 19–24, 1984; G.L. Stenchikov and P. Carl, "Climatic Consequences of Nuclear War: Sensitivity Against Large-Scale Inhomogeneities in the Initial Atmospheric Pollutions," Academy of Sciences of the German Democratic Republic, Central Institute for Electron Physics, printed monograph, October 1985); The National Center for Atmospheric Research (S. Thompson, "Global Interactive Transport Simulations of Nuclear War Smoke," *Nature*, Sept. 5, 1985, pp. 35–39); The Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory (M. C. MacCracken and J. J. Walton, "The Effects of Interactive Transport and Scavenging of Smoke on the Calculated Temperature Change Resulting From Large Amounts of Smoke," LLNL Report UCRL-91446); and the Los Alamos National Laboratory (R. C. Malone, L. H. Auer, G. A. Glatzmaier, M. C. Wood and O. B. Toon, "Influence of Solar Heating and Precipitation Scavenging on the Simulated Lifetime of Post-Nuclear War Smoke," *Science*, Oct. 18, 1985, pp. 317–19). For a summary of nuclear winter studies, see J. Peterson, "Scientific Studies of the Unthinkable—The Physical and Biological Effects of Nuclear War," *Ambio*, Vol. XV, No. 2, 1986, pp. 60–69.

[24] S. L. Thompson, S. H. Schneider, F. Giorgi, C. Covey, V. Ramaswamy, "Atmospheric Effects of Nuclear War Aerosols in GCM Simulations," papers presented at the Defense Nuclear Agency Global Effects Program Technical Review at Ames Research Center, Moffett Field, Calif., Feb. 25, 1986.

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contributor to climatic effects. In contrast, recall that the TTAPS calculations had no geographic resolution, and hence could not adequately predict the global spread or removal of smoke from the atmosphere. Of course, even the most sophisticated models include simplifying internal assumptions; thus we anticipate that present quantitative results will change somewhat as improvements continue to be made.

In the recent NCAR research, we have not adopted any particular detailed war scenario other than the obvious assumption that the smoke and dust would come from the NATO and Warsaw Pact countries.[25] In fact, there is no general consensus on the amount and blackness of smoke that would exist in the atmosphere a few days after the start of a major nuclear exchange like the 6,500-megaton war the NAS study used as a baseline. Given this large range of uncertainty, we have used three different amounts of moderately black smoke—20, 60 and 180 million tons—to bracket what is currently thought to be a reasonable range of smoke amount and blackness for a large nuclear war. It should be pointed out that the NAS baseline smoke amount estimate (180 million tons) now appears to lie closer to the plausible upper limit of effective smoke amount than it once was thought to. The war is assumed to take place during a typical day in July, with smoke generated for the first two days.[26]

The land surface temperatures produced by the three smoke cases are shown in Figure 1. This figure shows that the average temperature changes for the northern hemisphere mid-latitudes are considerably smaller than the original estimates of one-dimensional models, and are about two-thirds of the temperature changes found in our original three-dimensional calculations. These temperature changes more closely describe a nuclear "fall" than a nuclear winter.

[25] The geographic resolution of the model, although typical of global atmospheric models, limits the description of the smoke and dust sources to broadly defined regions. More realistically, the atmospheric injection of smoke and dust would occur in plumes and clouds over many probable target locations. Small-to-moderate-scale atmospheric circulations would transport and thin the dense plumes until they merged into the large patches that the global model can actually resolve. Global calculations with this degree of explicit detail are not yet possible. Instead, all global weather/climate models must approximate some weather phenomena, such as thunderstorms, that are too small to be explicitly resolved. It is not known to what extent this affects the results of nuclear winter, particularly the rate of smoke rainout. However, some important approximations that are known to be successful for normal atmospheric conditions can be generalized to nuclear winter conditions.

[26] The absolute drops in temperature will be largest in June or July at the time of maximum sunlight, but the maximum agricultural impact could occur in spring or fall when normal temperatures are closer to minimum tolerance levels for certain crops.

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The reasons for the moderation of temperature compared to the original calculations are well understood: first, the oceans have a large heat capacity, which ameliorates the cooling over land. Second, about three-fourths of the smoke is removed from the model's atmosphere over the course of 30 days. Third, the infrared "greenhouse" effect of the smoke, which was not included in earlier three-dimensional models, does produce a significant mitigation of the surface cooling.[27] We

FIGURE 1



NOTE: The three curves denoted as "NCAR" give the average July surface temperature of all land areas within the 30–50°N latitude zone for the 30 days following a hypothetical one-day nuclear war in which three different amounts of moderately black smoke are injected into the atmosphere over the course of the first two days. "Tg" refers to teragrams, or million metric tons, of smoke. (A metric ton is 2,200 pounds.) Temperatures at individual geographic locations and times can be more or less severe than the averages shown. The normal July surface temperature and the freezing point of pure water are shown as the thin horizontal lines across the graph. "Wiggles" in the curves are a consequence of averaging over weather variability, which the model simulates. The result of the first 30 days of the TTAPS model baseline case (see p.985) is shown as the dotted curve and is given for reference only since it is difficult to compare directly the NCAR results with the TTAPS results. The TTAPS model predicted an average northern hemisphere temperature for an all-land planet for annually averaged conditions. One difference between annual average and July cases can be seen in the colder Day 0 starting point for the TTAPS curve.

[27] The infrared effects of smoke and dust were included in earlier one-dimensional calculations (such as TTAPS), but the infrared effects, which moderate the surface cooling by roughly 5°C, were not considered to be very significant when compared to coolings of 30–40°C. The moderating effect is roughly constant, thus it takes on more relative importance when the basic cooling is 15–20°C, as found in several three-dimensional models.

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must stress that our results are for July, the month in which the temperature changes are likely to be largest. Similar calculations for January show much less effect simply because at that time it is already winter in the northern hemisphere.

The curves in the figures represent averages over all the land areas in wide latitude zones. At any specific location in the model, however, the temperatures are considerably more variable. For example, some large areas in the interiors of the North American and Eurasian continents, particularly in Canada and Siberia, fall below freezing intermittently in the two cases of larger amounts of smoke. On the other hand, some areas near coasts experience little effect. Thus, it can be misleading to interpret the curves on the figures without taking into account geographic and weather variability as well. Indeed, for certain biological impacts it would be sufficient to have only

FIGURE 2



NOTE: This figure is similar to Figure 1, except that the curves give land surface temperatures for three adjacent latitude zones in the northern hemisphere for the case in which 180 million metric tons (teragrams, Tg) of smoke are produced in July. The black dots at the start of each curve indicate the normal temperature of each latitude zone before the addition of smoke to the atmosphere. Compare the smaller drop (about 5°C) in the curve for latitude 10–30°N and the larger drops (10–15°C) in the other two curves, indicating the smaller cooling effect for the subtropical areas.

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a few hours of temperature below some critical level—e.g., subfreezing for wheat, or 10–15°C (50–59°F) for rice.[28]

The global spread of acute climatic effects is assessed in Figure 2. Previous atmospheric circulation models have supported the notion that smoke would spread upwards and across the equator into the southern hemisphere for a war taking place in the northern hemisphere during the summer. While this has not changed, our current estimate is that the *amount* of smoke thus transported would be relatively small. This is reflected in the temperature curve for the subtropical latitude band 10–30°N, which shows only a small average effect, even for our largest case of 180 million tons of smoke. Equatorial and southern hemispheric temperature effects are very small in all these cases. The much greater severity of effects at high northern latitudes, however, is shown by the results for 50–70°N.

Since smoke is continuously removed from the atmosphere in these simulations, an interesting question to ask is whether one could minimize nuclear winter effects by fighting a war

FIGURE 3



NOTE: The land surface temperature of the 30–50°N latitude zone for two cases having different assumed war durations, each of which produces a total of 60 million tons (teragrams, Tg) of smoke. The "one-day" war, allowing for some delay in fires, actually produces smoke over two days. The "ten-day" protracted war produces smoke continually over ten days, but at a lower rate than the one-day case. Despite the fact that smoke is continually being removed in each case, the slower rate of smoke input in the ten-day case actually worsens the climatic effects when compared to the faster war.

[28] Harwell and Hutchinson, *op. cit.* (SCOPE, Vol. 2.)

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slowly enough that a damaging amount of smoke could not build up in the atmosphere. This idea is not merely academic since the notion of being prepared to fight a "protracted" nuclear war has become a topic of some debate in the past decade. We have examined this idea by assuming a ten-day war that generates the same total amount of smoke as the one-day war. The results of the case using 60 million tons of smoke are shown in Figure 3. The steady input of smoke in the protracted war case actually produces *more* cooling after a week than the rapid war case. The implication from this simulation is that fighting a large war slowly (in the unlikely event that such a thing is possible) would not necessarily ameliorate environmental effects.

The difficult issue of chronic climatic effects (months to years) has not received nearly as much attention as the acute nuclear winter effects (one to 30 days), but will undoubtedly assume greater research importance in the future. A substantial fraction (perhaps ten to 30 percent) of smoke injection from any massive nuclear war would likely reside in the stratosphere for months before finally being removed from the atmosphere. Although the obscuration of sunlight caused by such a shroud would not be sufficient to cause severe surface cooling, it could create other serious climatic effects, e.g., anomalous late spring and early autumn frosts, or a disruption of normal monsoons and summer rainfall over continental areas. Such effects could greatly hamper agricultural recovery in those areas still having sufficient social stability and economic resources to carry out viable agricultural practices.

The previously discovered chronic environmental problems of global radioactive fallout and ozone layer depletion continue to be studied.[29] It now appears that the trend to smaller warheads has made the intermediate-term (days to weeks) and global fallout problems somewhat more serious, but the ozone problem has become less serious.[30] As noted earlier, neither

[29] Pittock *et al.*, *op. cit.*; Harwell and Hutchinson, *op. cit.* (the SCOPE reports); National Research Council, *op. cit.* (the NAS report).

[30] Estimates for intermediate time scale fallout have been revised upward because modern, smaller-yield warheads place the explosion cloud at a lower altitude where rain can bring the radioactive dust to the ground before it has a chance to decay harmlessly in the atmosphere. (Local fallout, which occurs within a day, has long been known to be a serious problem.) In addition, smaller-yield warheads often have a higher fission yield fraction, which also contributes to more radioactive fallout. The stratospheric ozone layer is less affected by smaller-yield weapons because the fireball-produced chemical compounds that affect the ozone layer do not reach the stratosphere as effectively. It is possible that synergistic effects involving a smoke-distorted atmospheric circulation and temperatures could change the current assessment of the ozone problem, however, but this idea has not yet been examined in any detail.

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problem *considered separately* is thought to pose a global threat that is substantial compared to the direct effects of a nuclear war. But considering all the chronic, indirect effects of a large nuclear war separately may be a misleading exercise; all the chronic effects would, to some degree, act synergistically with each other, and with the direct weapons effects, to produce unprecedented worldwide human misery.

The interaction between a failure of the Asian summer monsoon and the disruption of international trade in food, for example, would be a potent prescription for mass starvation on the Indian subcontinent. Many other interactions can be speculated upon, such as those of radiation-induced depression of the human immune system, disruption of medical services and epidemics of contagious diseases; such synergisms deserve the serious study that might allow us to draw less speculative conclusions. Therefore it is still quite plausible that climatic disturbances, radioactive fallout, ozone depletions and the interruption of basic societal services, when taken together, could threaten more people *globally* than would the direct effects of explosions in a large nuclear war.

In assessments of the severity of the nuclear winter problem, the long-term trend in temperature estimates has been directed away from the most severe effects. This trend has not been a smooth one, however. Researchers have made refinements and enhancements to the theory that have made the climatic effects both more and less severe. This was expected because original estimates of uncertain effects tried to incorporate "middle of the road" assumptions. Thus, researchers knew that the tentative conclusions about nuclear winter would change with time depending on the latest refinements. This is, of course, a legitimate and normal process of scientific assessment. Despite the potential for future changes in conclusions, we think it is unlikely that some unforeseen effect would either bring the estimates of nuclear winter back to the range of total climatic catastrophe or eliminate environmental effects altogether.

The cases we have examined (20, 60 and 180 million tons of smoke) bracket what we believe to be a wide range of probable effective smoke amounts for a large nuclear war. But it is conceivable that even larger amounts of smoke could be created, although the probability now seems small. Similarly, less than 20 million tons of smoke could be produced, at some low probability, even after a large war in which many cities were struck. In the absence of near-infinite consequences (e.g., hu-

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man extinction) we believe it is unwise to base expensive policy decisions (e.g., SDI) solely on either of these very low probability cases.[31]

Despite the downward trend in assessments of the effects of nuclear winter, there are good reasons to continue the research effort. First, it is essential that, to the extent possible, decision-making be placed on an increasingly firm factual basis. Second, as noted, assessments of smoke amounts do change and must be tracked, for example, by an ongoing parallel research program to improve atmospheric models. Third, the nuclear winter problem has strong links to several other atmospheric environmental problems (e.g., acid rain and the carbon dioxide "greenhouse effect"), and has contributed to improving our understanding of the behavior of the atmosphere. Finally, and perhaps most importantly, the significant environmental and indirect effects that remain highly plausible must be more carefully considered.

VI

Our current understanding of the climatic effects of nuclear war has changed the way that many previously proposed policy implications of nuclear winter should be viewed. Indeed, several of the strategic implications of nuclear winter, as it was originally conceived, are no longer justified: for example, the anxieties about a "threshold" for severe effects and the notion that climatic effects alone would serve as an in-kind retaliation against a major preemptive strike. The idea of automatic suicide is now unsupportable given that a scenario of weeks of continuous subfreezing temperatures on a continental scale is no longer plausible. However, the substantial amounts of smoke, dust and radioactivity that would necessarily be injected into the atmosphere in any large-scale preemptive strike should still add some measure of deterrent value, even if short of assured national suicide.

Apart from biologically oriented environmental effects, atmospheric smoke and dust could affect strategic surveillance, early warning, missile defense, communications, and attack

[31] George Rathjens, in testimony before the U.S. House of Representatives Committee on Science and Technology, Mar. 14, 1985, said: "If I did the worst case analysis [regarding nuclear winter], and if there were no costs involved [to build SDI], I'd say let's go ahead with SDI. You know, it might be one chance in a million that it would work and it would prevent nuclear winter. I think that's absolutely crazy, because we'd be spending a trillion dollars on an insurance policy that probably would not be effective against a threat that is improbable."

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assessment during a nuclear war. The primary effect would be obscuration of visible and infrared light that could, for example, degrade the information available from satellites or hinder the atmospheric propagation of laser beams used for communications or defense. It is arguable whether potential obscuration effects are strategically important because such effects would particularly apply to operations that would be carried out very early in a general nuclear war. Although there is debate on the issue, and the U.S. strategic command, control and communications (C^3) system is currently undergoing significant upgrading, the present informed judgment is that strategic C^3 could be maintained for only a short time if a massive attack were directed at the C^3 facilities themselves[32]—probably a shorter time than it would take obscuration to become a serious problem.

In summary, obscuration effects would not likely be as important in a *small* protracted war (if such a thing is possible) as in a large general war, and they may simply be irrelevant in a conflict in which C^3 and missile defense systems were attacked early. But since the effect of obscuration depends on the uncertain details of how a nuclear war would be fought, obscuration itself adds yet another uncertainty that may add some measure of additional deterrent.

There are policy changes that could minimize all potential effects related to nuclear winter, but we believe that these should also be judged by other criteria. For example, drastic cuts (by 90 to 99 percent) in the world's strategic arsenals would likely reduce the threat of environmental effects, but such a policy also has serious drawbacks. For example, verification of small numbers of weapons would be difficult, and "break-out" growth to larger arsenals would be a perceived threat. A small deterrent force might also be misread as a "weak" deterrent, thus reducing the inhibitions against a preemptive strike in times of crisis. In addition, horizontal nuclear arms proliferation could be encouraged, as some countries could achieve nuclear superpower status with a much smaller effort; one result of this could be even more difficulty in reaching arms control agreements. Lastly, it is possible that given a relatively limited number of weapons, one would choose

[32] Charles A. Zraket, "Strategic Command, Control, Communications, and Intelligence," *Science*, June 22, 1984, pp. 1306–11. Paul Bracken, *The Command and Control of Nuclear Forces*. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1983.

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to announce publicly a primarily countervalue (and thus smoke-producing) targeting policy to maximize the deterrent threat of one's strategic force. Nuclear winter, clearly, is not valid as a *sole basis* for embracing drastic cuts in nuclear arsenals.

Of course there are technical "fixes" as well that could conceivably minimize both unintended direct and indirect effects of nuclear weapons. For example, the deployment of low-yield earth-penetrating warheads would greatly reduce the potential for large-area fires and smoke generation. Such a change in arsenals would have to be defended against the concern that the modernization effort would make a nuclear war less catastrophic, therefore more "thinkable." More important, arguments for the development of any new generations of strategic weapons, which sometimes appear valid in isolation, can in effect be arguments against applying brakes on the strategic arms race and nuclear proliferation. These brakes include both arms limitation and testing restraints, such as the SALT II ban on more than one "new" ICBM, and the frequently discussed Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty.

Wide-area non-nuclear strategic defense, if it were possible, could reduce many effects of a nuclear war, but it is the subject of intense controversy in its own right. It seems likely that the antimissile systems that would be deployed first would be to protect point targets (e.g., missile silos) since that defense task is much easier than defending something as large and "soft" as a city. In this case, as in the case of drastic cuts in the arsenals, an adversary may choose to shift targeting toward cities in an attempt to maintain a credible deterrent, which in turn increases the risks of nuclear winter. Alternatively, an adversary might seek to overwhelm the defense by increasing offensive deployments, which also raises those risks. But in the absence of such changes in offensive strategy—and given our current understanding of environmental effects—concerns about nuclear winter add only a small component to the overall SDI debate.

There are actions that could be taken to reduce the environmental effects of nuclear war that, in principle, need not be very controversial. For example, both sides could minimize potential indiscriminate environmental effects by placing targets with a high fuel density into "withhold" categories in their strategic war plans. A counter to this commonsense proposal would have the superpowers place above-ground oil reserves near strategic targets, thus insuring a nuclear winter if one side

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attempted a counterforce attack. But the supposed assured retaliation afforded by such an improbable "doomsday" machine, even if pursued on a massive scale, might simply make the effects in the attacked nation worse without creating suicidal effects for the attacker.

Reducing the total explosive megatonnage of the world's strategic arsenals would also lessen the chances of global environmental effects should a nuclear war be fought. It is true that the trend of the past two decades has shown a reduction in the total yield of the U.S. arsenal, but future plans, such as the deployment of the next generation of D-5 missiles on Trident submarines (nearly 2,000 megatons of explosive equivalent on about 20 submarines), and to a lesser extent the deployment of MX missiles, do not bode well for the continuation of this trend. In any case, a more fundamental consideration of strategic arms deployments should be the need to stabilize and strengthen deterrence by avoiding systems that are tempting targets for a preemptive strike by virtue of their poor survivability and obvious utility for a disarming counterforce attack.

VII

Official U.S. responses to the nuclear winter theory went through early phases of disarray and cynicism, to settle eventually on qualified acceptance and a low-level interagency research program overseen by the Office of Science and Technology Policy, with highly focused research efforts sponsored by the Defense Nuclear Agency, Department of Energy and the National Science Foundation. Relative to official U.S. reticence, the Soviet Union has, to many Western observers, appeared steadfast in its ostensible acceptance of the absolute horrors implied by the earliest nuclear winter scenario. Remarks by Soviet spokesmen have especially emphasized the idea that nuclear winter "retaliation" would be automatic following a nuclear strike by either side. As one of the milder examples, Sergei Kapitsa, chief of department at the Institute of Physical Problems of the Soviet Academy of Sciences, remarked in the October 1985 issue of the *Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists* that "even if one power strikes, the consequences will be global and retaliation automatic."

The Soviet position, however, is frequently believed to have

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been adopted for its propaganda value,[33] presumably in the hope that U.S. and West European public opinion could be used to pressure the United States into arms control negotiating positions more favorable to the Soviets. Soviet research on nuclear winter, at least that which has been made available to the West, has not up to now been as helpful and forthcoming as we would have hoped. Some limited fire data have been received, and some Soviet scientists did participate in the international SCOPE assessment. For climate estimates, Soviet scientists have typically used war scenarios and other parameters taken from U.S. research and applied them to rather less capable computer models.

It is well known that differing perceptions of technical and political problems often contribute to the difficulties the superpowers have in coming to agreements on strategic issues. If environmental effects were perceived to be extreme enough for some sort of policy action other than research, then a response to nuclear winter could face the problem of asymmetric superpower perceptions. For example, if neither side believed in nuclear winter, despite any scientific evidence to the contrary, then the problem of mismatched responses would be moot. Similarly, if both sides believed comparably, then they would have some common ground for working out mutually satisfactory responses to the perceived threat. Problems arise, however, if one side perceives nuclear winter to be a genuine threat, but the other side does not.

One of the two possible cases of asymmetric perception seems implausible, namely the situation where the United States does not consider nuclear winter to be significant and the Soviet Union does. This is unlikely for at least two reasons. First, most of the progress in evaluating climatic effects of nuclear war has come from unclassified work by U.S. scientists, both in and out of government, and will probably continue to. It seems doubtful that the Soviets would sincerely embrace U.S. research if the U.S. government did not. Second, the Soviet Union has never publicly displayed much appreciation for "finesse" in strategic doctrine, for example, war-fighting strategies, limited options and the like. Therefore, a unilateral Soviet response to a less-than-apocalyptic nuclear winter threat would be out of

[33] See, for example, Leon Gouré, "'Nuclear Winter' in Soviet Mirrors," *Strategic Review*, Summer 1985, pp. 22–38.

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character since such a response would probably entail modifications of the Soviet arsenal and doctrine.

The last situation—the United States believes in nuclear winter and the Soviet Union does not—would be particularly dangerous.[34] It now appears that the U.S.S.R. has considerably more potential than the United States to unilaterally cause environmental damage from smoke due to nuclear war. The primary reason for this is that one estimate shows there to be more than twice as much burnable material in urban areas of the NATO countries than in the Warsaw Pact countries, according to the work of George Bing cited above. A secondary reason is that, since smoke production may be roughly proportionate to megatonnage (everything else being equal), the U.S.S.R. currently has about twice as much strategic megatonnage deliverable on short notice.

Furthermore, being in a position of publicly believing the theory could force the United States to try to adjust to the perceived threat of nuclear winter by changing arsenals and doctrine (while the Soviet Union did not), or else face public pressure for not acting despite a professed belief in the theory. The best hedge against the problems that can arise from differing perceptions of nuclear winter is to keep the results of all the nuclear winter research programs of both sides as widely available as possible.

Apart from such hypothetical asymmetric perceptions of the nuclear winter problem, there are real, physical asymmetries between the superpowers regarding potential climatic effects. It is rather ironic, given the Soviet Union's greater capacity to produce smoke by attacking NATO countries, that advanced simulations show that the more poleward position of the U.S.S.R. and the greater landmass of the Eurasian continent put the U.S.S.R. at a disadvantage vis-à-vis the United States in terms of climatic effects. This is true for the same reasons that the U.S.S.R., on the whole, experiences more severe normal winters than does the United States.

Canada, having a large landmass at high latitudes, would face nuclear winter effects similar to those of the Soviet Union. This potential has not been ignored by the Canadians, and they have responded by performing their own assessment of the

[34] As discussed by Francis P. Hoeber and Robert K. Squire, "The 'Nuclear Winter' Hypothesis: Some Policy Implications," *Strategic Review*, Summer 1985, p. 42.

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problem.[35] Apart from this, and despite the substantial implications that environmental and other indirect effects hold for noncombatant nations, there has been surprisingly little international political interest in the subject.[36] For example, the review of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty in the autumn of 1985 went smoothly despite the fact that the nuclear winter theory could have been used to accuse the superpowers of acting in bad faith by threatening noncombatant nations.

We cannot pretend to know what the legacy of the nuclear winter hypothesis will be. Perhaps it will be a scientific reconfirmation that the effects of a large nuclear war would not merely be scaled-up versions of effects from a war fought with conventional weapons. In the final analysis, though, we must recognize that whatever our level of understanding of the effects of nuclear weapons, and whatever our ability to apply technical fixes to weapons, defenses or doctrines, the problem of avoiding nuclear war is not amenable to scientific solution. This problem arises more from political differences than from the latest technical capabilities. If nuclear winter has made us more aware of the urgent need to find political solutions to the arms race and the threat of nuclear war, that alone will have made the entire exercise worthwhile regardless of the scientific disposition of the remaining uncertainties.

[35] *Nuclear Winter and Associated Effects, A Canadian Appraisal of the Environmental Impact of Nuclear War*, report of the Committee on the Environmental Consequences of Nuclear War, the Royal Society of Canada, January 1985.

[36] One important exception is "The Delhi Declaration" of Jan. 28, 1985, signed by Argentine President Raúl Alfonsín, Indian Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi, Mexican President Miguel de la Madrid, former Tanzanian President Julius Nyerere, the late Swedish Prime Minister Olof Palme and Greek Prime Minister Andreas Papandreou, which stated: "Nuclear war, even on a limited scale, would trigger an arctic nuclear winter which may transform the Earth into a darkened, frozen planet, posing unprecedented peril to all nations, even those far removed from the nuclear explosions."

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Evan Luard

SUPERPOWERS AND REGIONAL CONFLICTS

There was some disappointment, though no great surprise, at the failure of the November 1985 Geneva summit to provide much hope of agreement on nuclear arms. But there was general satisfaction, in Europe as elsewhere, at the understanding reached there for regular consultations on regional conflicts.

Discussions of this kind, many believe, may be more relevant to the real problems of the modern world than the endless negotiations about nuclear weapons and other forms of disarmament that have proceeded so interminably over the past 40 years with so little apparent outcome. They will, after all, relate to the kind of wars that actually take place today rather than to the possibility of an all-out East-West confrontation, which few now think likely. The regional conflicts themselves usually involve one or other of the superpowers, occasionally both, and appear a more likely cause of a direct confrontation between them, even if only with "conventional" arms, than the situation on the East-West frontier. Indeed, since it is these conflicts that are the main source of tension between them at any one time—as in Afghanistan, Nicaragua, Angola, Cambodia and other places—an accommodation over such questions may be the essential condition of reaching an understanding on the more fundamental relationships between East and West. Far from being an irrelevant and unimportant sideshow, therefore, these conflicts, and the disagreements between East and West about the way they should be resolved, may lie at the very heart of the matter.

So what are the chances of significant progress being made in these discussions? What kind of arrangements and understandings, even direct trade-offs (such as Soviet concessions in Afghanistan matched, say, by U.S. concessions in Nicaragua)

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might be reached to reduce their dangers? Above all, are there any general principles governing superpower conduct in such areas that might provide the basis for a wider consensus over disputes of this kind, and so reduce dangers in the future?

II

Many of the most bitter East-West conflicts of recent times show only too clearly the lack of such a consensus at present. Conflicts have developed in many different parts of the world—as in Korea, Vietnam, the Middle East, Central America and Africa—in which the superpowers were not originally directly concerned but into which they have been increasingly drawn, usually on opposite sides. Often each supports rival factions in a civil war. The action taken by one of them to support one side, whether government or opposition, is seen by the other as unacceptable interference in the affairs of another state or unjustifiable support for an unrepresentative regime. There are no agreed principles governing the limits of intervention by outside powers in such conflicts that might provide the basis for accommodation or for a restraint on superpower action.

What is more, because each side judges each situation in subjective terms, often hugely magnifying the evil intentions and Machiavellian activities of its opponent, there is little willingness to apply objective standards. Each power, it sometimes seems, wishes to apply one set of principles in one sphere and a different set in another. Thus the Russians appear to believe that their security interests justify them in seeking to dictate what type of government comes to power in Afghanistan, but dispute the right of the United States to do the same in Nicaragua or Cuba. Conversely, the United States may declare itself justified in supporting revolutionary forces seeking to overthrow the regimes in Nicaragua, Angola, Cambodia and Afghanistan, claiming that they are undemocratic and unrepresentative, yet strongly resists efforts by other states to support revolutionary forces seeking to overthrow established governments in other places (such as El Salvador, Chad, Pakistan or the Philippines), efforts that are often based on similar claims. Neither superpower is usually ready to concede that its own conduct in one area is any way comparable to that of its opponent in another.

It seemed at one time that it might be possible to establish a tacit understanding based on the principle of spheres of influ-

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ence. The United States would generally allow the Soviet Union a free hand in its border regions, such as Eastern Europe; while the Soviet Union would allow the United States the same in Central America and the Caribbean. For the first 30 years after 1945 this principle was generally applied: the United States did not respond, except verbally, to Soviet interventions in Hungary and Czechoslovakia, nor the Soviet Union to U.S. action in Guatemala or the Dominican Republic. Today that situation is changing. The Soviet Union has felt obliged to provide arms—even if limited in capability so far—to its new allies in Nicaragua, while the United States feels equally justified in providing support for revolutionaries operating close to the Soviet border in Afghanistan.

Disagreements on the principles to be applied are thus more intense than ever. To the Soviet Union, the West, in supporting rebels in Afghanistan, is deliberately threatening its vital security interests in an area adjacent to its own border. But to the West, it is merely giving assistance to those who are justifiably resisting a foreign occupation of their country.

In El Salvador the situation is reversed. Here it is the United States which claims that the Soviet Union is supporting, at least indirectly through surrogates in the region, a revolutionary force that is seeking to overthrow a friendly government in an area close to the United States' own borders. Against this the Soviet Union and its allies claim that the rebel forces in that country are merely seeking to establish a more genuinely representative government in a country that has long been effectively controlled by a small and unrepresentative elite (and in any case deny they are giving any assistance to the revolutionaries).

In Cambodia, the United States and China are, in the eyes of the Soviet Union, cynically assisting discredited rebel factions that have even less right to call themselves democratic than the government of that country, merely in order to promote their own political and strategic ends. The United States and China, on the other hand, claim that Cambodia is an occupied country, and that they are merely helping the Cambodian people to throw off unwelcome Vietnamese rule.

Conversely, in the Middle East it is the United States which claims that the Soviet Union is giving support to disruptive regimes in Syria and Libya, more in order to do damage to the interests of the West than in the pursuit of any discernible political principles or overriding national interest. The Soviet

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Union, on the other hand, would claim that it is merely responding to the requests of these countries for justified assistance, and making it possible for them in turn to help the Palestinians to defend their inalienable rights.

It is thus not easy to see any consistent principle being pursued by either East or West in its approach to these various regional conflicts. It can no more be said that the West only supports "democratic" forces than it can be said that the Soviet Union only supports "socialist" ones. The West in many cases supports authoritarian governments—for example in South Korea, Chile, Pakistan and Morocco—that are resisting demands for democratic reforms, while the Soviet Union gives its assistance to many governments that are by no means socialist. Nor can it be said that one side supports legitimate and recognized governments and the other revolutionaries: both sides support both in different circumstances and all that can be said is that each supports those it believes to be its friends, whether they are in government or in rebellion against governments. Finally, it cannot be said of either that it intervenes only in its own immediate region, to promote its own immediate security interests; the Soviet Union has become increasingly involved at least indirectly in Angola, Ethiopia and South Yemen, just as the United States has been closely involved, whether directly or indirectly, in such places as Lebanon, Grenada and Afghanistan.

III

At present, therefore, there is little consensus between the superpowers on the principles that should be applied in negotiations on regional conflicts, and little consistency in the approach that each has taken in addressing the various conflict situations in which it has become involved.

Is it likely to be possible, therefore, to construct a set of more consistent principles that might govern intervention in civil conflicts elsewhere—that might, in other words, provide the basis for a more lasting understanding between East and West on such matters?

There is nothing new in the attempt to establish such principles. There have been many efforts at different periods to define rules governing the intervention of outside powers in civil wars elsewhere. Under traditional international law, for example, when a civil war had broken out and a significant part of a state's territory was occupied by revolutionaries, other

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states were supposed to recognize the "belligerency" of these forces. Once that had been done, those states were under an obligation to adopt a position of strict neutrality. This meant that no assistance should be given even to the legal government, let alone the rebel forces, since aid to either would constitute a violation of neutrality. But despite the alleged "duty" to adopt this position, it was in practice largely a matter of discretion whether or not outside governments did so.

To recognize the belligerency of rebels was in practice a calculated act of hostility to the government of the state concerned. In practice help was freely given to governments and revolutionary forces alike. After the Napoleonic wars, France helped government forces in Spain (1823) and rebel forces in Greece (1826–29); Russia helped government forces in Austria (1849) and rebel forces in Bulgaria and Bosnia (1876–78); Britain helped rebel forces in Portugal (1833–36) and government forces in Spain (1835–40); Prussia helped rebel forces in Schleswig-Holstein (1848–50) and government forces in Poland (1863). Even after the First World War there was not much more agreement on such questions. The major powers began, as in more recent times, to help the ideological factions with which they sympathized. So in the 1930s Germany and Italy assisted the rebel forces in Spain, while the Soviet Union helped the republican government there.

By the end of the Second World War, the old idea that governments should remain neutral in the civil wars of other states had been largely abandoned. But there emerged a kind of consensus of a new sort. The general understanding came to be that intervention was legitimate when it was in support of an accepted government, but not so on behalf of revolutionaries. This view certainly was strongly supported in the West. Western politicians consistently denounced as "subversion" assistance to rebels elsewhere, regardless of whether a government was "democratic" or otherwise. Communist governments were widely condemned when it was believed they were giving support to rebel movements: for example in China, Greece, Vietnam and other parts of Southeast Asia, in Bolivia, Uruguay, the Dominican Republic and other parts of Latin America, in the Congo, Angola and Rhodesia in Africa. There was a general presumption that the government in power possessed some kind of prescriptive right and, however unjust its policies, was to be brought down only by constitutional means. It was recognized that, if such action became the norm, a situation

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could come about in which rival external powers were providing assistance to revolutionary forces in almost every Third World state, sometimes in competition with each other. A policy of providing support to revolutionary movements elsewhere was therefore seen as a threat to international order almost as unacceptable as acts of aggression against the frontiers of other states. That is why, if the United States itself wished to bring down the government of another state, as in Iran (1953), Guatemala (1954), Vietnam (1963) or elsewhere, this had to be done by covert means and never openly, in case it should be seen that the United States was breaking the generally accepted international rules.

This way of thinking now seems to have been abandoned, at least in the United States.[1] It is no longer seen as wrong to provide assistance to rebel movements elsewhere, or necessary (when it is done) to conceal such action. In Nicaragua, Afghanistan, Cambodia and Angola, for example, direct and unconcealed action is undertaken to assist revolutionary movements on the grounds that these represent "democratic" forces seeking to overturn a non-democratic government.

It would probably be true to say that thinking in Europe has not yet adjusted to this radical change of belief and strategy. On that continent there remains substantial doubt about the propriety (and often about the prudence) of external assistance to rebel forces in any country, whatever the character of the regime. In particular there is some perplexity concerning the principles that have been applied by the United States in deciding where such assistance is appropriate and justified.

If it is held that aid to rebels is justifiable in any case where a non-democratic government is in power, there would clearly be no shortage of suitable candidates. Something like three-quarters of the countries of the world today probably have governments that cannot be said to be democratic under most normal definitions. To hold that it was justifiable to support revolution in any of these countries would create a highly unstable international society. But it would at least be a principle of a sort.

It is difficult, however, to recognize this as the principle

[1] Perhaps the most significant change is not in the attitude of U.S. opinion generally but in that of the U.S. Congress: congressmen, from whom such actions once needed to be kept strictly concealed, have now become their most enthusiastic supporters and even (as in Cambodia) their originators.

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underlying current policies. There are many governments all over the world that are by no means democratic but that nonetheless are seen as friends of the West. In such places—Pakistan, Morocco, Chile, the Philippines until recently—Western governments, and the U.S. government in particular, do not view revolutionary movements with sympathy, however undemocratic the local governments are known to be. There would certainly be no willingness to accept that foreign assistance to revolutions in those countries, such as that given by the United States in Nicaragua and Cambodia, was justified in those cases.

Conversely, in cases where revolutionaries in other countries *are* helped (as in Nicaragua and Cambodia) it is not always clear whether the object is to ensure for them the government the countries want or the government the United States wants. Is it really believed that the people of Nicaragua can want the supporters of Somoza returned to power, or that the people of Cambodia want supporters of Pol Pot? Can assistance to such forces really be presented as support for "democracy"? It occasionally seems that the principle of democratic choice applied by the present U.S. Administration resembles the principle of consumer choice once favored by Henry Ford: have any government you like so long as it is not communist (or even rather left-wing).

Nor is it easy to see that assistance is provided for revolution at present where governments are *most* undemocratic: can it really be said that the governments in Nicaragua and Cambodia, which have had elections of a kind, however questionable, are those that are least democratic in the world (compared, for example, with those in Chile, Paraguay, Pakistan, Marcos' Philippines, or even China and Yugoslavia)? It would seem rather that the distinction is that the governments in the latter category, however undemocratic, are seen as the friends of the West, while those in the former category are seen as our enemies. It is this distinction, rather than the niceties of the constitutional system in each case, it would appear, that determines whether or not a revolution should be helped.

If, therefore, any kind of consensus is to be arrived at with the Russians concerning intervention in regional conflicts, it is likely to have to be based on somewhat more objective principles than appear to underlie current policy. There are obvious difficulties: domestic political constraints, ideological antagonism, believed strategic interests. But if the dangers such con-

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flicts represent—to the superpowers themselves as much as to their partners—are to be reduced, understandings of a sort may be necessary.

IV

What should be the basis of such principles?

Let us begin by considering the most fundamental aspect of the problem: the strategic interests of the superpowers themselves. For the foreseeable future it seems likely that the superpowers will remain intensely interested in the type of governments that come to power, and the policies which those governments pursue, in areas of special concern to themselves. This applies particularly to areas immediately adjoining their frontiers. The record of their actions since 1945 demonstrates only too clearly the concern of the superpowers that political developments in such areas should not represent an unacceptable threat to their strategic interests. The Soviet Union has directly intervened, through large-scale invasions by its forces, in Hungary in 1956, in Czechoslovakia in 1968, in Afghanistan in 1979; and has undertaken a show of force against Poland in 1981. By these means it has ensured that, except in the case of Yugoslavia in 1949 (a country that was in any case at the furthest extremity of its sphere of influence), no government has come to power throughout that region which was ideologically unacceptable to it.

In much the same way, if less brutally, the United States too has intervened, directly or indirectly, in Central America and the Caribbean, to try to prevent left-wing governments coming to power in that region. Six such administrations have been formed throughout the western hemisphere since 1945: in Guatemala in 1951, in Cuba in 1959, in the Dominican Republic in 1965, in Chile in 1971, in Nicaragua in 1979–80 and in Grenada in 1979. In each case the United States has intervened in one way or another to secure its overthrow, and failed to achieve that aim only in the case of Cuba in 1961 and in Nicaragua (so far).

Other countries have shown a similar propensity. Thus China has intervened several times in border areas: in Korea in 1950–53, on the Indian border in 1962 and in Vietnam in 1979 (in addition to reconquering Tibet and attempting to reconquer the offshore islands). South Africa and Israel have likewise intervened by force several times in areas close to their borders to protect their security interests. Such actions as these indeed

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represent the principal *external* use made of armed force in the modern world.

Is it therefore the case that, at least in immediately neighboring areas, superpowers are certain to demand a veto over the coming to power of politically unacceptable governments? Must this therefore represent one element in any understanding to be reached between East and West concerning conflicts in those areas?

To answer that question it is necessary to be clear about the fundamental motives of each superpower in intervening in that way. Though the *immediate* aim has always been to overturn a government, it is not the case that this was the *fundamental* concern. Of course the Soviet Union would prefer, for purely political reasons, to see communist governments in power in Eastern Europe. But that has not been the reason for its successive interventions. The reason has been to ensure that a government does not come to power there that might, it believes, represent a threat to Soviet security. Of course the United States would prefer to see democratic governments in power in Central America and the Caribbean. But that is not the fundamental reason for its successive interventions (otherwise the United States would have intervened in innumerable other cases as well). The United States has intervened to prevent a government coming to power that it believes might represent, directly or indirectly, an unacceptable threat to U.S. security.

The demand among major powers for security in immediately neighboring areas does therefore seem to be a fundamental feature of the contemporary international landscape, and it is one that must be taken into account in any attempt to arrive at settlements of the conflicts that arise within those areas. It is not the case, however, as the record of these attempts might suggest, that those security interests can only be safeguarded by according those powers a total veto over political developments in neighboring states. That view has come to be adopted, in practice if not in theory, because of a failure to distinguish between political and strategic concerns.

In an ideological world fears become focused on political doctrines, and on political factions that espouse those doctrines, rather than, as would be more logical, on the policies that the factions may pursue. Superpowers have therefore taken the view that their security interests can be safeguarded only if they are in a position to control the type of government that

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comes to power in particular areas. Thus the Soviet Union invaded Hungary—though the Western powers were totally uninvolved in the political developments taking place there, and though the new prime minister demanded nothing better than neutrality for his country—because it feared the emergence of a non-communist government that might lead to uncontrollable changes throughout Eastern Europe, and so to an unacceptable threat to its security. The United States supported an invasion of Cuba in 1961, despite a very limited Soviet presence there at that time, because it was feared that the continued existence of a communist-inclined government there might lead to unacceptable changes in Latin America as a whole. In all the subsequent uses of force—or support for its use—by both powers (Dominican Republic in 1965, Czechoslovakia in 1968, Afghanistan in 1979, Nicaragua starting in 1982), the reasons have been similar.

There has been little disposition on the part of the superpowers to consider whether it might be possible to secure alternative safeguards for security that did not require the overthrow of the government concerned: whether, for example, the new regime might be willing to provide undertakings, concerning military dispositions and alliance policies, even concerning its political activities, that might provide the reassurance required. Above all there have been no efforts by the opposing superpower, whether through public statements or private undertakings, to provide assurances that it had no intention of seeking political or military advantages from the new situation.

In other words, in all these cases the political and military consequences of a change of government have been regarded as inextricably joined. So long as this assumption has been maintained, the strategic interests of the neighboring superpower could be seen to make the overthrow of the regime an inescapable necessity.

If understandings are to be possible between the superpowers about such areas in the future, it is likely to be only through the de-linking of these two elements: the political and the strategic. It is this that might make it possible for the peoples of small countries in the neighborhood of a superpower to determine their own political future free of external interference, without representing any threat to the security interests of a neighboring power. If there is any chance of finding solutions to the various conflicts of this kind existing at the present time—in Nicaragua as in Afghanistan, in Cambodia as

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in El Salvador, in Angola as in southern Lebanon—it is likely to be along these lines.

V

How might this principle be implemented in practice?

The most obvious way would be by seeking a solution based on *neutralization* of the area concerned. This is a formula with a long and respectable pedigree. It was applied to Switzerland after the Napoleonic wars; and that country has since been involved in no foreign war. It was applied to Belgium under the treaty of neutralization of 1839 and to Luxembourg in the Treaty of 1867 (though these saved neither country in 1914, they did have the effect of bringing major powers to their defense, which might not otherwise have been the case). In more recent times the principle was applied to Austria—a country lying precisely on the border between the two spheres of influence—since 1954; it was attempted unsuccessfully for Laos in 1962, and has been adopted unilaterally by Finland and Sweden. The record is thus a patchy one. But it is certainly not so poor as to make the attempt to apply it once more in comparable situations a hopeless one.

One obvious case where it might be applied is in Afghanistan. Afghanistan was in practice a neutral country until the revolution of 1978: a neutrality effectively recognized by both superpowers, each of which contributed to the development of the country before that year and neither of which sought to acquire a dominant position. It is unlikely that the Soviet Union will withdraw its forces, or allow an independent government to emerge in Afghanistan, unless it receives assurances of the country's neutrality in the future. Recognition of that neutrality would need to be given not only by Western powers but by China (whose influence in the area appears far more dangerous than that of the West in Soviet eyes) and Pakistan. Such a recognition could and should be matched by undertakings from the Soviet Union and Afghanistan that they would not intervene in the affairs of Pakistan (the northern borders of which are populated by Pushṭun people, more closely akin to the Afghans thàn to other Pakistanis and under strong Afghan influence), and particularly in the highly sensitive and unstable province of Baluchistan.

A formula based on neutralization might also have a role to play in other areas. If the main concern of the United States in Nicaragua is the potential threat the government there may

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represent to U.S. security, and to stability in Central America generally, an essential element in any settlement may be undertakings by that government concerning its military and political alignments. These might include pledges concerning the number of military advisers from Cuba and the Soviet Union, and perhaps concerning levels and types of armaments. Even this might not meet U.S. apprehensions unless it were accompanied by similar undertakings concerning interference, military or political, in neighboring countries, above all El Salvador. But pledges of this kind would not of course be given unless they were matched by undertakings of a comparable kind by the United States and Honduras that they will prevent intervention in Nicaragua launched from Honduran soil. And here too undertakings by the countries in the region would need to be matched by comparable pledges by external powers, such as Cuba and the Soviet Union. It is precisely because no region today is totally insulated from superpower rivalries that the projected discussions between the superpowers about regional conflicts can be of such importance.

In Cambodia, too, a similar principle may be applicable. It has always been apparent that Vietnam would be unlikely to withdraw its forces except in return for a cessation of all aid, whether from China or the West, to the coalition rebels. These matching undertakings would ideally be linked with a commitment to U.N.-supervised elections. A long-term solution will almost certainly have to include commitments against *future* intervention, whether by Vietnamese forces or those of rebel factions ensconced on Thai soil. Whether or not this is linked to a formal recognition of neutrality (of the kind that Prince Norodom Sihanouk so long demanded), some form of neutralization of Cambodia is likely to come about (whose people doubtless wish for nothing more than to pursue their own lives free from foreign intervention). Though it is not likely that any comparable neutralization will be possible for Vietnam or even Laos, the removal of the external pressures will at least mean that Vietnam will no longer be pushed into the arms of the Russians, as it has been by recent Western policies; and in practice there are many signs, including the recent improvement in Vietnam's relations with the United States, which suggest that Hanoi might welcome the opportunity to pursue a more evenhanded policy.

In all these cases, therefore, the principle of neutralization—in fact if not in name—seems likely to form a part of the final

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settlement. For the superpowers themselves this represents in effect a kind of mutual self-denying ordinance. Usually in such cases the concern of each superpower is not to win unchallengeable political control for itself but to deny it to the other. A settlement based on a recognition that neither side will be militarily dominant in these contentious areas is the obvious way of procuring a settlement which may be acceptable to both. Since it insulates these areas from East-West rivalries it is often a solution that is also welcome to the state most directly concerned. Indeed one of the benefits of such arrangements is that they may provide a greater freedom of maneuver—except in the military field—to the individual Third World country concerned. Many Third World states wish for nothing better than to be "nonaligned" and they are therefore unlikely to feel too uncomfortably constrained in the one area where they are limited. But they will be freer in consequence to choose the type of government that they wish for themselves rather than having to fear intervention whenever their non-military policy preferences stray too far from those of the nearest superpower.

VI

The principle that any settlement of a local conflict should satisfy the strategic requirements of the superpowers is clearly one that can be applied only in areas relatively close to their own borders. Of course, given the continual erosion of distance, especially strategic distance, in the modern world, it could be argued that each today has a strategic interest in the situation in almost every part of the world. And this means that some areas may be seen as important to the interests of both. The Middle East is essential to the interests of the United States because of its dependence on Middle East oil, as well as because of U.S. links with Israel. But the Middle East is important also to the Soviet Union because it almost adjoins the U.S.S.R.'s own borders (much of it is far closer to the Soviet border than Grenada is to the United States). The Horn of Africa, though not of similar vital importance, is seen as of significant interest to both because both have strategic interests in the area, and both have client states that look to them for support.

Even so, most would accept that somewhat different principles apply to these more distant areas. Distant powers have less right to demand that their interests should be protected, and usually less capacity to ensure that they are, in these cases.

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Moreover, often the interest is more indirect. The immediate interest may be that of some local state which is itself an ally of one or other of the superpowers. So, for example, both Israel and Syria have a direct interest in the settlement reached in Lebanon, just as both Vietnam and Thailand have an interest in the settlement reached in Cambodia; and each of these is supported by a superpower that will seek to ensure that those interests are protected in a settlement.

The more important difference, however, is not that the interest of the superpowers is more remote; as the size of the world declines there may be less and less willingness to acknowledge there is any area in which they are not interested. The real difference is that both have an *equal* interest: something that cannot be argued in the case of their own border regions. In these cases therefore it is likely that rather different principles will be required in securing the settlement of regional conflicts, and that these will need to take account of the different geographical configurations.

It will mean that often both superpowers will need to have a voice in discussions of the settlement to be arrived at. For some areas this is not a principle that many in the West will readily accept. In discussions of the Middle East, for example, it has for many years been taken for granted that a major aim was precisely to *exclude* Soviet influence.

Yet it is arguable that the West itself has an interest in recognizing Soviet interest. This results today not merely from the Soviet Union's geographical propinquity but from the position it has acquired as a supplier of arms and other assistance to many governments, as well as from its naval presence in the Mediterranean. So long as Moscow feels that its interests are ignored and that it is being frozen out, the Soviet Union has every incentive to use its influence with its clients, above all Syria, in a way that is unhelpful to Western interests, and in a way that makes a settlement less possible. If brought into the process, it is more likely to use its influence to promote the prospects of peace in the area. The Soviet Union's interest in maintaining a fruitful superpower relationship, in avoiding being dragged into a dangerous conflict and in improving (as it now seeks to do) its relations with the less radical governments of the area (including Saudi Arabia and Israel) means that discussions are probably more likely to prove fruitful if it participates than if the Arab states negotiate in isolation.

It is now increasingly unlikely that it will be possible to

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negotiate a separate Israel-Jordan settlement on the lines of the Camp David accords, as many had hoped and as Israel would still like to see. The recent rapprochement between Jordan and Syria, Yasir Arafat's refusal to accept U.N. Resolution 242, as well as the reluctance of the Likud members of Israel's coalition to make the kind of concessions in the West Bank that would induce Jordan to take the plunge without the Palestine Liberation Organization, make it likely that sooner or later Syria (and possibly Lebanon too) will have to be brought into the discussions. In this case the creation of the suggested "international forum," in which the Soviet Union (on whom Syria is so dependent) has a role to play, may enhance rather than diminish the chances of a settlement. Conversely, any proposed settlement that is not underwritten by the Soviet Union, and so by Syria, may have little chance of lasting success.

In the Horn of Africa a similar situation exists. Ethiopia, for all its economic and political difficulties, remains the dominant power of the region. There are even some signs that it might welcome a reduction in its dependence on the Soviet Union. But it is the presence of Cuban troops in that country that represents the factor of primary concern to the West. Here too, it is self-defeating to deny the reality of Soviet interests in the region: for it is concessions from the Soviet Union and their allies—above all the withdrawal of Cuban forces—that the West mainly wishes to bring about. In this case too, therefore, it may be necessary to recognize the right of the Soviet Union to a voice. Indeed, the inclusion of the Cuban presence in Ethiopia among the subjects that President Reagan listed for discussion at Geneva has already acknowledged the point. As in the Middle East, therefore, each of the superpowers may have an important part to play in securing the cooperation of its own client states; and each may need to have a continuing role within the area, economic as much as political, if stability there is ever to be restored.

The presence of Cuban forces in Angola was another subject mentioned by President Reagan in proposing these talks. Here too it is unlikely that the Soviet Union will be willing to confine discussion of the question to that specific point alone. Indeed it has long been evident that the withdrawal of Cuban forces was only one element in a series of trade-offs that need to be negotiated if a settlement covering both Angola and Namibia is to be reached. Such a withdrawal is likely to be undertaken only in return for the cessation of all assistance, whether from

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the West or South Africa, to Jonas Savimbi's rebel forces. Similarly, an undertaking by Angola to prevent incursions into Namibia from its territory may need to be matched by corresponding guarantees of Angolan territorial integrity from South Africa. If it is the case, as Western spokesmen have often maintained, that the Cuban forces are merely "surrogates" for the Soviet Union, and that Cuba acts in this respect only on behalf of the Soviet Union, it may be logical (even if it is unwelcome to South Africa) that the Soviet government be directly involved in discussions. If Cuban forces are unlikely to be withdrawn without Moscow's assent, or if Angola is unlikely to accept their withdrawal without some external pressure, there is a good case for the Soviet government to become more immediately engaged than it is at present.

These three areas—the Middle East, the Horn of Africa, and Angola—are merely examples of current crisis spots that do not immediately adjoin either superpower yet in which each has some interest; they therefore could well feature in negotiations. Other areas of mutual concern will no doubt continually be added to the list. Southeast Asia generally, the Koreas, Chad, Western Sahara and the Antarctic are examples of other questions on which a degree of understanding between the superpowers would be valuable. Since the interests of each power are now worldwide, the potential agenda can scarcely cover less than the world as a whole.

VII

Is it possible to sketch out any general principles that might be observed in discussion of this kind?

The individual situations encountered in different parts of the world are of course unique, and it would be absurd to suggest that they can all be resolved according to some uniform formula to be applied in a mechanical way. It is nonetheless possible to suggest a few broad principles that could usefully be observed by those on both sides who take part in negotiations of this kind.

The simplest and most obvious is that it is important in all such discussions to understand what are the basic, and minimal, objectives and interests of the opponent. In most negotiations each side has objectives that may play a large part in their rhetoric, yet are not really fundamental concerns; while there are others—sometimes strategic considerations—that are rarely spoken aloud yet are often the most profoundly impor-

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tant. It is indeed precisely the purpose of negotiations of this kind to increase understanding of the fundamental interests and objectives of the opponent. It is only this which can reveal what kind of compromises may best reconcile the interests of each, and indeed of all parties (including the local governments and peoples). The objective must always be to secure a balance of advantage that, while it does not secure the maximum objective of either side, is nonetheless an outcome that each can live with. This is precisely what the nineteenth-century European Concert, operating through protracted and secret diplomatic negotiations, was often able to achieve. In that way it secured settlements of a number of major issues that were acceptable to all the five major powers of the continent.

Second, it is important to seek settlements that will avoid provocation, especially military provocation, whether to superpowers or lesser states. As we have seen, there is ample evidence that the most powerful motive of the superpowers in recent times is the protection of their strategic interests, and this aim usually proves even more powerful than purely ideological objectives. No settlement that is incompatible with the strategic interests of either side, therefore, is likely to be possible (or prove stable if attained).

Third, there will be more chance of success if each individual crisis is discussed on its own merits and, so far as possible, divorced from extraneous considerations. There are sometimes apparent attractions in "linkage," in using concessions made in one area to extract corresponding concessions from opponents in another. But in most cases each individual problem—say the Middle East—is already so complex that it is made virtually insoluble—or even more insoluble than before—if an attempt is made to inject cross-bargaining of this kind. It is almost certainly better, therefore, that discussion should be undertaken in separate compartments, probably by different teams of officials.

Fourth, the kinds of arrangement arrived at must not simply be imposed by the two superpowers to conform with their own interests, but must clearly take account of the interests and views of local governments and peoples. If this is not the case, a settlement is unlikely anyway to be enduring, and externally imposed settlements may therefore in time only discredit the entire system of superpower dialogue. What this means is that each of the superpowers needs at all times to remain in the closest contact with the local governments and groups con-

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cerned—above all their own partners and protégés—so that the superpowers may be understanding of the latter parties' concerns and in a position to secure the maximum possible consent for any arrangement arrived at. In the final resort local agreements can only be reached by local governments. The role of the superpowers, therefore, is rather to propose the general character such agreements may take and use their influence to secure their acceptance. In many cases it will not be easy to reconcile the views of local parties; if that were not the case there would be no crisis. And one of the benefits that the participation of outside powers may bring is that it may be easier for them to recognize the kind of compromise solutions that are necessary, and eventually to induce their local partners to show a similar realism.

The last point to make is one that will perhaps be more readily accepted by members of the present U.S. Administration than many of those that have gone before. It is that the only final answer for many local conflict situations is a resort to democratic elections. Most of these conflicts result from situations of civil conflict—as in Afghanistan, Nicaragua, Cambodia, El Salvador, Angola and Western Sahara at the present time—where two or more factions are struggling for power, each invariably claiming to be "more representative of the people" than its opponents. The only unchallengeable way to resolve such disputes is by resorting to the polls, by allowing ballots, not bullets, to determine the issue. Admittedly it is still necessary to ensure that such elections are fairly and impartially conducted, if only to make it less likely that their results will subsequently be challenged: a condition by no means easy to fulfill, as many recent examples (for instance, the elections in Uganda in 1980, El Salvador in 1982 and in the Philippines in 1986) testify. If Western governments are to be true to the principles they claim to stand for, however, the demand for fair, impartially conducted, externally supervised elections should play a central part in the negotiations undertaken on such questions.

VIII

Though the proposal for regional discussions has so far been fairly widely welcomed, in Europe as elsewhere, it could come up against important difficulties, which need to be confronted. The idea of superpower discussion is welcomed mainly because it is disagreement between the superpowers about such matters

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that at present arouses most concern. That disagreement is not only dangerous to the superpower relationship, but may reduce the prospect of successfully resolving the local conflict in question. The discussions between them, it is therefore hoped, may help reduce difficulties.

In time, however, a dialogue that was confined to the two superpowers might begin to appear increasingly exclusive. There could be pressure for the discussions to be opened up. When Far Eastern affairs are in question, it would not be unreasonable for China to wish to have its say, and even to denounce discussions about its own region in which it played no part. When questions concerning the Mediterranean, or even the Middle East, are discussed, Western Europe might increasingly wish to have a voice (especially since its view on those questions has in recent times often been different from that of the United States). When African trouble-spots are discussed, African states may begin to query the relevance of a discussion between two non-African powers, unless they themselves are in some way represented in those negotiations. And so on.

It may come to be believed that there is a need for something not altogether unlike the old Concert of Europe, but enlarged to cover the world as a whole: in other words a body far smaller than the Security Council, less cluttered with the representatives of several very small states, yet far more representative of the principal centers of power in the world than discussions confined to two states alone can be. Such a body would have to include, as a minimum, China, Japan, and the European Community (in practice this would be a single Western European country representing the EEC for a term). Even this would leave Latin America, Africa and South Asia unrepresented. In time these too might demand to be represented by suitable states (perhaps their own "great powers," Brazil, Mexico, Nigeria, Egypt, India), thus creating a body of eight or nine, not altogether unlike the five or six "great powers" that took part, with substantial success, in the negotiations of the Concert of Europe.

Such a prospect is of course still far away at present, if indeed it is ever realizable. Moreover, it could be argued that even if such a concert were finally to come about, it would be no substitute for continued regular consultations among the two greatest powers about the issues causing dispute between them. The latter talks are required only partly as a means of arriving

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at solutions to the difficult disputes that exist in many parts of the world, though it is certainly to be hoped that they may contribute to bringing about such solutions. They are required mainly as a means of reducing tensions and disagreements between those powers themselves, disagreements that may intensify local conflicts but are in themselves a source of danger.

For the next decade at least, such discussions clearly have a major part to play. It is thus important that the way in which they are conducted, the mechanics that surround the meetings, the spirit in which they are held, and the principles that they seek to apply are such as will maximize their likelihood of success. The allies of each superpower may increasingly seek a voice on such questions. This will reflect a recognition of the importance that the negotiations could have, if conducted in a genuine spirit of goodwill as well as realism, in helping to establish a more stable and peaceful international environment.

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Craig M. Karp

THE WAR IN AFGHANISTAN

Since the Soviet Union invaded Afghanistan in December 1979, it has failed to consolidate the rule of its Marxist client in Kabul. Although there are occasional reports that the government of the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan (DRA) has increased its control, events over the last year confirm an overall lack of progress and the growing strength of the Afghan resistance. The Soviet-sponsored regime has made few political gains and its administrative and combat performance has not greatly improved—a record that led to the abrupt resignation of Afghan leader Babrak Karmal on May 4, 1986. The mujahedeen resistance, on the other hand, is more capable than ever, boosted by increasing firepower, operational and political cooperation and international support. It is slowly but steadily evolving into a powerful military force.

The Soviets, however, are looking to the long haul. Facing increasing losses in the field, as well as the beginnings of dissent at home, Moscow has responded with marginal military adjustments and hints of diplomatic flexibility. Nevertheless, the costs to the Soviet Union seem manageable, and there is no evidence that it is willing to withdraw until its proxies are confirmed in power. Afghan tenacity and international pressure could someday force Moscow to change its calculations. But, at best, this will take years.

II

Two years ago, Soviet forces failed in a massive assault to eliminate the resistance in the Panjsher Valley. Since then the resistance has increasingly taken the military initiative. The overall level of combat has steadily intensified, even during the

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customary winter lull, when the focus of combat shifts to the south and west. Every summer the pace of fighting escalates as the mujahedeen take the offensive. The Soviet and DRA militaries have been forced to respond to these attacks with increasing force in order to stave off major losses. Were Soviet troops to withdraw from Afghanistan, the Kabul regime could not long hold off the mujahedeen.

Early in the conflict the Soviets concentrated their operations in "strategic" areas of Afghanistan—the densely populated and economically valuable belt stretching from the northern gas and agricultural fields, through the industrial region north of the Hindu Kush, down to Kabul and Jalalabad. But Soviet forces have been unable to consolidate their control within this core or eliminate the growing concentrations of mujahedeen. Consequently, in recent years the Soviets have shifted their attention to the border areas in order to stanch the flow of arms to mujahedeen inside the country. More Soviet forces have been garrisoned facing the border with Pakistan, though still at a distance. With increasing frequency, these Soviet troops have mounted both large- and small-scale operations in the border areas. These efforts have harassed and complicated, but not significantly curbed, mujahedeen movement and logistics.

As a result, in 1985 and so far this year, much of the fighting has taken place near the Pakistan border. In May 1985 the Soviets moved 10,000 troops with tanks and helicopters up the Konar Valley to relieve the Afghan regime garrison at Barikot, which had been periodically under siege since 1978. This operation was motivated partly by the failure of a smaller joint Soviet-DRA column to push through earlier in the year. Shortly after reaching its objective, however, the main Soviet force withdrew from the valley, leaving the garrison to DRA forces. It did not take long for the mujahedeen to return and reestablish the siege.

To the west of Konar, in the Panjsher Valley, the resistance gained a major victory in June 1985, precipitating a Soviet military reaction. For the first time in the war the resistance took an important regime garrison. Panjsher resistance commander Ahmad Shah Massoud and his troops first captured a number of outposts, then overran the Afghan garrison at Peshghor established after the Soviets' 1984 offensive. The mujahedeen captured extensive supplies and nearly 600 prisoners at Peshghor, including a number of Soviets and DRA

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

officers, and killed an Afghan general. The Soviets responded hastily; in contrast to their usual well-planned operations, they threw troops piecemeal into the Panjsher, perhaps to save Soviet garrisons further down the valley. By the end of July, with over 10,000 troops in the Panjsher, the Soviets went over to the offensive. Nevertheless, during the early part of 1986 Massoud's forces continued to operate within and outside the valley. Mobile groups from the Panjsher inflicted costly attacks on Soviet convoys traveling through the Salang Tunnel. The Soviets responded with several medium-sized operations and tactical airstrikes.

Late in the summer of 1985, the heaviest fighting shifted south to Paktia province on the Pakistan border. Five thousand mujahedeen drawn from several parties joined forces to attack the Afghan regime garrison at Khowst in the largest offensive

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ever mounted by the resistance. As many as half the outposts around Khowst fell to the mujahedeen, but they failed to take the town. The Soviets were able to relieve the garrison by air although several attempts to send convoys failed, including one with over 5,000 troops. Casualties were high on each side in some of the bloodiest fighting of the war. Although DRA troops mounted a counteroffensive from Khowst, the town remains under siege.

Heavy fighting in Paktia continues. In April of this year, DRA and Soviet forces captured and destroyed the largest resistance base at Zhawar, but then withdrew. The mile-long cave network at Zhawar, less than six miles from the Pakistan border, had been well defended by antiaircraft weapons. These proved inadequate in the face of what may have been the most intensive Soviet air strikes of the war, and the first use of large-scale night raids. Mujahedeen casualties ran in the hundreds, but the DRA army also suffered heavy losses. One of Kabul's few elite commando units, which led the initial assault, was cut to pieces; its commander was reportedly executed after a trial by resistance forces. The attackers have withdrawn and the mujahedeen are reported to have now moved back into Zhawar. The fall of Zhawar may have been the largest single defeat so far for the resistance, but it will not change the course of the war.

Mujahedeen activity has steadily increased in the other parts of Afghanistan as well. In the south, the regime has all but abandoned most of Kandahar, particularly the bazaar. In September 1985 resistance forces claimed to have downed a civilian aircraft near Kandahar with an antiaircraft missile. DRA and Soviet forces remain at the Kandahar airport and come under periodic attack. But the Soviets are fighting back. In early spring 1986 a large Soviet convoy was sent from Kabul to Kandahar. Soviet troops surrounded the town and bombarded the bazaar in an attempt to break resistance control of the city center. After extended house-to-house combat, the attack was broken off. Resistance forces apparently retain control of most of the city.

In the spring of 1985 several mujahedeen groups joined to attack the Kajaki Dam north of Kandahar; combat raged for months in the heaviest fighting of the war in the southeast. The Soviets had to increase their presence in this most isolated corner of the country.

In Nangarhar province, near the Khyber Pass, the DRA

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launched a series of operations in the winter of 1985–86. At first the DRA troops held together well, but on encountering heavy resistance had to withdraw and call for Soviet help. At about the same time, near the Pakistan border, the Soviets armed and trained about 400 Afridi tribesmen to fight the mujahedeen. When they brought the tribesmen into battle, however, the Afridis circled around, trapping the Soviets in a crossfire with the resistance, and then slipped away across the border into Pakistan.

Resistance activities in the north diminished after the death of the most important mujahedeen commander in the region, Zabiullah. Still, there were several attacks on the pipeline that carries Afghanistan's natural gas to the Soviet Union. The mujahedeen also made occasional forays into the U.S.S.R. itself.

Both sides have been particularly active in western Afghanistan. In 1985 resistance forces in Herat, under the unified command of Ismail Khan, moved to rid the city of its minimal regime presence.[1] The Soviets reportedly had to call in reinforcements directly from bases in the U.S.S.R. The Soviets attacked a number of resistance bases in the fall, and they have regained nominal daytime control of the city. But the fighting continues.

In the mountainous region of central Afghanistan known as the Hazarajat, Iranian-supported Shi'ite groups vanquished the traditional Shi'ite parties and moved to establish an Islamic republic administration. While in the past these groups have fought more against local rivals than against the Soviets, their increasing control has made the Hazarajat a more secure base for resistance forces.

The Afghan capital, Kabul, appears more secure. Refugees have doubled its population to about two million since the Soviet invasion. There are checkpoints and gun and tank emplacements on all access routes, and a nightly curfew is imposed. The movements of visiting news correspondents and resident diplomats are restricted. Yet observers have remarked at the city's apparent calm, the full bazaars, the accumulation of Volgas, Toyotas and Mercedes. If the war is not readily visible in Kabul, it is audible. The noise of explosions can be

[1] Stefan Lindgren, *Dagens Nyheter* (Stockholm), Feb. 16, 1986, (*Foreign Broadcast Information Service Daily Report: Europe,* Feb. 21, 1986). Lindgren notes that the overwhelming majority of the population of Herat has been driven out.

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heard year round; visitors note the constant drone of helicopters and warplanes. Numerous fires have been caused by aircraft ejecting antimissile flares.

The Soviets devote extensive resources to maintaining security in Kabul—their minimum tactical goal in Afghanistan—particularly on symbolic occasions or during important regime meetings. During these internationally visible events, as many as 60,000 Soviet or Afghan military and police personnel are deployed in the capital to maintain order.

With each passing winter, particularly when resistance movement is hampered, Soviet security measures appear increasingly effective. As the weather heats up, however, so does the fighting. Every summer, Kabul is shaken by rocket and commando attacks. The airport and military logistic centers are prime targets. In July 1985 the Soviet embassy compound in the western suburbs was hit by mujahedeen rockets, reportedly resulting in the deaths of several Soviet guards. Attacks became so frequent that the Soviets installed a rocket-launcher battery in the embassy compound in order to return the fire.

There is widespread and credible evidence that the war has significantly damaged the Afghan economy, already one of the world's poorest. In March of this year, Karmal claimed that since the beginning of the war the mujahedeen had destroyed 39 state-owned enterprises, 250 mosques and prayer houses, 2,707 schools and 130 medical centers, with total material damage amounting to 36 billion afghani, or about $18 million according to the official exchange rate.

Nevertheless, there is considerable evidence that the economy continues to function in much of the country. Disruption of agriculture has been mostly confined to areas of heavy fighting and population movement. These areas—most notably the provinces bordering Pakistan—are most familiar and accessible to Western reporters and the refugees; accounts of conditions there encourage perceptions of food shortages throughout the country. Food production in 1985 may have exceeded wartime averages, but isolated food shortages do exist. The Soviet Union has had to increase its already dominant share of Afghanistan's trade and aid to make up for the shortages.

In sum, the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan remains essentially a city-state, with military outposts in the hinterland and a secure civilian presence only in Kabul and a few other towns. Both Herat and Kandahar, the second and third most

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important cities in the country, are substantially in resistance hands. More than two-thirds of Afghanistan's population and an even greater proportion of its territory are beyond regime control.

III

The Soviets have adjusted their numbers, weapons, pace of activity and tactics to compensate for the growing capabilities of the mujahedeen and the decreasing effectiveness of the Afghan armed forces. In 1985 Soviet troop strength in Afghanistan increased marginally to about 120,000. They are supported by an estimated 30,000 additional troops stationed in the Soviet Central Asian republics north of Afghanistan.[2] Over the past year the Soviets have augmented or upgraded support and communications facilities, and employed new types of armor, artillery and mines. Tactical air support has been improved with the upgrading of airfields, permitting aircraft to be dispersed closer to combat zones. The Soviets have added to the number of war planes, equipping some with more sophisticated missiles.

Soviet forces now operate with greater frequency in smaller units. The number of Soviet special forces in Afghanistan has steadily increased since 1984 to approximately 4,000. Fighting in small units, they have successfully ambushed resistance caravans and engaged in reconnaissance and counterinsurgency thrusts; in larger formations they have conducted heliborne assaults. These commandos, unlike the regular Soviet troops, are respected and feared by the mujahedeen. But due partly to their limited numbers, they have not substantially affected the course of the war.

This more offensive posture has cost the Soviets in increased casualties and aircraft losses. At the end of 1985, the U.S. government estimated that the total number of Soviet casualties in Afghanistan since 1979 was over 30,000, including more than 10,000 killed. In addition, the Soviet Union and the Afghan regime together lost nearly 800 aircraft in the first six years of Soviet occupation.

There have been other costs as well. Soviet forces in Afghan-

[2] The Central Asian republics provide other kinds of support as well. In 1983, 64.5 percent of all students at higher education institutions in Tajikistan donated blood (compared with a national average of 23.5 percent). The figures suggest that an extra effort was made in Tajikistan to obtain blood for casualties from Afghanistan. *Kommunisti,* (in Georgian), Nov. 25, 1984, p. 4.

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istan continue to suffer morale problems. Alcoholism, drug abuse and disease, particularly dysentery and hepatitis, are rampant. Soviet soldiers have sold military supplies to pay for liquor and drugs, including heroin. Although there is no evidence of a coherent nationwide anti-civilian strategy, Soviet troops have increased reprisals on the civilian population in disputed areas, a sign of low morale and discipline.

The Soviet Union appears to be particularly sensitive about those of its soldiers who could be considered missing in action, avoiding mention of prisoners or defectors in its news media whenever possible. A few Soviets have gone over to the resistance; some of them even fight alongside the mujahedeen. According to Western press interviews, Soviet defectors often convert to Islam and adopt Muslim names.[3] In addition, various resistance groups hold Soviet prisoners, generally in secure base areas inside Afghanistan. The international press reported in May 1985 that 12 Soviet prisoners were killed in an explosion at Badaber/Mattani camp inside Pakistan. The incident was reported in the Soviet media only after the news reached the Soviet Union from international news sources.

The Soviet military has reaped certain benefits from fighting in Afghanistan. The war has provided a testing ground for new weapons systems. As many as 60,000 officers have served in Afghanistan, gaining useful combat experience. There are personal benefits to be gained as well. Despite the military's overall lackluster performance, Soviet captains and majors often leave Afghanistan with a promotion to assume a position at a military academy or a more senior command. Senior Soviet officers have parlayed their Afghanistan experiences into the most prestigious decorations, party rank and military posts.

Back in the Soviet Union, there is little evidence of genuine enthusiasm for the military occupation of what some veterans refer to as "Stan." Although there is no evidence of widespread opposition, there are signs of growing discontent. There have been public demonstrations against service in Afghanistan in Armenia, Georgia, the Ukraine and other republics. Draft evasion appears to have increased, prompting Soviet authorities to issue new laws punishing those who fail to register. Underground *samizdat* criticism has grown, including both negative

[3] Arthur Bonner, "Three Defectors, Turned Afghan, Fight Holy War," *The New York Times*, Nov. 1, 1985, p. 1.

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reports from Afghanistan veterans and open expressions of sympathy for the Afghan people.

One Soviet journal recently carried a letter that would have a familiar ring for Americans, concerning the difficulties of a veteran in coming to terms with attitudes of people back home. In Afghanistan, the veteran wrote, his buddy was killed and he himself was wounded and many times on the brink of death; on returning home he could not believe his eyes when he found his friends interested in obtaining new records and cars, his parents arguing over the site for a new dacha, and his girlfriend going about in "American jeans." He wondered what his comrade had died for.[4]

In an effort to generate more domestic support, the Soviet news media have significantly expanded their coverage of the war, including television reports. Not all the coverage is optimistic. One Moscow telecast reported that about 120 Afghan drivers working for an Afghan-Soviet transport company have died in ambushes over the past few years. At the Geneva summit meeting in November 1985, a Soviet spokesman publicly admitted to a sharp increase in casualties in Afghanistan that year. Soviet spokesmen have said that the fighting is "intensifying," a clear indication that Moscow is preparing its own people for a long struggle.

Politically and militarily, the Soviet Union appears to be settling in for a long, but limited, war. It has permitted only moderate increases over the years in its total commitment of troops. The Soviets have acted in the short term to preserve security in Kabul and a few provincial centers, to protect their supply lines and to prevent the resistance from growing too strong or threatening these secure zones. This defensive stance allows the Soviets to pursue longer-term political goals: wearing down the Afghan people's will to resist; stabilizing the government in Kabul; and developing loyal followers in the army, government and communist party who will be capable of eventually running the country.

For some time there was evidence of Soviet dissatisfaction with Kabul's performance, as revealed in its treatment of the Afghan regime and its leaders. Moscow's official greeting on the seventh anniversary of the April 1978 communist coup and again on Afghanistan's national day in August were less enthu-

[4] *Komsomolskaya Pravda,* Jan. 8, 1986, p. 4, (*Foreign Broadcast Information Service Daily Report: Soviet Union,* Jan. 9, 1986).

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siastic than in previous years and appeared to downgrade the status of the Afghan communist party, the People's Democratic Party of Afghanistan (PDPA).

Soviet dissatisfaction with Babrak Karmal became increasingly apparent when he was accorded low-level treatment on a series of visits to Moscow. During the February 1986 Soviet Party Congress Karmal was not received by General Secretary Mikhail Gorbachev or other key Soviet leaders, unlike other guests of equal or lesser rank. Thus, it was not surprising that on May 4, after a somewhat mysterious month-long visit in the Soviet Union, Babrak Karmal resigned as general secretary of the PDPA. He was replaced by the party secretary for security affairs, Najibullah (sometimes known as just Najib). Karmal asked the specially convened 18th plenum of the PDPA Central Committee to accept his resignation "because of health reasons, and after a careful assessment of my possibilities and of the issues and international problems."[5] A member of Karmal's Parcham faction of the PDPA, Najibullah is known for his long-standing close ties to the Soviets. He served as head of the KGB-dominated intelligence and security service KHAD from just after the Soviet invasion until December 1985.

Both Soviet and resistance spokesmen minimized the significance of the leadership change. But the announcement was accompanied by heavy security precautions that included the deployment of Soviet troops and tanks in the streets of Kabul. The replacement of Karmal, who had been a member of Afghanistan's parliament under the monarchy, by a figure known only for his leadership of a ruthless security organization will not contribute to Kabul's domestic legitimacy.[6]

IV

The Afghan regime remains weak and ineffective. With little prospect of improving its performance or appeal, Kabul has intensified efforts to construct a facade of legitimacy. The regime had never before invoked political devices such as elections or a *Loyah Jirga* (the traditional Afghan conciliar form of democracy)—probably because the PDPA could not win a fair election, and a managed exercise would have reduced the

[5] Radio Kabul, May 4, 1986, (*Foreign Broadcast Information Service Daily Report: South Asia*, May 5, 1986).

[6] Karmal remains president of the Revolutionary Council (and thus the nominal head of state) and a member of the PDPA Politburo.

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regime's credibility even further. Following Soviet direction, the regime has organized, stage-managed and publicized a series of meetings and public displays. There is no evidence that these exercises have yielded additional political support.

In April 1985 the regime hurriedly scheduled and convoked a Loyah Jirga—an assemblage historically used by the Afghan monarchy and the pre-1978 republican government to validate a transfer of power or to gain public approval of a specific new policy of major significance. The party and regime now claim to derive their legitimacy from the Proclamation of the 1985 Jirga. Nevertheless, prematurely playing the Loyah Jirga card devalues, for at least several years, a device that ultimately could have been used to help genuinely legitimize a regime with more popular support.

A large number of the 2,000 participants were regime functionaries, from the military or KHAD, or members of the PDPA or its various front organizations. The "independent" delegates were paid well for their attendance—reportedly 20,000 afghanis per delegate, and up to 50,000 afghanis for those who agreed to speak in the televised sessions.

Kabul also staged local council "elections" in August 1985, the first elections since 1978. As depicted in the government news media, "voting" consisted of counting raised hands in a random selection of residents (including young children). The regime announced that 450,000 Kabul residents participated, about 90 percent of eligible voters, but it is doubtful that even five percent of this number actually took part.

The regime focused on the frontier and its neighbors in a September 17, 1985, High Tribal Jirga for the Pushtun and Baluch tribes, whose territories span the borders with Pakistan and Iran. Again, delegates were reportedly paid well to attend. Cash payments were supplemented by arms, reportedly for use in defending the frontiers and presumably also tribal lands across the border.

Reinforcing the apparent change in emphasis from the party to the regime, Karmal presented on November 9, 1985, his blueprint for an ideological shift toward pragmatism. Invoking Leninist phraseology (thus certifying no departure from the ultimate goal of communism), Karmal outlined "ten theses" for broadening the social base of the Afghan revolution. He stressed that "our main aim is to establish conditions in the country under which all national questions could be solved . . . in a peaceful way." The basis of the initiative would be to

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"broaden the composition of leading state organs, that is, the Revolutionary Council and the Council of Ministers, to include the credible representatives of the people who can reflect interests of various strata and groups." Karmal also made assurances that Islam would be respected, the private sector would be encouraged, tribes would be permitted self-rule and that nonparty organizations could be formed if they were not hostile to the government.

Despite apparent Soviet support, Karmal subsequently acknowledged opposition to his "theses" from within the PDPA. He responded with threats that "those who do not obey the party decisions . . . have no place in the party. We do not intend to retreat from this decision." Much of this opposition has come from the Khalq faction of the PDPA. Formerly headed by deposed presidents Nur Mohammad Taraki and Hafizullah Amin, the Khalq faction is more ideological and nationalistic than Karmal's Parcham faction. Continuing disputes between the two factions have sometimes burst into violence.

The regime has tried to strengthen its position through personnel changes in the party and government. At the opening session of the 16th plenum of the PDPA Central Committee on November 21, 1985, a party reshuffle was announced, the first change in the Politburo in three years. It was at this meeting that Najibullah (in a replay of Yuri Andropov's rise to the top of the Soviet hierarchy) was named to the Secretariat of the PDPA, beginning his ascent from KHAD to the party leadership post in May 1986. Najib's deputy, Ghulam Farid Yacubi, was promoted to full member of the Central Committee and was quickly named as the new director of KHAD.

In December 1985 the regime announced the appointments of a number of purportedly "nonparty" figures. Sayed Amanoddin Amin was named vice chairman of the Council of Ministers. (There are several holders of this rank, the equivalent of deputy prime minister.) A technocrat, Amin previously served the DRA as a deputy minister and as chairman of the Economic Consultative Council, the voice of the so-called private sector. Other appointees similarly held important regime positions in the past, and their "nonparty" identities may be suspect. Abdul Hamid Mobarez, for example, named deputy education minister, was identified by Radio Kabul as a former head of the Afghan-Soviet Friendship Society.

In January 1986, 79 new members were nominated to the Revolutionary Council, doubling its size. The council's presid-

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ium was also enlarged. Haji Muhammad Chamkani was named vice president, the first time a nonparty figure had been elevated to such a high level. Throughout the so-called broadening process, the nonparty figures appear to have gained their appointments at the expense of Khalq faction members. On the whole, however, there is no evidence that the campaign has significantly increased the regime's popularity or legitimacy.

The PDPA continues to claim a steady growth in membership. In March of this year, Karmal told a Soviet interviewer that the party had 150,000 members, an increase of 15,000 from a figure he cited in January 1985. Western observers put party membership at half of this number or less, but the PDPA is unmistakably growing. Expansion of membership among peasants and soldiers has meant a smaller pool of capable, committed activists for the resistance to draw on.

In January 1986 KHAD was elevated to cabinet level as the Ministry of State Security. The change can be viewed as a "promotion" for good performance. The organization, which has a well-deserved reputation for brutality and torture, has grown steadily and now may be almost as large as the army. KHAD is overseen closely by the KGB and other Soviet bloc security forces. It has had some success in recruiting and keeping uneducated young urban males. These recruits have little or no ideological commitment to the communist regime but, having burned their bridges to the rest of Afghan society, have become loyal to the organization. Most KHAD cadres are based in Kabul, but the organization operates all over the country and abroad.

A new push has been made to build up local militias throughout the country. This effort parallels the traditional Kabul strategy of buying off villages and tribes—especially in the areas bordering Pakistan and Iran—with offers of arms, money and protection in return for a pledge to keep the mujahedeen out of the area. This approach has succeeded up to a point, but the militias have only rarely fought the mujahedeen. More commonly, groups take the government booty, then subsequently go over to the resistance.

The regime's efforts to gain long-term support among young people appear to have suffered a dramatic setback due to an apparently growing effort to fill vacancies in the military. In March 1986 the call-up was extended to teachers in the capital. In the past three years, half the graduating class of a top Kabul

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school have left the country before the end of their final term out of fear of conscription at graduation. Efforts to indoctrinate Afghan youth in regime-controlled areas or inside the Soviet Union have failed to produce a substantial committed cadre.

V

The Afghan military remains incapable of holding off the mujahedeen, notwithstanding continuing Soviet efforts to reverse its deterioration. The December 1984 appointment of a Khalqi, Nazar Mohammed, to head the Ministry of Defense apparently was not enough to inspire the largely Khalqi officer corps. They are likely to be further alienated as a result of continuing shifts in the factional power balance in favor of the Parchamis and the reduction of ideology in Karmal's broadening campaign.

In recent months the Soviets have intensified their efforts to "Afghanize" the war. The DRA military saw more engagements and scored some successes. Where it ran into serious opposition, however, it was forced to call on Soviet support. Enlisted men, who are mostly impressed conscripts, prefer not to fight the mujahedeen. They frequently desert, and the resistance generally sends them back home or absorbs them into its ranks. Mass desertions and surrender in the face of mujahedeen attacks continue. The DRA military remains a major source of arms and ammunition for the resistance. On more than one occasion DRA troops have reportedly tried to curb Soviet reprisal attacks on civilians.

The Soviets have been pressuring the DRA to expand its ranks. In March 1985 Karmal told the 15th Central Committee plenum that "bringing the ranks of the military up to full strength cannot be delayed." On January 5, 1985, the Politburo announced that those who "volunteer" for the army would have to serve only two rather than the standard three years required of conscripts. In fact, many conscripts have been forced to serve beyond their required term—a major source of disaffection within the army. In order to legitimize conscription by press-gang, the regime decreed that anyone between the ages of 18 and 38 who had not yet served would be liable for immediate call-up.

The Afghan air force, previously considered the most loyal service, has experienced increased defections and sabotage. Heightened vulnerability to mujahedeen air defense has steadily eroded morale. In June 1985 about 20 Afghan fighter

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planes were destroyed by sabotage at Shindand Air Base near the Iranian border—the largest loss of aircraft in any single incident of the war. The accused saboteurs (DRA officers who were later executed) were unhappy over the disciplining of pilots who dropped their bombs in the desert instead of on a village. In July DRA air force personnel defected to Pakistan with two Afghan Mi-25 (Mi-24D) export-version Hind helicopter gunships, the first Hinds to slip out of Soviet or proxy control. The DRA, claiming the pilots had gotten lost, demanded that Pakistan return the gunships.

VI

As for the resistance, it is better armed and trained than it was in the past, and increasingly professional. As a result, the mujahedeen have been able to take greater initiatives in the fighting. Many of the separate fighting groups are displaying increased cooperation. Improved air defense—still comprised primarily of heavy machine guns but increasingly supplemented by surface-to-air missiles—has blunted somewhat the impact of Soviet air power and forced the Soviets to adopt countermeasures. Through skillful use of mines the mujahedeen have increased their destruction of armored vehicles and convoy traffic. They have kept themselves well supplied with arms from captured equipment and a variety of outside sources. There are reports that the mujahedeen have stockpiled a large quantity of arms as insurance against future supply cut-offs or shortages.[7]

The Afghan resistance consists of several elements, both inside the country and abroad. The mujahedeen could not survive without the support of the overwhelming majority of the Afghan population. Although Soviet and regime reprisals have generated more caution in the behavior of civilians, in many cases reprisals have hardened attitudes toward the occupiers. Under the *pukhtunwali,* the Afghan traditional code of behavior, an unfulfilled requirement for *badal,* or blood revenge, is passed down through generations. Those who live under regime control, including many employed by the DRA, pass on intelligence or commit sabotage. The regime periodically uncovers resistance supporters among its ranks, but can-

[7] Stuart Auerbach, "Afghan Rebels Say They Hide Arms," *The Washington Post,* July 21, 1985.

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not get them all. At the end of 1985, four Afghan generals reportedly were arrested for cooperating with the mujahedeen.

Resistance units, known as fronts, are headed by local commanders, originally traditional leaders but increasingly young men skilled in combat and organization. Thus a new generation of nontraditional leaders is emerging inside the country. Most, but not all, of the hundreds of separate fronts are linked, sometimes tenuously, to one or more of the major resistance parties.[8] Tensions among the groups—at times reflecting traditional tribal or ethnic squabbles, sometimes disputes over territory or supplies—continue to be a problem for the resistance. But the war appears to be slowly creating a national consciousness among the Afghan population, and popular pressure has apparently contributed to a reduction in combat among different fighting groups.

Many of the more traditional fronts, operating as local self-defense units, never venture out of their local areas. Some occasionally attack convoys or regime posts. But alongside these groups a modern guerrilla army is developing. Operational units of increasing size have evolved around a single commander; this is particularly the case among non-tribal groups such as those organized by Massoud in the Panjsher Valley, Ismail Khan in Herat or (among tribal Pushtuns) Jallaluddin in Paktia. The Pushtun tribes gather around the traditional leaders like Pir Sayyid Gailani in Paktia, or join alliances as in Kandahar or the Helmand Valley. These groups, and perhaps the Hazarajat Shi'ites, can be viewed as the equivalent of *focos,* the political and military sub-centers proposed by Che Guevara in his model of Latin American guerrilla war.

Increasing numbers of mujahedeen fighters have received at least rudimentary training and have become adept at a variety of modern weapons and combat support equipment. Many have become full-time soldiers, especially the commanders (some of whom, like Ismail Khan, were originally officers in the DRA army). While Soviet troops are rotated (conscripts roughly annually, officers about every two years), the mujahedeen's combat experience accumulates. The development in a few short years of complex logistical networks handling many

[8] Olivier Roy, *L'Afghanistan: Islam et Modernité Politique,* Paris: Seuil, 1985 (soon to be available in translation). Roy's study describes the relationship between the resistance and the development of radical modernist politics in Islam, or Islamism, in Afghanistan. He notes that the most important contradiction in the resistance may well be between the parties in Peshawar and the commanders in the field.

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tons of supplies in a hostile environment with little basic infrastructure is a remarkable accomplishment.

The mujahedeen suffered a major setback in February when Zabiullah, regional commander of the *Jamiat-i-Islami* resistance group, was killed by a mine that exploded under his jeep. Zabiullah had been singularly successful in extending his influence outside his own party; his successors have not yet been able to reestablish the coordination he maintained with other groups in the north. The loss of major commanders remains a serious potential problem, but the ability of the resistance to find replacements is growing.

The loss of the logistic base at Zhawar, although not critical, can provide a valuable lesson to the mujahedeen. They are not strong enough to hold or deny territory to the Soviets. Regardless of the antiaircraft weapons the mujahedeen may acquire, the Soviets will always be able to destroy static bases: they can mass air assets sufficient to overcome any such defense. Thus, no matter how well-intentioned, pressuring the mujahedeen to escalate their resistance to a higher or conventional level, to hold land, or to determine tactical details from afar seriously risks the collapse of the struggle. Guerrilla war is a long-term vocation, and the Afghans' foreign supporters need to be as patient as the Afghans themselves.

The resistance has undergone a political consolidation over the years, partly at Pakistan's behest. In 1980 there were over one hundred different resistance parties with offices in Peshawar. Since 1979 there have been at least six major resistance alliances. The merger of the two existing "fundamentalist" and "moderate" alliances of the major resistance parties was announced May 16, 1985, in Peshawar. The new coalition kept the same name—Islamic Unity of Afghan Mujahedeen—that had been used by both alliances.

The new alliance is represented by a single spokesman, rotated quarterly among the party leaders. Decisions are by consensus among the seven leaders. The fundamentalists are now represented by four groups: Gulbuddin Hekmatyar's *Hezb-e-Islami* (Islamic Party); the *Hezb-e-Islami* faction of Yunus Khalis; the *Jamiat-i-Islami* (Islamic Society) headed by Burhanuddin Rabbani; and the *Ittihadia* (Islamic Unity) led by Abdul Rasool Sayyaf. The moderates are represented by three groups: the *Harakat-e-Inqelab* (Islamic Revolutionary Movement) of Nabi Mohammedi; the *Mahaz-e-Milli* (National Islamic Front)

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of Pir Sayyid Gailani; and the *Jebh-e Najat-e Milli* (National Liberation Front) led by Sibaghatullah Mojadeddi.

The major focus of the alliance thus far has been promoting the international political role of the resistance; it has demanded Afghanistan's seat in the United Nations and other international representation. Gulbuddin led a delegation to New York during the United Nations' 40th anniversary activities in the fall of 1985. Gailani went to the Islamic Conference meeting in Rabat, Morocco, where his presentation was apparently very well received; he also observed the U.N. Commission on Human Rights session in Geneva last March. Rabbani, the coalition's current spokesman, can also be expected to travel. Throughout all these appearances abroad, alliance unity has been maintained and the role of the spokesman respected by the other delegates—no small accomplishment for parties that in the past regularly fought each other.

The resistance alliance has its limitations. The various parties retain considerable differences over their visions of a post-Soviet Afghanistan. The alliance thus far has had greater impact abroad than inside Afghanistan. It remains only a representative coalition that lacks a central authority. And it has yet to integrate Afghans outside the seven parties (for example, the Shi'ite groups) or fully reflect leadership developments in the *jihad*. Nevertheless, the alliance is slowly developing a coherent voice. In the future it could become a credible interlocutor in a discussion of Afghanistan's future, and thus may prove to be the most significant political development in the resistance effort yet.

VII

Pakistan has become a "front-line state," threatened by the prospect of permanent Soviet domination of Afghanistan and the permanent presence of Afghan refugees. Pakistani-Afghan relations have long been troubled. The British-demarcated border, the Durand Line, which divides areas traditionally inhabited by the Pushtun and Baluch tribes, has not been recognized by Afghan governments. The recognition of the frontier is a highly valued plum held out by the Kabul regime in U.N. negotiations. In the past, Pushtun nationalism produced calls in both countries for Pakistan's North West Frontier Province (NWFP) and Baluchistan to become independent or merge with Afghanistan under the name of Pushtunistan. Since the Soviet invasion the question has become moot; Push-

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tuns and Baluch now feel lucky to be out of the Afghan embrace.

Afghans in Pakistan constitute the single largest group of refugees in the world. The Pakistan government reports registration of over 2.6 million Afghans; numbers continue to grow, although at a slower pace than in years past. Despite a recent renumeration, that figure may involve some double counting. However, there are large numbers of additional unregistered refugees, many living on the fringes of the camps in the NWFP and Baluchistan.

Net refugee flows are difficult to determine partly because there is still considerable movement in both directions across the border. Although from 1983 to 1984 the refugee flow diminished, it apparently increased in mid-1985 to as many as 35,000 people a month, then abated. The increase was due to an upswing in fighting and perhaps to deliberate Soviet and DRA efforts to drive Afghans out of the disputed areas near the border. The new refugees differ from their predecessors. Many are wounded or suffer from malnutrition. They come with few possessions, unlike earlier refugees who brought household goods, animals and even commercial vehicles. As registration can be a lengthy process, many refugees congregate around existing camps, where they are supported by relatives or fellow tribesmen until they can get other assistance.

The Soviets and KHAD both attempt to exploit Pakistani sensitivities over the refugee presence and the threatened spillover of the war. Over the past year there has been a marked rise in Soviet/DRA subversion in Pakistan's tribal areas along the border. Many KHAD infiltrators have been apprehended by the Pakistani authorities. A series of bomb explosions in Peshawar, including a January 1986 blast at a Pakistan International Airlines office, inspired a local demonstration against the Afghans' presence.

The specter of Pushtun and Baluch separatism was raised when the DRA convoked a jirga of the independent tribes in Kabul. According to Radio Kabul, two of Pakistan's most important regional parties, Abdul Wali Khan's National Democratic Party (representing Pushtuns from the NWFP) and the National Awami Party (Baluch), and a host of minor radical groups from Pakistan participated. The Sindhi Awami Tehrik party, implicated in the 1983 Anti-Zia disturbances in the Sindh, sent a message of solidarity. The Afghan Revolutionary

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Council told them "Afghanistan was and will be your homeland."

In 1985, there were over 200 DRA or Soviet violations of Pakistan airspace and more than 25 instances of shelling of Pakistan territory. Violations continued at a high rate through the early months of 1986. As before, nearly all violations were reconnaissance missions or air and artillery strikes related to fighting just over the border inside Afghanistan. Violations were especially numerous around Arandu, opposite Barikot, and all along the tribal areas that border Paktia province. During the spring 1986 fighting in Paktia, the frequency of Afghan air incursions into Pakistan territory was unprecedented.

The second largest concentration of Afghan refugees is in Iran. The government of Iran estimates that there are up to 1.8 million Afghans within its borders, few of whom are living in refugee camps. Iran does not recognize the DRA and refuses to participate in the U.N. negotiations on the Afghanistan situation. Iran complained of periodic border violations during the course of 1985. In June of that year, Ayatollah Hussein Ali Montazari, Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini's heir apparent, encouraged several Afghan Shi'ite resistance groups to stop fighting among themselves and concentrate on fighting the Soviets. Iranian support generally has been channeled to these groups and seems to be on the increase.[9]

VIII

Efforts in the United Nations to negotiate a settlement in Afghanistan have resulted in six rounds of indirect talks in Geneva since 1982. Negotiations are led by U.N. Under Secretary General for Special Political Affairs Diego Cordovez. Cordovez shuttles between delegations from Islamabad and Kabul, officially informing Iran of the discussions and unofficially informing the Soviets. In June 1985 the United Nations reported tentative agreement on three out of four proposed accords. The first accord calls for noninterference in Afghanistan's affairs; the second, international guarantees of a final settlement; the third, the voluntary return of Afghan refugees.

[9] On Iranian aid, Lindgren (*op. cit.*) notes: "For the first time in seven years the Iranian authorities allowed a shipment of clothes and sleeping bags from Pakistan to be transported up to Herat through Iran. But there is no help in the form of arms from Iran—apart from a small number of old U.S. rifles."

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Discussion of a fourth accord dealing with the key issue of a Soviet troop withdrawal (and establishing a timetable) was blocked in August 1985 when Afghanistan continued to demand direct negotiations with Pakistan. The Soviets and the DRA maintain that a withdrawal can be accomplished only through a bilateral agreement between Moscow and Kabul, but that this can be linked to the other elements of the U.N.-sponsored accords.

Afghanistan did not change its position regarding direct negotiations with Pakistan at a subsequent round of talks in December. In the absence of a settlement, Pakistan refuses to negotiate directly with the DRA government. In that same month, the United States offered to play the role of guarantor in a peace settlement that would include a speedy withdrawal of Soviet troops, linked to the other elements of the U.N. accords.[10]

In March 1986 Cordovez shuttled between Islamabad and Kabul in an effort to move the discussion of the fourth instrument forward. The DRA produced the timetable for the withdrawal of Soviet forces that it had hinted at the previous December. The DRA plan also calls for monitoring to determine that "outside interference"—the term Moscow uses to describe the indigenous Afghan resistance—has ceased before Soviet troop withdrawal begins. Previously, the DRA refused to discuss a time frame unless the Pakistanis agreed to direct talks. Dropping this condition was considered a concession by the DRA-Soviet side. Pakistan appears encouraged by the progress of the negotiations. President Zia ul-Haq told *Le Monde* that "it is very possible that Mr. Gorbachev has changed his mind."[11] Cordovez delivered a new draft of instrument four to the parties in April that served as the basis for another Geneva session that began May 5.

Despite hints of flexibility, Moscow has given little indication of a readiness to abandon the DRA to its fate. Moscow continues to stress the concept of a political settlement that applies "around Afghanistan," and that will maintain and legitimize its client in Kabul.

Nevertheless, Afghanistan is clearly of increasing concern to

[10] David K. Shipler, "U.S. Offers to Act as a Guarantor of an Agreement on Afghanistan," *The New York Times*, Dec. 14, 1985, p. 1.

[11] Don Oberdorfer, "Kabul Offers Timetable for Soviet Pullout," *The Washington Post*, Apr. 2, 1986, p. 2.

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the Soviet leadership. At the February Party Congress, Gorbachev mentioned Afghanistan alone as a "regional conflict." He called the Afghan war a "bleeding wound," the starkest description so far from a Soviet leader. Gorbachev's formulation on withdrawal, including the desire for a solution in the "nearest future," appeared slightly different from previous authoritative statements. Such close attention at the Party Congress indicates that the Soviet leadership feels that it must at least appear to be trying to solve the Afghanistan problem.

The Afghan resistance is not involved in the negotiations, and without popular Afghan consent there can be no solution. After more than six years of brutal war, there is little likelihood that an authentic Afghan government could be genuinely friendly to the Soviet Union. However, a government that the Soviets could live with, that would not be a threat, and whose neutrality would be internationally guaranteed is not inconceivable. Regardless of their jihad or the requirements of revenge, the Afghans can compromise and have done so several times in their history.

Consequently, the continuation of Cordovez' efforts is valuable: the U.N. negotiations provide a door for a possible withdrawal, should the Soviets ever decide it is time to leave. Such a decision does not now appear in prospect. But Gorbachev and the rest of the Soviet leadership may be showing signs of impatience over Kabul's lack of progress. Should they conclude that 15 years hence Afghanistan will be at least as big a headache for them as it is now, they might reconsider their involvement. It will take time and require a combination of pressures—on the ground in Afghanistan, abroad in their relations with the Islamic world, Europe and the United States, and within the Soviet Union itself—for such a reconsideration to occur.

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Archie Brown

CHANGE IN THE SOVIET UNION

Western reaction to the 27th Soviet Party Congress has been mixed. On the one hand, those who had forecast revelations or a shift of direction on the dramatic scale of the 20th Party Congress—when Khrushchev delivered his secret speech attacking Stalin—were disappointed. On the other hand, those who expected little in the way of new ideas or policy changes to emerge from the congress found what they expected to see.

If the expectations of the former group were too high, the ingrained skepticism of the latter group may have led them to underplay what was new. If this year's congress was not the earth-shattering event that all party congresses are made out to be in the Soviet Union, it was, nevertheless, the most interesting and significant such occasion since the 22nd Party Congress in 1961, when Khrushchev extended and made fully public his criticism of Stalin and many aspects of the Stalin period.

No Soviet leader in his first year of office has presided over such sweeping changes in the composition of the highest party and state organs as Mikhail Gorbachev. The scale of the turnover, especially in key domestic and foreign policy posts, raises the possibility of policy innovations worthy of the name. So, too, do the failures of the Brezhnev years—in the Soviet economy and in international relations—which left his successors with severe and unresolved problems. Yuri Andropov and Konstantin Chernenko reached the top job too infirm and with too little time to take the difficult decisions, though Andropov at least made a significant start by facing up to the seriousness of the failures and encouraging some fresh ideas and fresh faces. Before looking at the extent to which new policies are indeed being promoted under Gorbachev—and the evidence for this at the 27th Party Congress—and examining the scope

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for and limitations on further policy innovation, we turn first to the changes in the party and state leadership.

II

It is worth underlining both the sheer importance of those offices now held by new people and the remarkable extent of the personnel changes in the highest echelons of Soviet political life. The most powerful positions in the Soviet Union are the party general secretary, the senior secretaries of the Central Committee (those who hold a secretaryship in conjunction with membership of the Politburo), the chairman of the Council of Ministers and the chairman of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet.

Immediately prior to Chernenko's death on March 10, 1985, only Gorbachev, among present incumbents, held any one of these positions—he was a senior secretary. When he succeeded Chernenko as general secretary, other changes were soon set in motion. The following month, Yegor Ligachev and Nikolai Ryzhkov, who had been brought into the top leadership team[1] only under Andropov, became senior secretaries; and in October 1985 Ryzhkov succeeded Nikolai Tikhonov in the no less responsible post of chairman of the Council of Ministers. In July 1985 the only senior secretary who was a holdover from pre-Gorbachev days, Grigory Romanov, the former leader of the Leningrad party, was unceremoniously fired, and in the same month Andrei Gromyko was much more subtly moved out of the Foreign Ministry and into the post of chairman of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet (thus reducing his impact on the content of Soviet foreign policy). More recently, gaps in the ranks of the senior secretaries have been filled with the completion of the meteoric rise of Lev Zaikov, who moved from Leningrad to join the Central Committee Secretariat no longer ago than July 1985 and was elected a full member of the Politburo at the party congress. Like Romanov before him, he supervises the Soviet military and the defense industry.[2]

The 27th Party Congress saw also the completion of extensive changes under Gorbachev in the composition of the top foreign policy makers in the Soviet Union. New heads were

[1] By "top leadership team" I mean the full and candidate members of the Politburo and the secretaries of the Central Committee.

[2] Thus, the top five people in the Soviet Union as of April 1986, in terms of institutional power, are Gorbachev (age 55), Ryzhkov (56), Ligachev (65)—who is the de facto second secretary of the party, Zaikov (63) and Gromyko (76).

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appointed to the two departments of the Central Committee with the most important international responsibilities—the International Department, which deals with non-communist countries and with non-ruling communist parties, and the Department for Liaison with Communist and Workers' Parties of Socialist Countries, which is responsible for relations with the communist world. In 1985 Gorbachev lost no time in showing that his was going to be the most important single voice in the making of Soviet foreign policy and that he was going to conduct a much more active diplomacy than either Andropov or Chernenko (or Brezhnev in his last years) had been able to pursue. His frequent foreign policy pronouncements in 1986 confirm this.

The selection of key colleagues also bears his stamp. The days of "Ivanov's turn" in Soviet politics are over. No longer can the first deputy head of a ministry, state committee or Central Committee department wait in confident expectation of filling his master's shoes.

Taken together, Gorbachev's appointments show imagination and indicate his desire to bring fresh minds to bear on problems and to break up cozy relationships in Moscow. Thus, the highly capable Georgian, Eduard Shevardnadze, had no particular reason ever to step inside the Ministry of Foreign Affairs until he was appointed to head it, with a full seat in the Politburo; the equally skilled (and, in foreign affairs, vastly more experienced) Anatoly Dobrynin had not served a day in the party apparatus before he became a secretary of the Central Committee and head of its International Department. The men they replaced, Gromyko and Boris Ponomarev, were powerful figures within the foreign policy realm and, at least in Gromyko's case, enormously competent. But given their ages (Gromyko will be 77 in July and Ponomarev was 81 in January) and the fact that Gromyko had headed his ministry for 28 years and Ponomarev his department for over 30 years, it would have been more than a little surprising if they had been receptive to new ideas and to a new style of conduct of Soviet foreign policy.

The turnover at the top of the key foreign policy making institutions was completed with the retirement of the 76-year-old Konstantin Rusakov as a secretary of the Central Committee and as head of the Central Committee department responsible for relations with communist countries. His replacement, Vadim Medvedev, is 20 years younger and has moved over

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from heading the Department of Science and Education. His previous, rather varied career included teaching economics in technical institutes, a short spell in the apparatus of the Leningrad party organization, eight years as a deputy head of the Department of Propaganda of the Central Committee and five years as rector of the Academy of Social Sciences attached to the Central Committee. The last-named post (which he held from 1978 to 1983) would have brought him into contact with some of the rising stars in the East European firmament.

Also of consequence is Leonid Zamyatin's departure from the leadership of the Central Committee International Information Department to become Soviet ambassador to Britain. Accompanied as it was by the promotion of Aleksander Yakovlev to a secretaryship of the Central Committee, it may signify an extension of Yakovlev's authority over international as well as domestic propaganda.

Coming at the end of a year of significant changes in the top leadership, it is noteworthy that as many promotions as five new secretaries of the Central Committee (including the first woman in the team for a quarter of a century),[3] one new full member of the Politburo (Zaikov) and two new candidate members were made at the Central Committee plenum in March 1986. This means that at the end of Gorbachev's first year, no fewer than 12 people out of the top leadership team of 27 are complete newcomers[4] and only seven out of the 27 hold both the same rank and the same responsibilities they held before Gorbachev took over.

Just one rung farther down the political hierarchy, at the still very important Central Committee level, the changes that emerged at the party congress were a far cry from the turnovers of Brezhnev's time, though less spectacular than the change at the very top. It has, indeed, been a characteristic of personnel movement under Gorbachev that the higher the political echelon, the greater the extent of the change. In some ways this makes innovation in foreign policy easier to introduce and implement than in domestic policy, for the opportunities for

[3] Gorbachev had already urged party organizations "to promote women more boldly" and it was surely on his initiative that Aleksandra Biryukova, who had served in the central secretariat of the Soviet trade unions since 1968, became a secretary of the Central Committee. The last woman in the top leadership team was Ekaterina Furtseva, a Politburo member from 1957 until 1961.

[4] That is to say, they were neither Politburo candidate members nor secretaries of the Central Committee under Chernenko.

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people lower in the political hierarchy to undermine leadership decisions are greater in the latter than in the former case.

Given that the Central Committee is composed of people who, in most cases, possess important executive functions, it is of some consequence that the proportion of new Central Committee members increased markedly as compared with the turnover characteristic of the Brezhnev years. The contrast between the 26th and 27th Party Congresses is quite striking. Whereas new members accounted for approximately 28 percent of Brezhnev's Central Committee elected in 1981, they made up 44 percent of those elected at the recent congress.[5]

Neither at the Politburo nor Central Committee level did the changes amount to a clean sweep for Gorbachev and his allies. Shortly before the congress, Gorbachev succeeded in removing a senior conservative opponent, Viktor Grishin, from the Moscow party first secretaryship and the Politburo. But he still has in the Politburo two archetypal Brezhnev clients in the shape of Dinmukhamed Kunayev, the Kazakhstan first secretary, and Vladimir Shcherbitsky, who heads the Ukrainian party organization. That their survival caused some raised eyebrows is a measure of the speed with which Gorbachev has moved and the expectations he has aroused. Kunayev and Shcherbitsky are now, after all, the only survivors of Brezhnev's Politburo apart from Gromyko and Gorbachev himself. Perhaps more surprising is the retention in the Central Committee of a number of venerable party figures of conservative disposition who had lost their executive posts—among them former Premier Tikhonov, the former chief of Gosplan Nikolai Baibakov and longtime head of the International Department Ponomarev. This may reflect the undoubted fact that substantial support for the views they represent is still to be found in the party, or it may be a way of distinguishing their honorable retirement from the distinctly less honorable retirement of a Romanov or a Grishin.

Within the governmental hierarchy, the increase in the pace of personnel change under Gorbachev has been no less marked. More ministers and chairmen of state committees were replaced during Gorbachev's first year than in the Andropov and

[5] The difference is even more marked if one concentrates on the completely new faces—that is, by excluding those promoted to the full Central Committee from candidate membership or from the Central Auditing Commission. There were 41 such complete newcomers out of 319 in 1981 and 95 out of 307 in 1986.

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Chernenko periods put together.[6] In addition, in November 1985 five ministries and one state committee were abolished and replaced by a single new state committee (for the agro-industrial complex) with the real loss (as distinct from relabeling in the new institution) of between 40 and 50 percent of the jobs which had existed in those organizations. Gorbachev, an appreciative reader of *Parkinson's Law* (as he made clear on his visit to Britain in December 1984), intends to reduce the size of the state bureaucracy as well as to speed up the turnover of those who head it. To do so requires the cooperation and support of the chairman of the Council of Ministers, and it is probably not coincidental that the process of reduction of the number of ministries and of the size of the state bureaucracy got seriously under way only after Ryzhkov had taken Tikhonov's place at the apex of the ministerial system.

III

The 27th Party Congress produced important changes of style and substance as compared with the previous three congresses. The tone was far less complacent and reflected that of Gorbachev's statements ever since he became general secretary. Sycophancy was discouraged—Gorbachev interrupted one delegate to rebuke him for excessive invocation of his name. An important theme of Gorbachev's first year, that no ministry and no republican or regional party organization should remain beyond criticism, was pointedly reiterated.

At the congress, Ligachev, who has been a close ally of Gorbachev in his efforts to tighten discipline as well as the driving force behind the anti-alcohol campaign,[7] emphasized that "all organizations—whether Moscow, Leningrad, Ukraine, Kazakhstan, Stavropol, Tomsk or Sverdlovsk—all of them must be within the zone of criticism and open to party critique." The examples were telling ones, for the Soviet cognoscenti were well aware that Grishin's Moscow, Romanov's Leningrad, Shcherbitsky's Ukraine and Kunayev's Kazakhstan were beyond "the zone of criticism" in Brezhnev's time and that Stavropol, Tomsk and Sverdlovsk are the local political bases of Gorbachev, Ligachev himself and Premier Ryzhkov.

Criticism was extended to embrace also institutions which

[6] Three times as many changes were made under Andropov as under Chernenko.

[7] Whether he would wish to go as far down the road of economic reform as Gorbachev may be prepared to go is less certain.

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had not been attacked in the pre-congress months. In one of the liveliest and most forthright speeches of the congress, Boris Yeltsin, the new first secretary of the Moscow party and a candidate member of the Politburo, did not spare the Central Committee apparatus. He was critical of the Department of Party-Organizational Work and drew attention to the fact that the departmental structure of the Central Committee apparatus had come gradually to resemble that of the ministerial system, leading to duplication of the work of the State Planning Committee (Gosplan) and of the Council of Ministers. While it seems highly unlikely that Yeltsin would call for reform and restructuring of the Central Committee's economic departments against the wishes of Gorbachev and Ligachev, it is, perhaps, noteworthy that his closest personal association is with the chairman of the Council of Ministers, Ryzhkov—they worked together in Sverdlovsk; Ryzhkov obviously has a particular interest in the achievement of a clearer division of labor between the Central Committee apparatus and the ministerial system and the granting of more political space to the chairman and Presidium of the Council of Ministers.

Another highly unusual target for criticism was the newspaper, *Pravda*—this time from Ligachev. While giving a qualified endorsement to the more open criticism found recently in the Soviet mass media, Ligachev indicated that some of them had on occasion overstepped the mark. The example he cited was that of the most authoritative and normally untouchable of all Soviet newspapers. It is likely that he had in mind, in particular, a remarkable collection of readers' views published in *Pravda* two weeks before the party congress, in which a party member from Kazan called, in the name of social justice, for an end to the special privileges of party, soviet, trade union, economic and Komsomol leaders and drew attention to the existence of special eating places, shops and hospitals for them. If the bosses had to wait like everyone else, the writer argued, then something might be done sooner about the lines in the shops. In the same issue a Moscow party member since 1919 called for the introduction of a law to establish periodic purges of the party! The *Pravda* commentary dissented from that suggestion, though it published the allegations of excessive privilege without comment.

The 27th Congress adopted a new, revised version of the Party Program, which had remained unaltered since it was endorsed by the 22nd Congress in 1961. Reflecting Khrush-

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chev's over-optimism, the 1961 program had promised that "a communist society will in the main be built in the U.S.S.R. by 1980" and that the Soviet Union would overtake the United States in per capita production by 1970. As it turned out, it was the Party Program that was overtaken—by events—and the new version of the program (in many respects foreshadowed by Andropov in June 1983) largely eschews futurology and is more realistic and circumspect in its assessment of the tasks ahead.

IV

Before and after the congress, one of the questions most frequently asked is whether there is going to be within the Soviet Union an economic reform that goes significantly beyond the tinkering with the economic mechanism characteristic of the Brezhnev years. The answer is not yet wholly clear; the signals are mixed.

To accept, on the basis of the absence of a comprehensive reform package at the party congress, that there will be no reform would be a mistake. Some Western observers have jumped prematurely to that conclusion because they assumed that if there was going to be a reform, the congress would be the occasion for unveiling it. But several important statements of Gorbachev himself point in the opposite direction. While it could be argued that so far he has not gone beyond rhetoric, personnel changes and some organizational restructuring, it is important to recognize that these were the logical places to start.

In order to change, it is first of all necessary to create a climate of opinion for change, and this is a task to which Gorbachev has addressed himself with great vigor and, it would appear, with some success. To get people "to work in a new way"—a favorite phrase of Gorbachev—it helps to replace those at the top of the various hierarchies who have been working in the "old way" for more years than most of them care to remember. And while organizational change does not in itself amount to economic reform, it may be a necessary precondition for it. A first step toward reducing excessive bureaucratic interference in the activities of industrial associations, enterprises and agriculture (in the last, this has already been recognized and acted upon) is to reduce the functions and size of the bureaucracy whose raison d'être is to interfere.

The evidence available on Gorbachev's position suggests not

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only that he takes seriously the deficiencies of the Soviet economy, but also that he does not believe that tinkering with the economic mechanism will be enough. In December 1984 he warned that the unjustified preservation of "obsolete elements in production relations may bring about a deterioration of the economic and social situation." In June 1985 he declared that "the acceleration of scientific and technical progress insistently demands a profound reorganization of the system of planning and management and of the entire economic mechanism." Without this, he told a conference convened by the Central Committee to discuss the acceleration of scientific and technical progress, "everything that we are talking about today may remain just fond hopes."

In his Political Report to the congress in February 1986, a report that carries the authoritative weight of the entire leadership, Gorbachev went further. It is of some significance that when speaking of the economy, Gorbachev not only used the word "reform" for the first time but he even said: "A *radical reform* is necessary" (italics added). This was not a phrase thrown out in passing. Gorbachev must have known that it would be cited and used by those Soviet specialists in favor of far-reaching economic reform and would provide little comfort for conservative opponents of change. It was used also by Ryzhkov in his speech (which on the whole, however, was less reformist than Gorbachev's) and was soon reiterated in an editorial in *Pravda*.

Gorbachev indicated, moreover, that the economic reform process was just beginning. He said: "We are only at the start of the journey. . . . To restructure the economic mechanism in the conditions of our country with its immense, complex economy, requires time and energy." After the congress, Gorbachev returned to this theme. Addressing workers at the Volga Car Works in the town of Togliatti on April 8, 1986, he said: "Can you manage an economy which runs into trillions of rubles from Moscow? It is absurd, comrades. Incidentally, it is in this—in the fact that we have attempted to manage everything from Moscow up until very recently—that our common and main mistake lies."

Gorbachev has also made it clear that there is both covert and overt opposition to economic reform. Covertly, it takes the shape of ministerial encroachment upon the independence even of those industrial enterprises which are part of an economic experiment specifically concerned with enhancing that

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independence. On several occasions he has publicly criticized this practice. In his April 8 speech in Togliatti, he told his audience that he had learned that "contrary to the resolutions of the Central Committee and the government," the Ministry of Finance had become involved with the Volga motor vehicle works and begun "editing the experiment." Gorbachev added: "I made a note of this, and we shall check why this is happening."

It is, however, part of the logic of the administered economy that the higher administrative units, which are ultimately held responsible for the results of the lower units, try to control the activity of the latter. In the absence of a greater degree of self-regulation within the economy and of concessions to the market, this is likely to continue. That Gorbachev is against "market socialism" is not to say that he believes that the Soviet economy can dispense entirely with the market. A number of his pronouncements on agriculture suggest otherwise. If, as reported recently in this journal, he believes that Yugoslavia (in particular) and China are examples of countries that have bowed too far to the dictates of the market,[8] he may still hold that the Soviet Union has not yet gone far enough in achieving the optimal balance between central strategic economic decision-making and market forces.

That he has been pushing to go further than some of his colleagues want to go—that there is overt as well as more disguised opposition to taking Soviet economic reform further—was made plain by Gorbachev in his Political Report to the party congress. He spoke about a "widespread" attitude whereby "any change in the economic mechanism" is seen as "a virtual departure from socialist principles." His reply to this ideological criticism was a pragmatic one: "It is the socio-economic acceleration, the strengthening of socialism in practice, that should be one of the highest criteria of perfecting management as well as the entire system of socialist production relations."

Some of the most clear-cut innovation has been in agricultural policy. Gorbachev has long favored giving much greater autonomy to groups of farmers within the large collective and state farms, including family-based groups, and has wished to protect the farms themselves from excessive administrative

[8] Seweryn Bialer and Joan Afferica, "The Genesis of Gorbachev's World," *Foreign Affairs*, America and the World 1985, esp. pp. 612–13.

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interference. The fact that when he was the Central Committee secretary responsible for agriculture such changes were not instituted on a wide scale is sometimes cited as evidence of a lack of reforming zeal on Gorbachev's part. It should be more correctly interpreted as a reflection of the strength of political and administrative resistance, which Gorbachev was in a position to overcome only when he had the resources of the general secretaryship at his disposal. The significance of the creation of the new State Committee for the Agro-Industrial Complex last November lies not only in its streamlining of the agricultural administrative machinery but also in the fact that its chairman is Vsevolod Murakhovsky. He succeeded Gorbachev as first secretary of the Stavropol regional party organization in 1978, and his obviously good relations with Gorbachev stretch over 30 years.

With a reliable ally in charge of the new body overseeing agriculture, and the weight of the general secretaryship behind that body, Gorbachev's policy initiatives in this sphere should have a much better chance of reaching the stage of implementation. Among these priorities are encouragement for family and other groups of workers to enter into a contract with their collective or state farm, which gives them a large measure of financial and organizational autonomy, and in which the material incentives are closely linked to what they produce; the right for the farms themselves to sell products in excess of planned quotas to the state or on the local market to the financial benefit of the farms; and (in Murakhovsky's words) "a flexible policy of price formation and provision of credits for enterprises in the agro-industrial complex."

The last point touches on a key issue. Pricing reform and a greater price flexibility will be necessary components of any far-reaching economic reform, and it will be of great interest to see if they emerge in the more comprehensive reform package. It already seems clear that there will be reform at least to the extent of a further administrative streamlining—including a reduction in the number of Central Committee departments and of ministries—but whether something more radical will in due course be adopted remains an open question. In any case, the risk of dilution of proposed reforms exists at every step.

Some contradictory signals are still to be found in Soviet economic pronouncements—even in the speeches of leaders. Thus, a stress on the need for superior quality of production

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(which Gorbachev is attempting to make a matter of patriotic pride) makes a strange bedfellow with favorable references to the Stakhanovite movement (of the 1930s) in which quality was sacrificed to quantity and record-breaking output was frequently achieved under highly artificial conditions. Though Gorbachev has spoken of "the notorious stress on volume of production," a very great emphasis is, nevertheless, still placed on speeding up the rate of growth in quantitative terms.

In agriculture, of course, such quantitative improvement would be particularly beneficial to the Soviet economy. The sharp drop in the international oil price in recent months has made considerable inroads into the Soviet Union's foreign earnings and provided yet another incentive to reduce or eliminate the need to spend hard currency on grain imports. Since this is the area in which a more pragmatic approach to economic problems has made the greatest strides under Gorbachev, perhaps a more surprising obstacle to the sale of American grain to the U.S.S.R. than the deterioration of superpower relations may yet emerge—a significant improvement in Soviet agricultural performance.[9]

On the prospects for economic reform more generally, all that can safely be concluded is that some reform will take place and that more far-reaching reform is at least on the political agenda. A very wide range of views is appearing in Soviet publications, and it seems highly likely that this debate has its less public counterpart within the major party and state institutions.

Gorbachev was not only on the reform wing of the Brezhnev, Andropov and Chernenko Politburos, but would appear to be also on the reform wing of his own Politburo. There is nothing strange about this, nor is it an entirely new phenomenon. Though Brezhnev was by temperament a conservative and by choice a centrist within his own Politburo (and even Stalin began by pretending to be a centrist), Khrushchev and Andropov both took the lead on reform. Khrushchev's reformism, however, suffered from impulsiveness as well as inconsistency and Andropov's was undermined by his rapidly failing health. Gorbachev would appear to have the advantage over Khrushchev of a calmer temperament and over Andropov of health

[9] The accident at the Chernobyl nuclear plant could provide unexpected complications for Soviet agriculture, but the extent of the setback—how much of the surrounding Ukrainian farmland has been rendered unusable—is at the time of writing unclear.

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and vigor. Having, as compared with Khrushchev, 20 more years of sobering experience to contemplate and having, unlike Andropov, a possible 15 years or more ahead of him as Soviet leader, Gorbachev has no reason to rush into an ill-prepared economic reform. He may also wish to see what results can be achieved by the measures adopted and foreshadowed thus far—personnel change, tightened discipline, organizational restructuring and some devolution of responsibility—before embarking on more drastic measures.

It is evident that Gorbachev is dedicated to transforming Soviet economic performance. If minor reforms do not achieve that, my reading of his character is that he possesses the self-confidence, pragmatism and political will to go further.

v

That the links between Soviet economic and foreign policy are closer than ever is a point that has been frequently reiterated by Gorbachev himself. An increase in international tension and an accelerating rate of military expenditure would exacerbate the difficulties of economic reform and diminish the prospects for significantly enhancing Soviet economic performance. A concern for the consumer has been a recurring theme in the post-Stalin years. But Gorbachev has raised expectations more than Brezhnev did. This may be of benefit in the short term inasmuch as people may be coaxed into working harder, but it could turn into a disadvantage if they feel their efforts have gone unrewarded.

It therefore made sense for Gorbachev to reassess Soviet foreign policy to see what innovation might be required in this area, too, to complement his ambitious domestic programs. In his report to the congress he observed that "continuity in foreign policy has nothing in common with the simple repetition of what has gone before, especially in the approach to problems that have accumulated." He pointed to a number of unilateral steps that the Soviet Union had taken—notably, the moratorium on the deployment of medium-range missiles in Europe, the reduction in the number of them, and the suspension of nuclear weapons testing.

The coming to power of any new top leader in the Soviet Union changes, to a greater or lesser extent, the correlation of forces among the various institutional interests, opinion groupings and issue networks which exist within both the domestic and foreign policy making realms. Under Gorbachev it must

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be said that thus far the military has been kept in a very subordinate position, as is reflected not only in its relatively modest representation in the highest echelon of the party (unlike his two immediate predecessors as minister of defense, Marshals Andrei Grechko and Dmitri Ustinov, the current incumbent, Marshal Sergei Sokolov, remains only a candidate rather than a full member of the Politburo), but also in the tenor of Gorbachev's and Shevardnadze's speeches. The latter include Gorbachev's reference to Afghanistan as a "bleeding wound" (albeit turned into one "by counter-revolution and imperialism"); an expressed willingness to compromise in arms control and public acceptance of monitoring and verification (on the principle that "disarmament without monitoring is impossible, but also monitoring without disarmament is meaningless"); the argument that security in relations between the superpowers can only be on the basis of mutual security; and the public use of the language of "national interest."

While the notion of national interest has long been an implicit part of Soviet leaders' way of looking at the world, Gorbachev's public espousal of it must have been displeasing to the Marxist-Leninist fundamentalists. At the Geneva press conference following the 1985 summit, Gorbachev recalled that in Britain a year earlier he had quoted approvingly to Mrs. Thatcher Lord Palmerston's dictum that "England does not have eternal friends and eternal enemies, only eternal interests," while at the party congress he brought the term into somewhat closer correspondence with traditional Soviet theory (albeit flexibly interpreted) when he said that "we understand very well that the interests and goals of the military-industrial complex are not at all the same as the interests and goals of the American people and the real national interests of that great country."

Though the tone of the first part of Gorbachev's Political Report to the party congress—concerned with laying, as it were, the Marxist-Leninist foundations for what follows—is less conciliatory than the later section on foreign policy, there, too, a fresh approach to the eternal verities is discernible. Gorbachev criticized as "contrary to the spirit and essence of Marxism-Leninism" any attempt to turn "the theory by which we are guided into an assortment of ossified schemes and prescriptions valid everywhere and in all contingencies." This section, for which drafts and proposals were probably submitted from a rather different group of people than those involved in the foreign policy part of the report, is sharper in its criticism

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of the United States and of imperialism, but even here it is the "right wing of the U.S. monopoly bourgeoisie" (rather than the entire bourgeoisie) that is blamed for building up international tension as a means of justifying military allocations and, ultimately, global supremacy.

Another possible source of innovation in Soviet foreign policy is to be found in the nature of the recent appointments to the top foreign policy making team, not least the bringing together in the Secretariat of Yakovlev and Dobrynin. What makes their joint presence in the Secretariat especially piquant is that they would appear to have different outlooks on the world and, in particular, different attitudes toward the United States. Yakovlev takes a very dim view indeed of the U.S. and has been quite pessimistic about the prospect for better relations. He is rightly seen as a leading spokesman for a more multipolar Soviet foreign policy who regards the prospect for improved relations with Western Europe and Japan as more realistic than that of getting on significantly better terms with the United States.[10]

In contrast, Dobrynin, having spent almost a quarter of a century dealing on a day-by-day basis with every American administration from Kennedy to Reagan, and having earned a reputation as a bridge-builder, presumably not only believes in the possibility of doing business with the United States but also sees the Soviet relationship with the United States as the central one. Apart from bringing into the Secretariat a different outlook from that of Yakovlev (and different again from that of his conservative predecessor, Ponomarev), Dobrynin carries into the inner circle of Soviet foreign policy formation an unrivaled knowledge of what might play in Washington.

There has been evidence already during Gorbachev's general secretaryship of much more serious Soviet efforts to improve or consolidate relations with a wider range of countries, not excluding informal contacts even with Israel. Gorbachev is scheduled this year to visit Greece, Italy and India as well as (all being well) the United States. It is probable that he sees high-level overtures to important West European and Asian countries not as a substitute for better relations with the United States, but as a complement—and even a stimulus—to them.

[10] On this point, see, for example: Jerry Hough, "Gorbachev's Strategy," *Foreign Affairs*, Fall 1985, esp. pp. 52–53; and Jeremy R. Azrael and Stephen Sestanovich, "Superpower Balancing Acts," *Foreign Affairs*, America and the World 1985, esp. pp. 490–91.

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At the congress, he observed that "one must not in world politics restrict oneself to relations with just one country alone, even if it is a very important one." To do so, "as experience shows," said Gorbachev in a passage which indicated that he thought Soviet policy until the most recent period had been too exclusively bipolar, "only encourages the arrogance of strength." He immediately added: "But, of course, we attach great importance to the state and nature of relations between the Soviet Union and the United States."

Gorbachev may well suppose, and not unreasonably, that if the Dobrynin thesis that the Soviet Union can do business with the United States is posited against the Yakovlev antithesis that this is a forlorn hope and that the leadership would be better occupied directing their political and diplomatic energies elsewhere, the synthesis could be a more conciliatory policy on the part of a United States unwilling to be diplomatically outflanked. If the Soviet Union comes to be perceived in the outside world as an increasingly circumspect superpower, and one more willing than the United States to curb military expenditure, this could indeed be an inducement to a U.S. administration to modify its policies—assuming it was adequately attuned to the international political environment and not only to the domestic one.

That the Soviet Union's newly widened diplomatic horizons do not mean any downgrading of the superpower relationship was indicated clearly by the format of Gorbachev's Political Report to the party congress. In a departure from Brezhnev-era congresses, there was no listing of the state of the Soviet Union's relations with a series of individually named countries in a kind of ranking of political performance of the bourgeois world. Only the United States among non-communist countries was singled out for attention. Yet, equally, the failure to mention others could hardly be taken to indicate their lack of importance in Soviet eyes, for in contrast with the 26th Party Congress the East European countries also were given scant attention, and the centrality of that region to the Soviet leadership's political and security concerns is not in doubt. Only China, apart from the United States, was the subject of a careful assessment, in which Gorbachev noted with satisfaction "a certain improvement in the Soviet Union's relations with its great neighbor—socialist China" and observed that "the reserves for cooperation between the Soviet Union and China" were "enormous."

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VI

If I have been correct in suggesting that Gorbachev has the political will to make significant innovations in both Soviet domestic and foreign policy, the question remains: has he got the political means? While it would be rash indeed to answer with a categorical yes, it would be an even bigger mistake to assume a priori that he can change nothing. Much turns, of course, on the extent of the changes intended.

The general secretary, in the years since Stalin's death, has not been a dictator. Khrushchev, for all his good intentions, at times veered in that direction, but his fate demonstrated the existence of limits on the top leader's power. For a general secretary, however, who builds alliances with greater skill than Khrushchev and uses his powers with greater boldness than Brezhnev, the office has enormous potential. Gorbachev—unlike Khrushchev—respects such conventions of collective leadership as the necessity of not making public announcements of policies that have still to be agreed upon by his colleagues. That may be one of the reasons why his reform rhetoric has appeared more radical than the reform measures introduced thus far. Even in the early stages of his general secretaryship, Gorbachev can decide for himself the tone of his speeches and the extent to which he wishes to promote expectations of further change, but concrete changes themselves require consultation with institutional interests and Politburo approval.

Gorbachev's position is already very strong. He is referred to as "the head" of the Politburo and "the head" of the Central Committee. He is cited in speeches and articles as the ultimate contemporary Soviet political authority, and he would be quoted even more profusely had he not decided that the traditional excessive homage to top leaders was unseemly. He has not only made important personnel changes at unprecedented speed, he has included among them a number of people with fresh ideas. A few worked with him in Stavropol and may be regarded as especially close allies.

Yet, in making his initial appointments, Gorbachev was selecting from a pool of talent that was far from being entirely of his own choosing. The sense of hierarchy in the Soviet Union is such that no one can mount too many rungs of the ladder in one leap. If, therefore, Gorbachev is going to overcome resistance to reform, he may have to use the threat of dismissal of those already appointed and to advance quickly the

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careers of those who had not reached particularly high positions under Brezhnev. Certainly, using to the full his de facto powers of appointment will constitute one of his most potent weapons in the fight against bureaucratic inertia and overt resistance.

Gorbachev's authority—which complements and assists his exercise of power—has been established remarkably early in his general secretaryship. The wide publicity given to his speeches and meetings in the mass media enhances his prestige more than similar publicity enhanced Brezhnev's. That is not just because it took Brezhnev years to establish the command of the media Gorbachev acquired within months, but because Gorbachev, in contrast with Brezhnev (and with his immediate predecessor, Chernenko), is an effective speaker. He benefits similarly from his well-publicized meetings with groups of people from different walks of Soviet life.

Opportunities for publicity do not in themselves guarantee real enhancement of a leader's authority and support for his power; he has to have the skills to take advantage of them. This is one of Gorbachev's strengths, for it is harder—in the Soviet Union as elsewhere—to frustrate the will of, or to conspire against, a popular leader than an unpopular one. (Khrushchev by 1964 had lost most of the popularity he had earlier gained.) Gorbachev is sometimes described misleadingly in the West as a technocrat. In reality, he is a politician to his fingertips.

A change of top leader tends to bring about a shift in the relative strength of various institutions and opinion groupings within the Soviet Union. The changes wrought in this respect by Gorbachev's accession to the general secretaryship appear to be, on the whole, encouraging ones from the standpoint of both the Soviet population and the international community. Though the fate of Gorbachev's policy innovation will be determined essentially within the Soviet Union itself, it requires something more from the West than the stock response.

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Tamar Jacoby

THE REAGAN TURNAROUND ON HUMAN RIGHTS

Virtually all politicians experience something of the tempering effects of public office, but it is rare indeed that an American president reverses his position on a major issue. Yet Ronald Reagan seems to have done just that, picking up the pieces of a human rights policy he tried very hard to dismantle in his first days as president. It was a hesitant and somewhat opportunistic shift, but ironically it may help to strengthen the policy he inherited.

From its first days in office the Reagan Administration made no secret of its contempt for former President Jimmy Carter's human rights policy. The question of how much human rights should figure in American foreign policy had been a prominent issue in the 1980 election campaign. Even as a candidate, Reagan had associated himself with Jeane Kirkpatrick, whom he later designated as the United States' permanent representative to the United Nations, and with her widely publicized view that Carter's moralist human rights policy had been detrimental to American strategic interests.

One of the new President's first acts was to nominate Ernest Lefever—a man who had suggested that the promotion of human rights abroad should not be the responsibility of the United States—to be assistant secretary of state for human rights and humanitarian affairs. From the outset, then, human rights advocates in Congress and outside the government braced for a battle with the new President.

By early 1986, the world had turned over many times. Human rights concerns had by then exercised a considerable effect on the Administration's policies toward El Salvador, South Africa, Turkey, South Korea, Poland, Nicaragua and the Soviet Union, among other countries. Then, in February 1986, Presidents Ferdinand Marcos of the Philippines and Jean-Claude Duvalier of Haiti—American allies both, with egregious human rights records—were driven from office,

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with some help from Washington. In mid-March, President Reagan delivered a statement to Congress, claiming credit for these events and vowing in the name of human rights to continue to "oppose tyranny in whatever form, whether of the left or the right."

Public reaction was mixed. Some critics saw the statement as a cynical attempt to cloak the President's appeal for funding for the Nicaraguan "contras," then under consideration in Congress, in the language of democracy and human rights. Others, including the President's national security adviser, John Poindexter, claimed that the statement contained "nothing new." Still others hailed it as a reversal of the Reagan Administration's adherence to the so-called Kirkpatrick doctrine, with its contention that "totalitarian" Marxist regimes should be treated differently than "authoritarian" dictatorships of the right, which were said to be less repressive, more susceptible to change and better for American interests.

In truth, the President's statement should have come as no surprise—for in some part it reflected a shift already under way. In response to pressure from Congress and from human rights activists, the Administration had claimed for some time to have an "evenhanded" human rights policy, and a promise to oppose abuses by both the right and the left had become a routine part of its human rights pronouncements. As of February 1986, however, the White House was willing to back up its words with deeds—not only in Haiti and the Philippines, where Washington's hand had been forced by events, but also in Chile, where the pressures were somewhat less urgent. The shift in policy had been gradual and often grudging; for all the President's resounding words, his commitment to human rights was still limited in scope and his Administration's future policy was far from certain. Nevertheless, there had been a change, a 150- if not a 180-degree change.

II

To judge the magnitude of this shift, it is helpful to look at the Administration's early determination to downplay human rights concerns. The President and his conservative advisers were determined to mount an aggressive ideological attack on the Carter Administration's policy, which they saw as a primary cause of America's recent setbacks abroad—particularly in Nicaragua and Iran. Mr. Reagan's intention to reverse this

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policy was, from the beginning, a crucial part of his effort to restore American power and enable the nation to "stand tall."

Jeane Kirkpatrick, then a professor of government at Georgetown University, had laid the intellectual foundations of the policy in two articles in *Commentary* magazine. "Dictatorships and Double Standards" is the better known, famous now for its academic-sounding distinction between authoritarian and totalitarian regimes; traditional autocrats, unlike Marxist dictators, "do not disturb the habitual rhythms of work and leisure, habitual places of residence, habitual patterns of family and personal relations. Because the miseries of traditional life are familiar, they are bearable to ordinary people." The intent of the article was not merely to cast doubt on what Kirkpatrick saw as an undue concern with commonplace tyranny. In her view, the Carter human rights policy was a symptom of a more serious disease: a disregard for the "centrality" of the East-West conflict and a "predilection for policies that violated the strategic and economic interests of the United States."[1]

They were grave charges indeed. But even this essay was not quite as explicit, nor as harsh, as a later piece, "U.S. Security and Latin America," which attacked the Carter Administration not merely for "losing Nicaragua" but for giving it away—for using its human rights policy in an active and concerted way to bring down the regime of Anastasio Somoza.[2]

Even as Kirkpatrick prepared the ground for a change in policy, a signal went out to the world with the election of Ronald Reagan. His campaign rhetoric was unmistakable as far away as Haiti, South Korea and El Salvador, and in all three countries human rights abuses soared in the period between his election and inauguration. Michele Montas, one of the intellectuals who was seized and expelled from Haiti in December 1980, explained that the Haitian authorities now "thought the international climate was favorable to this sort of thing. They thought human rights was over." In South Korea, some 1,200 dissidents were rounded up and 67 opposition papers were closed. In El Salvador, seven Americans were killed—four churchwomen, two labor advisers and a journalist. Back in the United States, a group of some 70 prominent clerics sent an open letter to the President-elect expressing concern that

[1] *Commentary*, November 1979, pp. 34–45.
[2] *Commentary*, January 1981, pp. 29–40.

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"military governments in many countries are viewing your election as a green light" for human rights abuses.

The President-elect and his advisers were undeterred. It was in this period before the Reagan inauguration that the so-called Committee of Santa Fe, a group of conservative experts on Latin America convened to advise candidate Reagan, stated in its blueprint for policy that the Carter Administration emphasis on human rights "must be abandoned." And only a few weeks after the inauguration, Secretary of State Alexander Haig announced at his first news conference that "international terrorism will take the place of human rights in our concern because it is the ultimate of abuses of human rights." A few days later, Ernest Lefever was nominated.

Nor were the changes merely rhetorical. The Administration proceeded in its first months in office to urge Congress to reinstate military aid to Argentina, Chile, Guatemala and Uruguay—all denied assistance under the Carter Administration because of their poor human rights records. Generals from Chile and Argentina trooped through Washington to discuss possible aid packages, as did President Chun Doo Hwan of South Korea. (The release of the 1980 edition of the State Department's *Country Reports on Human Rights Practices* was delayed until after Chun's visit, so as not to offend him with its description of the abuses committed under his rule.) In the meantime, U.S. delegates at multilateral development banks were instructed to reverse the Carter Administration's opposition to loans for authoritarian governments in Latin America, the Philippines and South Korea.

Secretary Haig set out the Administration's position in a speech to the Trilateral Commission in early spring 1981. "There are limits," he said "to what we can or should do to transform other cultures, customs and institutions." Moreover, he made clear, if human rights were to figure at all in this Administration's foreign policy, they were to be used as a weapon against hostile communist regimes. In keeping with Kirkpatrick's vision, the force of "our own example" was held to be the best method for correcting bad habits in authoritarian countries.

All in all, it was a formidable offensive, but it soon became clear that the new policy would have trouble lasting out the President's term. The Senate Foreign Relations Committee put up the first resistance, before the President had been in office six months, by rebuffing the Lefever nomination. The hearings

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were bitter and highly publicized, and it was evident that what was under review was not so much Lefever as the Administration's decision to dismantle the Carter policy on human rights. In early June, after being debated for nearly three weeks in committee, the nomination was rejected by a vote of 13 to 4.

It took some time for the Administration to regroup. The post of assistant secretary for human rights remained empty for another four months, provoking renewed criticism of the Administration's lack of regard for the issue. The White House continued to press for new loans to military governments in Latin America. Ambassador Kirkpatrick visited Chile and Argentina, where she declined to meet with human rights groups, and Vice President George Bush traveled to Manila to toast President Marcos for his "adherence" to democracy.

Nevertheless, a change was clearly in the works—a change forced upon the Administration by its critics. In part, the White House was responding to the press and the general climate of opinion, but by this time various critics of the Reagan policy had also begun to coalesce into a loosely structured human rights community.[3]

By the end of the summer, committees in both houses of Congress had stipulated that no military aid would be released to El Salvador unless President Reagan could certify, on a regular basis, that the government there was making progress in curbing human rights abuses. Already on the defensive, the Administration began to boast about the results of its "quiet diplomacy" in El Salvador and South Korea. By early autumn, it was clear even within the Administration that there was a national consensus for a more aggressive and evenhanded human rights policy. The result, in late October 1981, was an "eyes-only" State Department memo—reportedly drafted by

[3] The oldest and most authoritative monitoring group, Amnesty International, remained aloof from American political battles, but several other organizations, some formed in direct response to the Reagan policy, were beginning to coordinate activities among themselves and with sympathetic members of Congress. Among the largest and most influential of these groups today are the Fund for Free Expression, which sponsors the activities of Americas Watch, Helsinki Watch and Asia Watch, and the Lawyers Committee for Human Rights (originally named the Lawyers Committee for International Human Rights). Both are based in New York and directed in large part by lawyers, publishers and civil libertarians. Like many smaller groups around the country, and an increasing number of chapters of large professional organizations such as the American Bar Association, they combine international monitoring efforts with lobbying and other advocacy work. Their allies in Congress include Democrats and Republicans, men like Representatives Stephen Solarz (D-N.Y.), Tony Hall (D-Ohio), and Senators Tom Harkin (D-Iowa), Dave Durenburger (R-Minn.) and Daniel Patrick Moynihan (D-N.Y.), who often rely on these monitoring groups to provide information for their disputes with the Administration.

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Elliott Abrams, then assistant secretary of state for international organization affairs, soon to be appointed to head the human rights bureau—stating in no uncertain terms that "human rights is at the core of our foreign policy."[4]

III

The State Department memo marked the beginning of a new phase in the Reagan human rights policy; having given up its effort to downgrade the issue, the Administration now sought, in effect, to co-opt the idea and use it for its own geopolitical purposes, rather narrowly defined. In a period that more or less coincided with Abrams' tenure as assistant secretary of state for human rights, the White House endeavored to appropriate the banner of human rights for itself—to use it in battle not only against communist regimes but also, in a more defensive way, against domestic opponents of its human rights policy. It was a brilliant strategy, no more than half cynical, and it almost worked.

Critics called the new approach hypocritical—so much lip service and manipulative argumentation that "cheapened the currency of human rights"—and in some part, it undoubtedly was. But the strategy foreshadowed in the memo of October 1981 turned out to be more potent than its critics had expected. For one thing, it allowed the Administration to strike a pose that was at once assertively moralistic—a quality Kirkpatrick much mistrusted—and staunchly anti-communist. For the President, this was a congenial combination, a welcome release from the cold and calculating Kirkpatrick doctrine. What took the Administration by surprise was just how congenial the new policy also turned out to be to the American people.

Not only did the moralism appeal, for different reasons, to both the left and the right, but it proved to be both hardy and indivisible. It was as if the Administration simply could not sustain its own skepticism about pursuing human rights, and with time its more assertive policy began to be taken at face value. Not only did the American public and Congress mean what they said about human rights—even in places like El Salvador and Guatemala—but in other areas the concern for human rights turned out to be surprisingly consistent with a broad range of foreign policy objectives. So, in the end, the

[4] *The New York Times*, Nov. 5, 1981.

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Administration was caught in the net of its own strategy—its own half-calculating effort to co-opt the human rights issue.

Some of the calculation was apparent in the State Department memo. "We will never maintain wide public support for our foreign policy unless we can relate it to American ideals and to the defense of freedom." So ran an italicized sentence in the first paragraph, and from there on, the subject of the memo remained politics, not moral conviction. The first part of the short document, including a section on "East-West Relations and the Battle for Western Opinion," focused on the Administration's standing among West Europeans and among congressional critics and other domestic opponents—and it suggested that the White House should appeal to these groups by taking the offensive on human rights. The ultimate purpose of the policy was to advance American ideals at the expense of communism, but human rights seemed very much a means to an end; human rights, according to the memo, "give us the best opportunity to convey what is ultimately at issue in our contest with the Soviet bloc."

A later section outlined a two-track human rights policy—a "positive" effort to expound democratic values and shame the Soviet Union, complemented by a "negative" policy of scolding both friends and adversaries for their serious abuses. The author of the memo made it clear that the United States would not necessarily take action against such allies; he reiterated Kirkpatrick's point that "it does not help human rights to replace a bad regime with a worse one, or a corrupt dictator with a zealous Communist politburo." Still, in his view—and he knew it would mean "trouble"—"we must be honest," even about violations by allies.

Less than a week after the memo was circulated, the White House nominated Abrams to be assistant secretary for human rights. His confirmation proceeded without problems, and he quickly began to make his mark at the bureau, repeating much of the language of the confidential memo in his introduction to the 1981 edition of the *Country Reports on Human Rights Practices*, published in February 1982. Human rights advocates reacted with some skepticism and mixed reviews.

The memo's suggestion that the Administration must be honest about violations by allies and friends was, to some extent at least, borne out in the 1981 country reports. In some entries, particularly those on countries where the United States had a significant geopolitical stake, the Lawyers Committee for In-

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ternational Human Rights found evidence of distortion in both language and emphasis. On the whole, however, the committee hailed the volume for its comprehensive and objective reporting. That assessment has been repeated each spring, when the human rights community—the Lawyers Committee was joined the next year by Americas Watch and Helsinki Watch—issues a review of the most recent year's country reports. Each year, however, the three groups also ask when the Administration will begin to act on the information it has compiled.

IV

The Administration began to put the State Department memo into practice—in international forums and official pronouncements first of all, but also in places like El Salvador, where human rights abuses were extensive and routine. The 1981 country report on El Salvador did, as the memo suggested, make some effort to "speak honestly" about the violations there. But El Salvador was one of those places, also outlined clearly in the memo, where the Administration could not afford to press too seriously to end abuses, lest it destabilize an important ally. Thus, in January 1982, President Reagan certified for the first time that the Salvadoran government was making a "concerted effort" to comply with international human rights standards.

It was hard at the time to see this as an improvement in the Reagan human rights policy. In the eyes of the Administration's critics, open contempt and disregard for human rights issues had been replaced by a hypocritical show of interest—different from the earlier disregard only in that it could not be attacked as such. The Administration was now officially committed to human rights, but only as the flimsiest of covers for a policy in which human rights were clearly among the least important in a long list of its concerns in El Salvador.

According to human rights organizations, in 1982 more than 6,000 civilian noncombatants were killed by Salvadoran government forces and paramilitary groups. Yet the toll was significantly lower—almost half—than that recorded in 1981, and it enabled the President to talk about "progress" when he certified a second time in July 1982 and again in January 1983. By July 1983, when Secretary of State George Shultz certified for the fourth and last time, the Administration had refined its language even further; by then, it was said that the progress was "disappointingly slow" and that it "falls short" of what

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had been sought, but that aid should continue nevertheless because there had been improvement. The formula was of a piece with the Administration's larger strategy in El Salvador—one that seemed to show a careful and informed concern for human rights abuses but managed largely to disregard them when it came to helping the Salvadoran armed forces.

Congress and human rights groups persevered nevertheless, pressing the Administration to continue talking about Salvadoran abuses, until eventually the White House had to take steps to back up its words. The disputes in Washington continued unabated throughout 1983, growing more sophisticated all the time. At issue now was no longer whether human rights should matter, but precisely how extensive abuses had been, whether the Salvadoran government was making a genuine effort to investigate and end them, whether the government-controlled military or the extreme right was doing the killing, and which of the Salvadoran human rights monitoring groups could be relied upon to provide an accurate account.

It was a grim and often arcane debate. At times, it was also rather angry. Nevertheless, in the end, the debate seems to have kept the issue alive in the minds of the Salvadoran armed forces. Whatever signals the White House was sending by continuing to certify and provide military aid, the Administration's dispute with Congress and the human rights community was clearly audible in San Salvador, and it sent a very different message. Perhaps even more important, the debate served to keep the issue alive within the Administration, forcing it to pay increased attention to human rights.

The payoff came in the second half of 1983, when Washington made a serious effort to push the Salvadorans to improve their record. Outgoing U.S. Ambassador Deane Hinton set the tone in July with a strong speech about human rights delivered in San Salvador. His successor, Thomas Pickering, backed him up with an added emphasis in November, stressing that Congress was likely to withhold aid unless the Salvadoran performance improved. The autumn months brought a series of visitors to El Salvador—including Henry Kissinger, Defense Secretary Caspar Weinberger and, in mid-December, Vice President Bush—all of whom pressed home concern about human rights abuses. The vice president's visit in particular marked an important shift in Administration policy, for he carried a letter from President Reagan to President Alvaro

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Magaña listing names of officers thought to be involved in the death squads and urging that they be removed.

Even then, however, the signal from Washington was somewhat mixed, for on December 1 the President had abruptly vetoed legislation requiring him to certify human rights progress. This meant that, whatever was said about human rights in Washington or San Salvador, there would be no interruption of U.S. aid. Nevertheless, the vice president's message seemed to get through, and the Salvadoran government took steps to purge some military leaders and expedite the prosecution of those involved in the killing of the four American churchwomen. It was limited progress, to be sure, but more than anyone had expected from either the Administration or its Salvadoran allies. Once again, the Administration had been forced by its critics to pay attention to human rights abuses. The trouble, in El Salvador at least, was that the White House still seemed merely to be playing a part.

V

Back in Washington, other members of the Administration were caught up with the second track of the human rights policy proposed in the October 1981 memo—the assertive campaign on behalf of democratic values. The President himself was very much drawn to this approach—conceived as a deliberate shift away from the Carter emphasis on torture, disappearances and absence of due process—and he gave it a big send-off in his speech before the British Parliament in June 1982. Chiding the Soviet Union in the name of the U.N. Universal Declaration of Human Rights, he announced a major initiative "to foster the infrastructure of democracy." Assistant Secretary Abrams elaborated the theme in his introduction to the 1982 country reports: from now on, the Administration's approach to human rights would be to "treat not only the symptoms but the disease."

The Administration went ahead with a program of conferences, studies, exchanges and grants, culminating in December 1983 with the creation of the National Endowment for Democracy, a federally funded private corporation to encourage democracy around the world. The endowment has been surrounded by controversy from the start, although most critics quarrel less with its purpose than with the way that it has gone about executing that mandate—intervening in a partisan way

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in a Panamanian election, for example, and supporting right-wing groups opposed to the socialist government in France.

Critics of the Reagan human rights policy have not generally been in the forefront of opposition to the National Endowment for Democracy or the President's propaganda offensive against the Soviet Union; virtually no human rights organization disagrees with the notion that democratic institutions are in the long run the best guarantor of rights. Critics have, however, raised a number of questions about the way the President's emphasis on democratic values seemed at times to obscure and distort his policy toward human rights.

The use of human rights for propaganda purposes has in some instances seemed to dilute the meaning of the term, as when President Reagan and Secretary Shultz charged that the Soviet downing of a Korean Air Lines Boeing 747 in September 1983 was a violation of the human rights of the 269 people killed. But the civil libertarians who dominate the leading human rights monitoring groups also felt that the focus on democracy was a way of evading many of the human rights concerns that had prevailed in international forums and in the Carter years; by emphasizing political rights and democratic institutions, it was felt, the Reagan Administration has effectively downplayed more fundamental rights associated with what is called "the integrity of the person"—the right not to be killed, tortured or imprisoned at will.

More serious yet, the democracy initiative has on occasion turned out to be something of a smoke screen, covering the Administration's hesitation to press "friendly" dictators who abused human rights. Argentina is one case in point, a place where the Administration showed little interest in human rights or democracy—in fact, Ambassador Kirkpatrick and others had made a special point of maintaining warm relations with members of the military government and encouraging renewed U.S. aid—until events over which the United States had no control led to the election of President Raúl Alfonsín. Thus, even as late as spring 1983, when it became clear that the Argentine military government would not last out the year, the White House was still committed to "quiet diplomacy."[5]

Two days before Alfonsín was inaugurated in December 1983, the Reagan Administration certified that Argentina's human rights record had improved enough to warrant the

[5] *The New York Times*, Apr. 17, 1983.

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resumption of military aid. As it happened, the Alfonsín government, which owed much of its support to the fact that it had kept its distance from the military, was not particularly interested in the resumption of aid, and it made a point of saying so. Today, however, Argentina figures prominently on the Administration's list of Latin American countries that it has helped move toward democracy.

The Administration's emphasis on democracy also served a troubling purpose in El Salvador, where the existence of formal democratic institutions helped to disguise the role that the military continued to play in running the country, despite its well-known record of human rights abuses. American televison viewers were naturally thrilled to watch thousands of Salvadorans making their way to the polls in 1982 and 1984, often in the face of great inconvenience and threats of reprisals. What Americans tended to forget was that both President José Napoleón Duarte and his predecessor Alvaro Magaña survived in office only at the sufferance of the armed forces and often had some difficulty controlling them.

VI

The national debate about human rights seemed to have reached a standoff by the final year of President Reagan's first term. There was some trouble brewing in Chile and the Philippines but the American public had not yet focused much attention on the human rights situation in either country. Many Latin Americans had given up hope that the issue would ever again play the part it had once played in U.S. policy toward their governments. Disputes between Abrams and the human rights community had reached an acrimonious pitch, and in contrast to debates in earlier years their quarrel now seemed unlikely to have much of an effect in forcing changes in Administration policy.

Abrams had insisted from the beginning that his approach and that of the Carter Administration were not as different as they seemed—that the main difference was one of tactics. "Effectiveness" was the word that appeared again and again, in his speeches and introductions to the State Department country reports, until it became a code word for the Reagan preference for quiet diplomacy over public denunciations of our allies. Underneath all of the talk about means, however, there was a much more fundamental difference, which began to come out more explicitly as the debate grew more bitter.

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The real question at issue between the Administration and the human rights community was whether human rights were necessarily subordinate to the nation's larger geopolitical concerns.

Abrams clearly believed that they should be. As his 1981 memo stated bluntly, the very purpose of a human rights policy should be to convey to the public, at home and in Europe, just what the difference was between East and West. From the beginning, Abrams encouraged the President to use human rights as a rhetorical weapon against Moscow. And, like Secretary Haig and Ambassador Kirkpatrick before him, he harbored great reservations about the geopolitical consequences of a policy that threatened to destabilize our "friends."

"It is not enough," Abrams told a reporter in 1982, "to ask who is in power and what is he like. We also have to ask what is the alternative, what are the likely prospects for improvement." By December 1983 he was even more explicit, noting in a speech delivered in New York that human rights are "not a free-floating goal to be considered in isolation each morning. We do not betray the cause of human rights when we make prudential judgments about what can and can't be done in one place at one time."

The monitoring groups have for the most part taken a more idealistic view—that human rights policy should be based on strictly humanitarian concerns—and have criticized Abrams for allowing the issue to be used as an instrument of geopolitics. The Lawyers Committee, Americas Watch and Helsinki Watch put the charge pointedly in January 1985, in a report on the Administration's record in 1984; in their view, Abrams had "developed and articulated a human rights ideology which complements and justifies Administration policies"—and in doing so, had compromised his mandate and the integrity of his bureau. Such critics argued further that the Administration had betrayed human rights by trying to make them a matter of policy rather than law—making what should be an absolute standard hostage to the whims of public officials and partisan political debate.

Abrams found such criticisms entirely unrealistic. He charged sharply that many human rights organizations "are political, whether they admit it or not," and are determined to do what they can to "restrain the American role in the world." But he also argued with some persuasiveness that the government simply cannot "rise above" political concerns, and that it

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would not want to even if it could. "Strategy," he asserted, "is crucial"; whatever the goal, no foreign policy can hope to succeed without "a sense of reality" and "a sense of priorities."

It was not an unreasonable argument. The trouble, in practice, was that the Reagan policy was often so pointedly political in its focus that it undermined the credibility of what the White House said about human rights. The policy in Nicaragua was an example. It was, in one sense, an extremely clever effort, the Administration's most successful bid to co-opt the human rights idea. Sometime in the middle of Mr. Reagan's first term, the White House began a major campaign to draw attention to the Sandinista government's disregard for democratic values. Most, if not all, of the charges were sound and the strategy worked, up to a point. Certainly by 1984 the American press and public were considerably more concerned about human rights abuses in Nicaragua than about those—and they were still much worse—in neighboring Guatemala and El Salvador.

But the Administration did not stop there. It was so determined to have human rights on its side—to appear to the world to be in favor of freedom and opposed to tyranny—that it eventually began to defend the human rights record of the anti-Sandinista rebels, even against well-documented charges by the human rights community and the press. Neither Congress nor the public were persuaded, and the controversy has made it considerably harder for the White House to get funding for the contras, despite widespread antipathy for the Nicaraguan government.

VII

In other countries, particularly South Africa, the American public has made it fairly clear that it too sees human rights as an absolute good—a universal aspiration to be pursued for its own sake, without too much regard for geopolitics. The geopolitical question is rather murky in South Africa. Obviously, the stakes are high—for geographic reasons and because of the region's vast mineral wealth. But the American people have not been persuaded by the conservative argument that it necessarily runs against the U.S. interest to press for accelerated change. Whatever the reason—be it sophisticated geopolitical calculation or simple moral instinct—most of the Americans who have taken an interest in the region have seemed quite certain that continuing the status quo in South Africa does not serve the larger interests of the United States.

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The national debate about South Africa that began in 1984 has also been a decisive rebuke for the Administration's commitment, justified from the beginning by geopolitical concerns, to quiet diplomacy. In South Africa it went by another name—"constructive engagement"—but the reasoning was very much the same. Concerned above all not to destabilize an important ally, and thus not to encourage Soviet designs, the Administration took the position that the white leadership of South Africa was more likely to respond to supportive coaxing toward reform than to confrontation and exigent demands.

This put the Administration formally on the side of change but allowed it to renew a wide range of cooperative ties—exports of non-lethal military equipment, training in America for South African naval personnel, and more consistent support for the South African government in several international forums including the International Monetary Fund (IMF). American contacts with black South Africans were significantly reduced and in 1983 Washington failed to oppose the creation of separate parliamentary chambers for Asians and people of mixed race—an arrangement that continued to shut blacks out of the political equation.

Public pressure for the United States to take a more aggressive stand in favor of change began in earnest in early 1984, and in this case the pressure came not only from human rights activists but from a rich variety of American citizens and institutions. The initial impetus came from events in South Africa—a spate of demonstrations and violent repression following the implementation of the parliamentary reforms. The first to respond in the United States were universities and municipal governments, which took financial initiatives against South Africa, followed in short order by several congressional efforts to pass punitive legislation. By October, people were dying in racial violence in South Africa, and five American state legislatures had passed divestment laws. The Administration started to speak out more vehemently against apartheid but firmly opposed taking punitive action. In November, prominent Americans—black and white congressmen, local politicians, labor leaders and other activists—began to be arrested for protesting at the South African embassy and consulates around the country.

The AFL-CIO, the American Bar Association and significant portions of the business and financial communities had added their voices to the uproar by the time several key Republi-

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cans—including Representative Jack Kemp of New York and Senator Richard Lugar of Indiana—broke with the White House over South Africa. In March 1985, South African police opened fire on 4,000 demonstrators, and still the Administration refused to budge. Not until fall, after the House had approved a package of sanctions and a similar bill looked certain to pass in the Senate, did the President finally give in and issue an executive order imposing punitive measures, milder than those in the pending Senate bill. It had taken an enormous push from the American public and a burst of violence in South Africa, but the episode dealt a crushing blow to the Reagan defense of quiet diplomacy. Even more important for the future, it revealed a large American constituency in favor of an aggressive human rights policy.

VIII

There is, to be sure, no consensus—and no unchanging rule—about whether quiet entreaties or noisy pressure are more effective in encouraging human rights observance. The monitoring groups generally favor public pronouncements, although even they concede that this can be a tricky question, best decided on a case-by-case basis. Assistant Secretary Abrams tended to see public pressure as a last resort, and he argued untiringly for maintaining relations with even the worst abusers on the grounds that this gives the United States its most effective leverage. The great paradox—and the great boon to human rights activists—was that Abrams' own effective public style often helped to draw attention to violations that might otherwise have gone largely unnoticed.

Human rights abuse had, for example, been commonplace in Turkey—troubling to activists here and in Europe, but hardly a significant issue for most Americans—until a bitter dispute erupted in mid-1984 between Abrams and Helsinki Watch. The arguments were again about tactics—what would be the best way to encourage Ankara to improve its record—and about the relation between human rights and geopolitical concerns. Abrams also made a point, in the American press and in a speech in Ankara in July, of disparaging the "ill-informed and self-righteous" human rights community. The playwrights Harold Pinter and Arthur Miller joined the fray; they traveled to Turkey to look into abuses and had a public quarrel with the United States ambassador. The controversy attracted considerable attention—including, eventually,

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congressional hearings—and has made a significant impact in Turkey, where human rights have now become a major issue in the domestic political debate.

Nor is Turkey the only example; the human rights community claims that its factual disputes with Abrams—generally about the extent of abuses and who exactly was responsible—have on the whole had a beneficial effect, encouraging both the Administration and its critics to upgrade their reporting efforts. Monitoring groups that used to issue skimpy flyers, designed merely to draw attention to an offending country, now publish lengthy, detailed reports; a recent volume on North and South Korea ran to more than 350 pages. They also time their studies carefully to coincide with congressional decisions and regularly revise them to keep abreast of events.

To an outsider, this public disputation often seemed unnecessary and distracting—a needlessly *ad hominem* and bitter controversy for controversy's sake. Yet on other occasions, it seemed to serve a useful purpose, conferring new legitimacy on human rights issues and providing the noisy background clamor—the evidence of domestic American concern—that was often needed to give some meaning to the Administration's quiet diplomacy.

Abrams moved on in the second term to become assistant secretary of state for inter-American affairs, and his successor at the human rights bureau, Richard Schifter—formerly the U.S. representative to the U.N. Human Rights Commission—is not likely to attract nearly the same attention. Schifter is a soft-spoken, lawyerly man, uncomfortable with confrontation and polemics, who does not seem to find the limelight particularly congenial; in contrast to the treatment of Abrams' arrival at the human rights bureau, Schifter's appointment was hardly reported in the press. Both he and the human rights establishment expect that their relations will now take on a friendlier cast, but activists worry that human rights may suffer in the long run from a lack of publicity.

The White House itself has begun to show some uncertainty on the question of tactics. In 1986 it resorted to quiet diplomacy in a place where it had never dreamed of using it before—the Soviet Union. Open condemnation of communist human rights abuse had been a pillar of the Reagan policy from the start. It was a natural instinct on the President's part and a constant American refrain in international forums, particularly the review conferences of the Helsinki accords held in Madrid

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and Ottawa. To be sure, even on this subject the Administration's signals were mixed, and the lifting in April 1981 of the U.S. embargo on grain shipments to Russia had seemed to undermine much of the President's tough talk. Nevertheless it was universally assumed that some sort of rough "linkage" between Soviet human rights improvements and friendlier U.S.-Soviet relations was and would remain a fact of life under the Reagan Administration.

Secretary of State Shultz gave the first signals that policy was changing in a Los Angeles speech delivered in October 1985, in which he noted the "limitations" of a linkage policy. Conservatives began to wonder further about Reagan's commitment to Soviet human rights when he resisted their pressure, in July 1985, to repudiate the Helsinki Final Act. (They argued that Soviet abuses had if anything grown worse in the ten years since it had been signed.) Yet few Americans noticed in November, when the President told a British Broadcasting Corporation radio interviewer that he didn't see the point, in this realm of superpower relations, either of public discussion or of "accusing fingers being pointed at each other." It thus came as a surprise, a few days after the U.S.-Soviet summit meeting in Geneva in November 1985, when Reagan told his cabinet that there would, for a time at least, be no more public pressure on Moscow to improve its human rights record.

The American public was rather baffled, but the President seemed convinced—apparently on the advice of former President Richard Nixon—that a less combative approach might be a more effective way of achieving not propaganda victories but real results. As he told the cabinet, it no longer made sense to him, "in a world of politics, to try to push someone in a corner in which he must then publicly try to get out of that corner and in doing that appear to take orders from a figure in another government." In February 1986, Soviet dissident Anatoly Shcharansky was released from prison and allowed to leave the Soviet Union, and in March the President made good on his word, refusing to meet with Yelena Bonner, the wife of Andrei Sakharov.

It was an astonishing reversal, and the world waited to see if it would last. The results also remain to be seen—and to be meaningful they must involve more than the release of an individual or two—but there is something appealing about the new approach. In a case such as this, where it is clear that President Reagan is truly committed to achieving an improve-

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ment in human rights, it may not be necessary or productive for him to shout too loudly. In this instance at least, a combination of quiet diplomacy backed up by noisy public concern may well turn out to be the best possible strategy.

IX

It may in fact be the ideal combination in other countries too. Certainly it is better not to have to grandstand or to bully other governments—and if the rest of the world were sure that the White House meant what it said about human rights, there would be less need to do either. About the Reagan Administration the rest of the world had been far from sure; and Washington's public support for human rights in Haiti, Chile and the Philippines had a significant impact. The Reagan statement promising to sustain a more evenhanded human rights policy was also welcome, tentative as the new position may be.

Part of the problem is that in all these three cases, the Administration seemed so hesitant, as if it were once again being backed into a virtuous position by the public and Congress. In fact its hand had been forced. But this time the Administration was reacting to other pressures as well—pressures from within Chile, Haiti and the Philippines. In all three countries, Washington found it necessary to shift its position when the dictator it had been supporting began to lose his battle with his people and the opposition forces he had been repressing for years. In Haiti, there were riots and a revitalized Catholic church determined to play a role in national political life. In Chile, there were also riots, and such political polarization that Washington began to lose hope for a return to democracy. There, the Administration began to act in earnest only in late 1985, when it perceived the danger of what an anonymous State Department official called "another Nicaragua." In the Philippines, most dire of all, there was the growing threat of a communist takeover.

In all three cases, the Administration perceived that the promotion of human rights coincided with America's strategic interests, and so it acted to advance those interests. In all three cases, the White House was extremely cautious, even reluctant, and it acted more out of fear than any heroic commitment to human rights. Finally, in all three cases, it calculated very carefully, and in no instance did it make a major push. Instead, it waited for the tide of events and then, when the end seemed

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near, seized an opportunity to take its distance from the faltering dictator. True, the Administration started nudging Marcos months before he fell. But when the crisis broke, Reagan almost missed the opportunity to act: it was not until several days after it was evident that Marcos had stolen the election—and lost the confidence of his people—that Senator Paul Laxalt (R-Nev.) made clear to Marcos on the telephone that the White House thought it time for him to go.

In Chile, too, there has been building pressure from Washington and from its new outspoken ambassador, Harry Barnes, who has made a point of reviving contacts with the democratic opposition. But in this case also, the Administration wavered, taking two steps backward for every one it moved ahead, voting against Chilean dictator General Augusto Pinochet at the Inter-American Human Rights Commission and then voting for him, condemning him at the U.N. Human Rights Commission but then allowing the World Bank and the IMF to proceed with plans for loans.

The Administration did not exactly cover itself with glory in either country. Yet there is much to be said for a human rights policy grounded in strategic interest. Such an approach would not produce a perfect human rights record. Humanitarian and geopolitical concerns do not always line up as neatly as they seemed to in Chile and the Philippines. It will not always be so easy or convenient to take the side of human rights, and when the two concerns do not coincide, it seems unrealistic to expect any American president to act against U.S. interests—no matter how noble the cause.

Still—and this is the lesson of the Reagan experience—human rights and strategic interest turn out to be consistent far more often than many Americans expect. Jeane Kirkpatrick thought it went against our national interest to push Somoza out of power in Nicaragua; President Reagan ultimately seemed to think that it advanced American interests if Marcos were ousted from the Philippines. In a sense, the Administration's instincts were right from the start, or at least from the time of the State Department memo of 1981: there is—or can be—an important connection between geopolitics and human rights. The White House's mistake at the outset was to try to use human rights as a mere tool of geopolitics—a self-serving and manipulative policy that eventually backfired. By March 1986, the Administration seemed to understand that it might,

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paradoxically, do more for American interests by pursuing human rights as an end in themselves.

In Chile, Haiti and the Philippines, America found it in its interest to distance itself from losing dictators and encourage the transition to democracy before it was too late. In other cases, like South Africa, it may be in America's interest to promote human rights for no other reason than to demonstrate that the United States does indeed stand for something in the world. But even this sort of human rights initiative is unlikely to get very far unless it is grounded in realism and compatible with broader U.S. foreign policy concerns. So much "realism" may sound calculating in this context, but it has its advantages—for a human rights policy founded on strategic interest is likely to be far more consistent and reliable than a "purer" and more moralistic policy without underpinning. The Reagan turnaround on human rights may say less about the Administration than about the strength of the human rights idea—and it is indeed a tribute to the force of the idea—but if it has taught us something about the possibility of a strategic human rights policy, then it may not have been such a pointless detour after all.

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Carl H. Landé
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AQUINO TAKES CHARGE

As Corazon Aquino begins the tasks of reuniting a divided Filipino people, rebuilding the institutions destroyed by a discredited dictatorship and reviving a devastated economy, she has chosen to combine the spirit of reconciliation with measures to place her new government in firm control.

In view of the Marcos legacy, her task will not be an easy one. Ferdinand Marcos divided Philippine society. In a country accustomed to frequent and peaceful alternation of power among competing political groups, Marcos and his followers used corruption, violence and fraud to entrench themselves as a permanent ruling group. Their opponents remained outside, in embittered frustration. Now that the tables are turned, bitterness is on the other side. It will not be easy to restore good feeling.

Marcos also leaves a legacy of institutional decay. Repeated constitutional changes, devised by the former president and pushed through by means of questionable legality, produced a presidentially dominated system of rule. Under Marcos, a clever lawyer adept at using legalistic forms to distort the spirit of the law, the system became a self-serving autocracy.

Long established and respected institutions were turned into caricatures. The Commission on Elections, once an impartial guardian of honest elections, became an instrument for the subversion of the electoral process on behalf of the regime. In the armed forces, heirs to the American tradition of nonpartisanship, major elements were transformed into a praetorian guard whose main task was to protect the president against his countrymen rather than the country against its enemies.

Other institutions lost their independence. The judiciary, including the Supreme Court, became a pliable instrument of the president's will. Civil servants lost both security of tenure

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and the right to vote as they pleased. The financial agencies of the government, no longer subject to full accounting, became milch cows for members of the presidential circle, who appropriated huge sums for their private purposes. In a most cynical example of the president's willingness to corrupt his countrymen, public school teachers, who traditionally serve as polling officials because of their presumed integrity and impartiality, were bribed in 1986 to help defraud the opposition. Thus these underpaid and overworked professionals were robbed of one of the few rewards of their calling, the respect of their pupils.

Private sector institutions, which in the past had served as checks against the government, lost their independence as well. Ownership of the news media was given to kinsmen and friends of the president who turned them into instruments for governmental propaganda. Business, labor and professional associations were consolidated into corporatist structures under governmental supervision. Radical student organizations were disbanded, replaced by a government-sponsored youth organization led by the president's daughter.

A highly competitive two-party system was ended in 1972 with the imposition of a presidential dictatorship. Just before the restoration of national legislative elections in 1978, Marcos hastily created a regime party, the New Society Movement (KBL), and in the elections only limited opposition from several new minor parties was allowed. Provincial governors, municipal mayors and assemblymen who joined the KBL gave blind obedience to the president in return for electoral endorsement and patronage. The private armies of politicians that had been disbanded during the early reformist years of martial law (which began in 1972) were revived in order to provide muscle for Marcos' local henchmen and help them to manipulate elections in the government's favor.

In sum, the establishment of authoritarian rule allowed Marcos to politicize Philippine society to his own and his inner circle's advantage, but the cost to his country and the challenge for his successors was great.

II

The legacy that Ferdinand Marcos was building through his 20 years in power was not always as grim as it became by the end. Indeed, the first years of the martial law period were an economic honeymoon. With a strengthened fiscal system and World Bank aid, the government was able to initiate a program

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of rural infrastructure development, including a major expansion of irrigation facilities and road construction. Farmers were encouraged to use new rice varieties and to improve cultivation methods generally. A program of land reform, limited to rice and corn lands but much more far reaching than any the pre-1972 Congress could enact, was imposed by presidential decree.

The results were impressive. Agricultural production increased by over 60 percent from 1970 to 1980. For the first time in history the Philippines was consistently producing a surplus of rice for export. Streamlined legal and administrative procedures led to a dramatic increase in direct foreign investment, which swelled to a half-billion dollars a year. The adoption of an export-oriented industrialization strategy produced an impressive increase in light manufactured exports. Tourism receipts grew tenfold. Foreign exchange receipts from Filipinos working in the Middle East and elsewhere abroad contributed another half-billion a year of hard currency.

In spite of these favorable developments, the twin problems of unemployment and declining real wage rates—what many economists consider the bottom line of Philippine economic development—were getting worse. The situation became so embarrassing by 1976 that the Marcos government was forced to drastically change the definition of employment used in official statistics in order to conceal the rising number of unemployed. In 1980, publication of the Central Bank index of wage rates was also discontinued.[1] The decline in real wage rates that got under way in the 1960s reached truly alarming levels during the martial law era. It is noteworthy that the periods of low agricultural wage levels, particularly before 1954 and after 1970, roughly correspond to the two periods of communist insurgency, which has been most active in the rural areas.

What went wrong? There was the disastrous fall in most Philippine export prices—sugar, coconut oil, copper and timber prices. But the root causes lay in the mismanagement of macroeconomic policy and the resultant decline in industrial efficiency. Since the early 1970s Philippine industry has regis-

[1] Similarly, the Office of Census and Statistics conducted its fifth household survey of income and expenditures in 1975 but never published the results; they reportedly revealed further deterioration in the distribution of income. No further income distribution surveys were undertaken.

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tered large and uninterrupted declines in labor productivity. Output per unit of imported intermediate goods was declining rapidly too, creating a voracious demand for imports. Thus the Philippine balance of trade kept sliding into deficit even during years when primary commodity prices were peaking.

Added to this was the steady outflow of the Marcos' capital abroad. When this situation began to be widely appreciated by the middle class, an outflow of capital of truly panic proportions began, fueled at first by high export prices and later by loans from American banks. As foreign exchange reserves dwindled, industrial growth continued to slow, falling even further behind the growth of the labor force. This effectively forced an increasing share of the labor force into low-productivity occupations in the service sector or on marginal farms. The fall in real wages and deterioration of labor income accelerated into its steepest decline in this century.

These ills did not go unrecognized. Filipino and foreign economists were known to agree that the heart of the problem was the complete politicization of entrepreneurship. "Cronyism" was not invented by the Marcos administration, but it was fine-tuned into a polished system for political and administrative control. Political reliability became the litmus test determining the government's allocation of economic resources. Continual intervention in the economy became the accepted implementation strategy, as attested to by the stream of 688 presidential decrees and 284 letters of instruction dealing with economic and social matters between 1972 and 1980 (approximately one every two working days).

Thus, in spite of early gains in highly visible sectors, by the early 1980s the deteriorating condition of the overall economy had become obvious. The Marcos administration had lost credibility, not only in politics but also in its once promising management of the national economy.

III

As the inheritor of the Marcos legacy looks to the future, President Aquino benefits from her great popularity and the euphoria inspired by her victory. Most Filipinos are willing to give her an extended honeymoon, which she will need in order to deal with the major problems of her country.

To promote national unity she must look to her opponents as well as her supporters. The latter are a diverse coalition of parties, groups and independent voters. The breadth of this

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coalition was a source of electoral strength, yet its composite nature makes her task of governing more difficult. While all her predecessors came to power as leaders of well-established political parties that could govern alone, the new president won election as the candidate of an alliance of new parties and non-party groups. All of them are represented in her cabinet, and will want to share in decision-making.

The new cabinet includes members of different parties of the former democratic opposition. Mrs. Aquino heads Laban, founded by her late husband, Senator Benigno Aquino, Jr. Vice President Salvador Laurel heads the United Nationalist Democratic Organization (UNIDO), which held most opposition seats in the recently abolished National Assembly. Minister of Local Government Aquilino Pimentel is a founder of the Philippine Democratic Party (PDP). Commission on Good Government Chairman Jovito Salonga leads a faction of the old Liberal Party. Policy differences between these parties are bridgeable. However, the political ambitions of some of their leaders may pull them apart. Both Laurel and Pimentel see themselves as presidential timber. Already there have been unseemly struggles over patronage appointments, especially over the politically vital appointments of new provincial officials.

In addition, Aquino's cabinet includes some recent defectors from the Marcos government, among them Defense Minister Juan Ponce Enrile, who is also regarded as a potential presidential aspirant. Finally, there are in the cabinet some non-politicians whose main ties are with the business community, the Catholic church, or the "sectoral" and "cause-oriented" groups such as those representing urban squatters, tribal minorities and rural "Basic Christian Communities."

Party and personal rivalries aside, divisions within Mrs. Aquino's coalition also turn on fundamental questions of public policy, among them issues of nationalism and socioeconomic justice. During the Marcos years these issues divided opposition political parties into three distinct groups, the moderates, the nationalists and the communists. While the individual political parties may be ephemeral, these broader groups are enduring.

The moderates are relatively pro-American, support trade liberalization and are conservative in matters of social reform. The nationalists, who find their strongest support among intellectuals and the new Filipino manufacturing elite, oppose continued American military, political and cultural influence

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in the Philippines, favor economic protectionism, and give at least verbal support to social reform. The communists are bitterly anti-American and seek to ally themselves with the nationalists; but, unlike the latter, they are engaged in armed revolution.

The three groups differ from each other in their political tactics as well as their views about public policy. The moderates chose to run candidates in the 1984 legislative elections and the presidential election of last February in spite of the heavy odds against them. Most of the nationalists saw no hope in elections or revolution, but decided instead to confront Marcos by peaceful demonstrations in the "parliament of the streets." Some nationalists, however, threw their support behind Mrs. Aquino. The communists denounced the elections as a meaningless struggle among the bourgeois, and urged their followers to stay away from the polls.

The victory of Mrs. Aquino was a triumph for the moderates, who are best represented in the new cabinet. But a number of well-known nationalists, including human rights lawyers Jose Diokno and Jovito Salonga, have been appointed to prominent positions also. Their presence in the government will make the debate over nationalism and social reform an internal one. In the long run, however, differences over the issues of nationalism and social reform may well form the basis of a new two-party or multiparty system. As for the communists, while several cabinet members are alleged to have ties with the left (as was the case also in the Marcos government), the Communist Party of the Philippines is on the outside looking in.

IV

In addition to organized political parties, several groups that in pre-Marcos times were not in the political arena have joined the Aquino coalition and will demand a voice in policymaking. The most important of these are the Catholic church, the sectoral and cause-oriented organizations, and the military officers whose revolt finally forced Ferdinand Marcos into exile.

A striking feature of the Marcos years was the emergence of the Catholic church, through the person of Manila's Jaime Cardinal Sin, as a major political force. That was a break with the practice of nearly a century. During the Spanish colonial period, the church was a partner with the Crown in its mission of imperial expansion and religious conversion. During Amer-

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ican colonial times, however, the separation of church and state was firmly established, and it was maintained after Philippine independence until 1972. Except for occasional defensive forays by its lay members to ward off secularist attacks, the church before martial law had little interest in politics and social issues. It was solidly conservative, content with the existing social and political order.

All this changed after September 1972, though in an incremental fashion. From the outset of martial law, the Task Force on Detainees, sponsored by the religious orders, began publicizing governmental abuses of human rights. Some rural priests organized Basic Christian Communities, and a few, inspired by liberation theology, joined the communist-led New People's Army (NPA).

At the same time, Cardinal Sin led the church hierarchy into increasingly open opposition to the Marcos government. Beginning with limited protests against infringements of the rights of the clergy, he moved to broader criticisms of the financial profligacy and other abuses of power by the ruling family. The assassination of Benigno Aquino on August 21, 1983, led to a further escalation of the cardinal's opposition, which included appeals to Marcos to step down.

By the end of 1985 he had made the church an active part of the political opposition. When snap presidential elections were announced, the cardinal helped bring together Cory Aquino and Doy Laurel, persuading the latter to accept second place on a joint ticket. During and after the election campaign it was the church that provided the main nonofficial means of communication through Radio Veritas and a succession of pastoral letters urging citizens to vote. It offered a venue to the National Movement for Free Elections, or NAMFREL. When Marcos would not yield his office to Aquino, the Council of Bishops called for passive resistance. Finally, it was Cardinal Sin who called out "people power" to protect the military rebels at Fort Aguinaldo and Camp Crame.

President Aquino now has among her advisers the "Jesuit Mafia," led by Fr. Joaquin Bernas, president of Ateneo de Manila University and editor of *Veritas*, directing their influence toward social responsibility and reform. In addition, a major part in providing expert advice to the new government is played by various lay organizations in the business and academic communities. Cardinal Sin still offers informal advice to the new president from time to time, in part as the final

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stage in the church's role in recent events, but also as a reflection of Mrs. Aquino's own religious orientation. Open political partisanship by the church is not likely to become a continuing feature of Philippine politics as long as things go well.

Other influences on President Aquino include a welter of self-help and protest organizations that sprang up during the Marcos years to serve the poor. Some were purely local, others show the guiding hand of the church or the Communist Party. Some are sectoral organizations, which at least initially confined their activity to defending the shared interests of their members. Others, the cause-oriented groups, announced from their inception broad social reformist and political goals.

After the Benigno Aquino assassination, these organizations of the poor were joined by groups of professional and business people in mounting a wave of antigovernment demonstrations. When Mrs. Aquino announced her presidential candidacy it was to such groups, no less than the opposition parties, that she looked for support.

Unlike the rank and file of the KBL and of most earlier Philippine political parties, these new political actors expected no direct personal rewards in return for their votes. While Marcos packed his political rallies by paying people to attend, the Aquino campaign produced the unprecedented spectacle of the poor contributing money to her campaign. In contrast to the bought voters of the past, however, they will expect Mrs. Aquino to repay them by instituting redistributive measures designed to improve the conditions of the lower income groups.

Not all of the non-party groups supported Mrs. Aquino. Those dominated by the Communist Party boycotted the elections. Like that party, they did not contribute significantly to the "people power" that protected the soldiers who rebelled against Marcos. That power was Aquino yellow, not red. Had army chief General Fabian Ver's men seen red instead of yellow, clenched fists instead of rosaries and flowers, they might not have held their fire.

Still, while the "reds" may have missed the boat in February, their decade-long efforts to mobilize the poor helped to create the climate of political activism that in the end overwhelmed President Marcos. They will not be denied a voice in post-Marcos politics, whether it be within the Aquino coalition or in opposition to it.

Latecomers to the Aquino coalition include those leaders

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and members of the armed forces who rebelled against Marcos between February 22 and 25 and ultimately forced him into exile.

At first sight, it seems remarkable that there were enough anti-Marcos officers to attempt a revolt. Since martial law, Marcos had taken pains to ensure the loyalty of the armed forces by showering them with unprecedented authority, prestige and favor.

The flaw in favoritism as a method of control, however, is that favor for some means disfavor for others. Marcos gave preference in honors, promotions and resources to his praetorian guard, the Presidential Security Command, and thus offended the sense of fairness and professionalism of the slighted officers who had the less valued task of combating the New People's Army. This led to the formation of the Reform the Armed Forces Movement (RAM). Among his closest advisers, Marcos favored General Ver over Defense Minister Enrile and General Fidel Ramos. When Ver and Marcos, suspicious of RAM as well as Enrile and Ramos, laid plans to arrest them all after the elections, they acted preemptively and launched their revolt.

Having helped bring a new government to power, will men in uniform continue to involve themselves in politics and become accustomed to making coups? They will certainly expect to have a voice in policymaking, especially in matters affecting the communist and Muslim insurgencies, and the future of the U.S. military facilities, Clark Air Base and Subic Bay Naval Base. They were strongly opposed to the release in March of four prominent imprisoned communists, but accepted the new president's decision in this matter with good grace.

New military coups seem unlikely except in extraordinary times. The pre-Marcos tradition in Philippine politics was one of civilian supremacy. RAM was organized to restore professionalism in the armed forces—which had been eroded by their politicization under Marcos—not to assert a military role in politics. RAM members know that they could not have overthrown Marcos unless the ground had been prepared in a civilian-dominated election campaign led by an immensely popular woman. They know also that they would have been crushed even then, if they had not been protected by massed civilians. In the aftermath of that event, much goodwill between soldiers and civilians has been restored. The military will not wish to throw that gain away.

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There would appear to be only one development that could lead the soldiers to rebel against civilian authority: if a future government were to make disastrous and, in their own view, unnecessary concessions to the communists. That at present is most unlikely. In the meantime, General Ramos has taken measures against a possible pro-Marcos coup by retiring or transferring most overstaying generals. In addition, he has abolished General Ver's National Intelligence Security Authority and Presidential Security Command. Former presidential guardsmen have been assigned to combat units in the provinces. Some have fled abroad.

V

To hold her coalition together, the new president will have to devise a program acceptable to this diverse group of members. A likely area of policy conflict is land reform, which is at the top of the policy agenda of her social reformist supporters but goes against the interests of her middle-class followers. Many of these own land that is cultivated by agricultural tenants, and find it hard to accept the logic of land reform. Another possible source of strain among the liberal and conservative members of the coalition may be the treatment of three groups who now are opposed to the new government.

These groups are the Communist Party, the Muslim rebels of the southern Philippines and the unreconciled followers of Ferdinand Marcos. President Aquino must either win their support or prevent them from sabotaging her programs. She is attempting to do both by combining firm action with reconciliation.

The New People's Army is not the first manifestation of armed communist power in the Philippines, but it is by far the most serious one to date. Unlike the Hukbalahap rebellion of the late 1940s, which was confined to the high-tenancy rice growing regions of central and southern Luzon, the NPA now has active guerrilla bands in most of the country's 73 provinces. According to American estimates, these control some 20 percent of the country's territory.

When Marcos declared martial law, he justified it largely as a measure necessary to put down a newly resurgent communist movement. At that time the NPA had less than 2,000 armed guerrillas; Pentagon estimates put its armed strength as of January 1986 at 20,000 regulars. Its growth rate since the assassination of Benigno Aquino is estimated to be 20 percent

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per year. Marcos' seeming inability to stem that growth was among the reasons why U.S. policymakers turned against him.

The growth of the NPA may be explained partly by long-standing peasant grievances, notably the exploitation of agricultural tenants and day laborers. It must also be explained in part by developments linked to the Marcos government: the post-1970 economic decline; the displacement of smallholders during the Marcos years to make way for large-scale public and private development projects; abuses of power by poorly led and ill-supplied soldiers and by the undisciplined Civilian Home Defense Forces; the frustration of those who saw no other way of removing the Marcos government.

Faced with the Herculean task of reviving the economy, President Aquino would prefer not to be diverted from that effort by a continued war against an insurgency inherited from her predecessor. She is attempting to attack the problem, at least initially, by political means. During her election campaign she promised the release of all political prisoners and an immediate cease-fire and dialogue with the NPA. The political prisoners have been released, among them the founder of the Communist Party, José Maria Sison, and his most famous military commander, Bernabé Buscayno. Now her government is preparing concrete proposals for a cease-fire and an amnesty.

If the NPA proves unwilling to come to terms, Mrs. Aquino can draw on the experience of an earlier president, Ramón Magsaysay. That immensely popular leader, faced with the Hukbalahap rebellion, addressed peasant grievances with a promise of land reform and the provision of homesteads to those guerrillas who surrendered. At the same time, he confronted the Huks with soldiers better trained and more disciplined than they had been under his predecessor. Magsaysay had the advantage of an economic environment of steadily rising peasant and worker incomes, expanding employment and the stabilization of prices. Such times are not conducive to agrarian revolt, which may partly explain Magsaysay's success in putting down the Huk rebellion.

The same conditions do not exist today. The economy has hit rock bottom. In spite of Mrs. Aquino's best efforts, it will not recover quickly. No land remains for frontier homesteads. It is now on the former frontier that the NPA is strongest. Finally, while the Hukbalahap was overwhelmingly a peasant movement, the NPA is dominated by intellectuals. Peasants, as Samuel Huntington has noted, lose interest in revolution when

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their grievances are redressed. Revolutionary intellectuals strive for utopian goals and are not placated by reforms.[2]

Still, President Aquino, like Magsaysay, has the affection and trust of great numbers of ordinary Filipinos. That will enable her to win back many of those who had gone into rebellion because they had lost confidence in the Philippine government.

The Communist Party now finds itself in a dilemma. The NPA has come very far by force of arms. Its military dominance in parts of the countryside gives it control of a large, albeit partly unwilling, peasant population. If it lays down its arms in return for a chance to compete electorally against a popular new president, it may find itself with disappointingly little voter support.

But there are risks too in continuing the guerrilla war. The NPA's past military successes were due partly to the unpopularity of the government and its armed forces. Had Marcos held on to power after the recent elections, many more of his frustrated opponents would have joined the NPA. That condition has changed dramatically since the events of February 1986. The new president is immensely popular. Worse, in the minds of the public, the armed forces have been transformed from "goons" into heroes. In parts of the country NPA members are surrendering to the government on their own. If NPA leaders insist on continuing their fight, they may see defections of their followers on a much larger scale.

In retrospect, the party leaders recognized that their election boycott was a grave mistake. They have responded to President Aquino's overtures with decided caution. They have applauded her release of prisoners, but have responded to her cease-fire proposals with counterproposals calling for policy concessions and some share in governmental power for themselves. In the interim, the NPA continues its armed attacks on her soldiers.

The military, for its part, is skeptical about the prospects for a peaceful solution to the insurgency and, with its improved leadership, morale and popularity, wants to press the battle against the NPA. The United States, which shares its skepticism, stands ready to provide increased supplies for the anti-insurgency campaign. If the pessimists are right, then one may expect a protracted period of negotiations, accompanied by continued if intermittent warfare.

[2] Samuel P. Huntington, *Political Order in Changing Societies*, New Haven: Yale University Press, 1968, pp. 371, 374.

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No longer serious as a military threat but still important as a political and social problem for the Aquino government are the remnants of an armed secessionist movement among the Muslim minority in the country's southern islands of Mindanao and Sulu. Its fundamental cause was the migration into previously wholly Muslim regions of land-hungry Christian settlers from the north. It was exacerbated by the application to Muslims of a nationwide policy of arms confiscation imposed at the beginning of martial law. Further upsetting the Muslims was Marcos' policy of granting large blocks of land in the south to Christian and foreign plantation developers and timber concessionaires. At one time the main military threat to the Marcos government, the Muslim insurgency was reduced to minor proportions after the mid-1970s by Marcos' skillful cooptation of traditional Muslim political leaders, and by the granting of partial autonomy and development aid to the predominately Muslim provinces. This led, with the help of Imelda Marcos' Middle East diplomacy, to a decline in arms aid from Muslim countries abroad. Leaders of some, though not all, Muslim rebel groups have offered to support the new president. She will have to continue and extend Marcos' policy if she hopes to discourage new resistance from the Muslim minorities.

VI

Another serious challenge to the new president will come from the followers of Marcos who held appointed or elected offices when he left the country. Some of them have sought an accommodation with the new government, but on terms the latter could not accept without placing its own effectiveness in jeopardy. Rebuffed, Marcos' followers have changed their tactics to ones of confrontation by organizing antigovernment "people power" demonstrations of their own.

The issues for Mrs. Aquino in dealing with the remnants of Marcos' political machine are both constitutional and political in nature: Would she accept the validity of the 1973 "Marcos Constitution"? What is to be the future of Marcos' political party? The two issues are interrelated. Her decision to suspend the constitution is unacceptable to her opposition critics and will doubtless be challenged in the courts. The future of the KBL remains an open question and will be decided in large part by the country's voters.

Mrs. Aquino ran for the presidency in an election called

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under the provisions of the 1973 constitution. That document was adopted, amid charges of corruption, by a convention held under martial law conditions and was ratified by a show of hands at hastily called public meetings instead of through a plebescite as required in the constitution. These circumstances discredited it among the democratic opposition.

Had President Aquino retained the 1973 constitution, all officials elected or appointed under its provisions would have been entitled to keep their offices. Among those officeholders were members of the KBL majority in the National Assembly who could have wrecked the new president's legislative program. Among them also were judges with permanent appointments who might have blocked the confiscation of the dubiously acquired wealth of the Marcos cronies and who could have protected presidential subordinates accused of committing crimes under his authority. Finally, they included KBL provincial governors and local mayors who could have impeded the new government's efforts to establish its rule in the outlying provinces.

While a few Marcos officials fled the country and some others offered their resignations, most insisted on the right to keep their jobs. Those holding appointed posts appealed to the rules of tenure. Those in elected positions argued that Mrs. Aquino's promise to restore democracy obligated her to respect the earlier choices of the voters. Leaders of the KBL majority in the National Assembly offered to reverse their earlier proclamation of Marcos as president and to endorse Mrs. Aquino instead, but only on condition that she not abolish the assembly.

After extended cabinet debate, Mrs. Aquino cut the Gordian knot by suspending the Marcos Constitution and proclaiming a new interim "Freedom Constitution" in its place. Her own authority, it was argued, rested not only on her election but also on revolution. The new constitution will remain in effect until a permanent one can be adopted. A committee to draft such a document, for later submission to the voters, will be appointed by the president. By suspending the old constitution Aquino has been able to replace most KBL governors, mayors and lesser elected officials with her own appointees. These "officers in charge" will serve until new local officials can be elected. Invalidation of the Marcos Constitution also allowed her to abolish the National Assembly and to assume the power to legislate alone. Marcos has assailed her for this and has accused her of being a dictator.

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The political question, which will be resolved over a longer span of time, is whether those who helped Marcos maintain his dictatorship should now be allowed to play the role of a loyal opposition, or whether their past offenses justify their exclusion from the political game.

Marcos' KBL followers will try to win back their offices in future elections, either as members of a separate party or by joining one of the new ruling parties. Philippine history suggests that many will be able to do so, for the society places high value on reconciliation. After World War II, a brief attempt was made, largely under American pressure, to prosecute those who had collaborated with the Japanese rulers. That effort was quickly abandoned. In a few years, most collaborators among prewar members of the legislature had won back their seats. Marcos followers see themselves as local leaders in their own right, who had to maintain their "power bases" by working with whatever national government was in place. Some refused for a time to give up their offices. The issue of participation in the Marcos dictatorship is clouded, furthermore, by the presence within the new Aquino administration of several recent defectors from the Marcos government. If they and the communist insurgents are forgiven, why not also those Marcos supporters who confess their error at a later date? If those who run for office are elected, their rehabilitation will be confirmed; this would restore the web of harmony among the rural elite but lessen the prospects for major social and political reform.

President Aquino has to impose her government's control in the provinces. In order to do this, local private armies will need to be disbanded. Such armed groups have been a perennial impediment to peace and order in the rural Philippines. It was the armed "goons" of local KBL officials, more than the government's military forces, who intimidated voters at the recent elections.

Some of the very large private armies are controlled by Marcos' closest associates. Top crony Eduardo Cojuangco had several thousand men under arms on his various plantations. The new government has seized 900 M-16 armalite rifles from him alone. Defense Minister Enrile, too, is reputed to have a large private army: the task of disarming such a force will present a great challenge to his subordinate, Chief of Staff General Ramos.

Armed rebellion remains a danger in Marcos' native Ilocos provinces of northern Luzon, where loyalty to the former

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president rests on strong regional sentiment. Had Marcos flown to the Ilocos as he now says was his intention, instead of leaving the country as demanded by Mrs. Aquino and the American government, he might have organized armed resistance there. Such a rebellion could still occur.

There is no simple solution for the problem of "loose firearms" in the rural areas. Local officials, of whatever party, want to be protected by armed men they can trust. That wish has been given special urgency by the rapid growth of the NPA. Defensive armament usually leads to its offensive use, i.e., the bullying of political opponents. These want to arm themselves in turn. Unless an overworked army and constabulary can ensure the safety of everyone, a state of semi-anarchy will result. Maintaining peace and order therefore is a major challenge for the new government.

VII

When Marcos fled the Philippines in February 1986 he left a nation stripped and impoverished beyond anything known in Philippine history with the possible exception of the close of World War II. The fiscal deficit will amount to nearly $2 billion this year. The balance of payments is in deficit. Industry is operating at 35 percent of capacity, real unemployment is running at 15 percent or more, with probably an equal percentage of the labor force underemployed. What are the plans of the Aquino administration for dealing with these problems?

The broad outlines of a program to revitalize the economy have been sketched out by the president and her new finance minister, Jaime Ongpin. One aspect of the plan is to stimulate domestic business by demonopolizing markets, particularly sugar and coconuts; another is a thrust toward privatization of government corporations. Both these measures are intended to unshackle private entrepreneurs from the uncertainty of government regulation and the threat of government competition. A third aspect of the program to revitalize the economy contemplates an injection of hard currency aid from outside to facilitate the reflation of domestic incomes without generating more inflation.

The Aquino administration intends to renegotiate the terms of its foreign debt so that annual interest and amortization payments are reduced from the present level of one-half of export receipts to no more than 20–25 percent of receipts. Additional external assistance in the form of a "mini Marshall

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Plan" from the United States and Japan will be sought to cover the foreign exchange needs of the economy as industrial output levels are raised from their present level of 35 percent of capacity to, say, 75 percent. These measures can be implemented within the year, and it is reasonable to expect that they will have significant positive effects.

Over the longer term the new government looks to agriculture for a substantial increase in domestic food production. This constitutes the central thrust of President Aquino's development policy. The increase in nontraditional exports, including light manufactures, is viewed as a secondary aim. The Aquino policymakers say that they are more concerned with feeding people and providing employment than with earning foreign exchange. Philippine industry, overprotected with tariffs in the past, will continue to receive protection at present levels for a time. However, Finance Minister Ongpin has indicated that over the longer run he opposes protectionist measures and will work to reduce them, although exactly how this is to be done has not yet been clarified.

It is too early to make a critical assessment of the chances for overall success of the Aquino program. In the near term, the demonopolization of markets, the privatization of government enterprises and the provision of external assistance could raise aggregate income levels and reduce the large internal fiscal deficit of the government. In addition, if there should be enough improvement of investor confidence, there could well be a return of some of the estimated $10 billion that private Filipino investors have sent abroad during the Marcos years. This would greatly strengthen the country's external accounts, stabilize the exchange rate and remove the threat of inflation. Such a scenario is entirely possible and would provide the Aquino administration with an economic honeymoon during its first year or so in office, but this requires effective political control for its implementation.

Further down the road we see potential problems with depending too heavily on agriculture to lead the country's development thrust. Today, only about one-third of Philippine GNP is produced by agriculture. The remaining two-thirds comes from industry and services. Moreover, agriculture provides new jobs for barely half of the country's 750,000 annual entrants into the labor force; at least 325,000 new jobs have to be found outside agriculture each year. Clearly, the Aquino administration will need to make some major policy decisions

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to spur the expansion of industry (including rural industry) and the service sector if the aims of alleviating unemployment and raising worker incomes are to be achieved.

While the new president has devoted much effort to achieving an end to the war with the NPA, less attention appears to have been given to redressing the social and economic grievances that have allowed the NPA to expand its support among the landless rural poor. In her campaign speeches, Mrs. Aquino appeared to American observers to equivocate on land reform. While Marcos made land reform the subject of his second martial law decree, Mrs. Aquino's advisers were still squabbling over the choice of a minister of agrarian reform almost two months after she came to power. Foreign land tenure specialists stress the need to expand land reform beyond the rice- and corn-growing regions to which Marcos' program was confined. Mrs. Aquino hinted during her campaign that this might be done. But her advisers appear to value productivity above land redistribution. Thus reform may be slow in coming to large plantations that use wage laborers to produce export crops.

And what about industry? Will a new, less protectionist oriented group of entrepreneurs emerge? If they do, will they be permitted to wrest control of industry from the scions of old families? Such changes would obviously increase the strains on President Aquino's middle-class coalition. If Philippine industry is required to become more competitive, to what extent will the new entrepreneurial group be dominated by resident Chinese and foreigners? All these potential directions of socio-economic reform bring with them a thicket of divisive economic and political issues with which the Aquino administration would understandably prefer not to tangle. It may be forced to deal with them, however, if it remains in power for long.

VIII

A controversial foreign policy decision on Mrs. Aquino's horizon involves the two major American military bases at Clark and Subic Bay. The five-year agreement on these bases will expire in 1991. Before that time, both governments must decide whether and on what terms they wish to renew it.

Even before martial law, the bases were criticized by Filipino nationalists as potential magnets for Soviet attack in case of a war between the superpowers. After 1972 they were criticized on the grounds that the rental payments, partly paid in the form of military aid, provided weapons and massive economic

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underpinnings for a repressive regime. American support for that regime, it was suggested, showed that the United States was more interested in its bases than in the welfare of the Filipino people or the survival of their democracy.

Any centrist Philippine government in the foreseeable future is likely to make every effort to retain the bases simply out of fiscal pressure. The annual rental amounts to nearly ten percent of total Philippine government domestic tax collections. In addition, American expenditures in the base regions create an enormous multiplier effect in the local economy. At a time when the Philippines is hard pressed to earn enough foreign exchange to pay even interest on its foreign debt, the bases' rental is much too valuable to be jettisoned for ideological reasons alone.

President Aquino has stated that she will abide by the bases agreement until it expires in 1991. After that she will "keep her options open." Earlier she favored Salvador Laurel's proposal that the matter be left to a plebiscite. A mid-1985 national survey commissioned by the Philippine Bishops-Business Conference found 43 percent favoring the retention of the bases, with 23 percent opposed. It appears in any case that the bases are a real issue only for a minority on the nationalist left.

Until the time comes for a new bases agreement, the less said about them by the United States the better. To the degree that Washington appears to give its highest priority to these installations, to that degree the nationalist case against them is strengthened. Similarly, the new Philippine government, in seeking to defuse the NPA rebellion by offering reconciliation, does not want to be pushed by the United States into continuing the war, at least until reconciliation has been rejected by the communists. Thus the dispatch to Manila of Defense Secretary Caspar Weinberger and Joint Chiefs of Staff Chairman Admiral William Crowe, Jr., as the first high-level Reagan Administration emissaries to the new government, suggests a misunderstanding in Washington of the nuances of current Philippine politics.

IX

Of the major political problems facing President Aquino, the most intractable is national unity. Mrs. Aquino's charismatic candidacy brought together for a historical moment dissatisfied majorities among all social classes: the middle class, which has seen an erosion in its quality of life and wants an active part in

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decision-making after being dominated too long by a paternalistic strong man; the old wealthy class, whose once exalted position was taken away by Marcos' new crony elite; and the urban and rural poor, whose first concern must be survival. Will the coalition hold together in facing hard policy decisions that favor one class over another?

Throughout Philippine history, national unity has been held back by the separate linguistic-regional loyalties of the country's many distinct language regions. Before martial law, interregional political rivalries were kept within bounds by the dispersion and periodic rotation of positions of power. In attempting to ensure a solid body of supporters for his rule, Marcos strongly favored his native Ilocos region through lavish public works expenditures, thus alienating other areas. With the fall of Marcos, the tables have been turned and Ilocos has become the locus of potential rebellion. By offering reconciliation instead of retaliation, President Aquino hopes to lessen that danger. Will she also be able to offer policies that will unite all regions around shared national goals?

Marcos built both a rational modernizing government and a thoroughly traditional regime, occupied with the personal gratifications and familial interests of the ruler. The public behavior of Ferdinand and Imelda Marcos reflected the cultural patterns of the old elite families who had come to power under the Spanish regime and consolidated their control during the American colonial period. The old elites relied on land ownership for their status and assumed that the level of worker wages and income were institutionally given, permitting them a lifestyle aimed at the display of familial wealth.

In a show of assertiveness unequalled in Philippine history, the Marcoses forced their way into this elite, destroying those families who resisted while making the remainder wholly dependent on them. From their aggressive accumulation of wealth down to the bouffant hairstyles of Imelda, they exaggerated and sometimes caricatured the behavior of the old elite. In their fixation with money and "beautiful living," in their fascination with public buildings as monuments, in their neglect of finance, they were super-clones of an increasingly outdated elite. In the eyes of the modern world, including the new professional middle class, that behavior was seen as standing somewhere between the incredible and the indecent.

Among those forces supporting Mrs. Aquino there are also elements that are not in tune with the mood or the needs of

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the day. For these the clock stopped in 1972, when Marcos brought a halt to competitive politics and ended the influence of the previously powerful elites. They want to pick up the pieces as they fell at that frozen moment in history. These elements include the old provincial politicians, who now hope to rebuild their political power bases.

Also backward-looking are economic protectionists, who long for a return to the import substitution policies of the 1960s, and landowners whose style of life so impressed the Marcoses. There are the Maoist intellectuals who still cling doggedly to formulas that have lost their persuasiveness for the left in almost all of the rest of the developing world. Finally, in debates on Philippine-American relations, there is a continuation of 1960s-era attitudes, polarized between equally unrealistic hostility toward and trusting dependence on a foreign country that, like all others, pursues its own national interest yet remains an essential source of economic trade, aid and capital.

The clock of social, economic and political change did not stop during the Marcos years. It raced ahead at double speed. Since 1965, when Marcos came to power, the population has nearly doubled. Urbanization and industrialization have increased at even faster rates. So have the attitudes and needs of a relatively modern population. Even rural society has become more complex, after Marcos' land reform and rural development programs.

Must the return of democracy to such a society mean a restoration of the old contests between local kingpins now freed of a national kingpin's dominance but still unable to look beyond the old patronage game? Or is the Philippines ready for policy-oriented political parties that can enact programs of deep social reform? An Aquino dictatorship can initiate reforms. To continue them under conditions of democracy will depend on the president's ability to forge a political movement that can organize sustained public support.

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RECENT BOOKS ON INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

Edited by Lucy Edwards Despard

General: Political and Legal

John C. Campbell

MARXISM AND INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS. By Vendulka Kubálková and Albert Cruickshank. New York: Oxford University Press, 1985, 281 pp. $19.95.

As Marx and Engels laid down no rules of international relations to guide the Marxists of the twentieth century, Lenin, Stalin, Mao, Ho Chi Minh, Tito, and a host of Western and Third World communists have all had a go at it, generally to suit the particular international conditions confronting their respective states and parties. Kubálková and Cruickshank diligently follow and comment on the convolutions of those theories that, without having produced an agreed code, have been important in defining, whether for guidance or as rationalization, the Soviet Union's relations with the bourgeois capitalist order and the system of "socialist relations" among communist states. The often abstract analysis may test the patience of the reader, but the subject and the book will remain important as long as communist foreign policies have an ideological content.

REDESIGNING THE STATE: THE POLITICS OF CONSTITUTIONAL CHANGE IN INDUSTRIAL NATIONS. Edited by Keith G. Banting and Richard Simeon. Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1985, 257 pp. $30.00 (paper, $14.50).

Experts on the politics of a number of industrial democracies (Canada, the United States, Britain, Belgium and Spain) examine the relationship between the fundamental constitutional law (the rules of the game) and the elements of power and politics that are the actualities of the game itself. They are particularly good in showing how ethnic and regional interests have shaped, or distorted, the constitutional structure. Thrown in for good measure—or contrast—is a chapter on the U.S.S.R. and Eastern Europe.

HUMAN RIGHTS AND THIRD WORLD DEVELOPMENT. Edited by George W. Shepherd, Jr., and Ved P. Nanda. Westport (Conn.): Greenwood Press, 1985, 380 pp. $45.00.

Most of the papers in this collection take issue with what is said to be the conventional wisdom on development; they argue that, far from being a strictly economic process, development can succeed only if economic change goes hand in hand with the extension of human rights. Many of the points are well taken, the treatment is thorough and the sources extensive, but the approach tends to be ideological, stressing the sins of imperialism (especially U.S. policy in Central America) and the need for revolutionary change and self-reliance in the underdeveloped countries—in general, thin on economics and thick on sympathy. A few papers (on China, on the West Bank and on refugees in Africa) go their own way without much connection to the rest of the volume.

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THE UTILIZATION OF NUCLEAR ENERGY AND INTERNATIONAL LAW. By Vanda Lamm. Budapest: Akadémiai Kiadó, 1984, 155 pp. (Atlantic Highlands, N.J.: Humanities Press, distributor, $29.95).

A useful introduction to certain political and legal questions relating to the use and international control of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes. It provides the essential background information on the relevant treaties and international institutions, concentrating on the functions of the International Atomic Energy Agency and its safeguards against the proliferation of weapons material. The political tone is neutral, and controversial issues, though mentioned, get rather light treatment.

IN THE EYE OF THE STORM: A MEMOIR. By Kurt Waldheim. Bethesda (Md.): Adler & Adler, 1986, 269 pp. $17.95.

This is not a full-length autobiography, and it skips lightly over Waldheim's early years, with no reference to his now-controversial tour of duty with the Wehrmacht in World War II. Mainly it is an accounting of his U.N. stewardship during the 1972–1982 decade, with its storms over the Yom Kippur War, Cyprus, Lebanon, Iran, Afghanistan and elsewhere, from a vantage point different from that of those who think in terms of strictly national policy. The book is sober and cautious, but there is blunt comment on the arms race and spice to be found in Waldheim's impressions of world leaders and diplomats, including some resident in Washington.

General: Military, Technological and Scientific

Andrew J. Pierre

AMERICA CAN WIN: THE CASE FOR MILITARY REFORM. By Gary Hart with William S. Lind. Bethesda (Md.): Adler & Adler, 1986, 301 pp. $17.95.

Not a campaign tract, this is a serious book with the purpose of explaining and propounding the ideas of the "military reform movement." The catalyzing ideas have come from a small group of specialists, including John Boyd, Steven Canby, Norman Palmer, Pierre Sprey and co-author Bill Lind. They have fed the grist of their mill to the Congressional Military Reform Caucus, an ideologically diverse and loosely knit bipartisan group, two of whose most prominent members are Senator Gary Hart and Congressman Newt Gingrich. Among their recommendations: adopt maneuver instead of attrition warfare; define quality in terms of what works in combat, not by the complexity of the technology; strengthen unit cohesion by keeping personnel together for many years rather than rotating them; restructure the navy so as to make the submarine rather than the aircraft carrier the capital ship; reduce senior positions in the officer corps and refocus officer education on the art of war rather than the art of management. The authors, making their case fully and fairly and without much jargon, have written an important book. Although there is resistance in the other services, the army has already gone some length in adopting such ideas.

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MILITARY INCOMPETENCE: WHY THE AMERICAN MILITARY DOESN'T WIN. By Richard A. Gabriel. New York: Hill and Wang, 1985, 207 pp. $16.95.

Military reform, as called for in the Hart and Lind book reviewed above, would not be the issue that it is were it not for the frequently heard charge that the U.S. armed forces are often found wanting in the test of battle, not because of lack of bravery but because of disorganization and deficient competence. This book, by a former army intelligence officer, examines in depth five case studies including Grenada, Beirut in 1983, and the raid on the POW camp in North Vietnam in 1970. The analysis is credible and damning. The American officer has become more of a military bureaucrat than a combat leader. The solution, Gabriel suggests, lies in changing the structure and the value system of the military profession—no easy task! This should be a valuable book even to the many who will not accept the validity of the whole argument.

A REASONABLE DEFENSE. By William W. Kaufmann. Washington: Brookings, 1986, 113 pp. $8.95 (paper).

This short volume, by the man who may well be the most knowledgeable individual in this country on the defense budgets of the past quarter-century, serves as an excellent review and critique of the Reagan Administration's approach to the defense budget. Kaufmann believes that if U.S. forces could be more coherently designed, they would greatly outperform our current programmed forces, and at a savings of $200 billion over five years. He decries the decline in the planning-programming-budgeting system, Secretary Weinberger's deference to the individual military services, the use of exaggerated threat assessments, and the reluctance of Congress to forgo or cancel major weapons systems on its own initiative.

ALTERNATIVE MILITARY STRATEGIES FOR THE FUTURE. Edited by Keith A. Dunn and William O. Staudenmaier. Boulder (Colo.): Westview Press, 1985, 236 pp. $26.50.

The product of a conference at the U.S. Army War College, this collection of essays is better than the run-of-the-mill because of its well-chosen authors. They present a wide range of alternatives to current U.S. defense policy, but not so off-the-mark as to make them irrelevant to policymakers.

BUREAUCRACY AT WAR: U.S. PERFORMANCE IN THE VIETNAM CONFLICT. By Robert W. Komer. Boulder (Colo.): Westview Press, 1986, 174 pp. $20.85.

This book deserves more attention than it is likely to receive. American *performance* in Vietnam is not a popular subject. But here it is analyzed cogently and pungently. The author, known at the time as "Blowtorch," designed and directed the pacification program, which dealt with the "people's war." This is not a book about policy or morality. But Komer's insights about institutional constraints and weaknesses in the management of war has relevance far beyond Vietnam.

NUCLEAR ETHICS. By Joseph S. Nye, Jr. New York: Free Press, 1986, 162 pp. $14.95.

Ethical discussions of nuclear weapons usually lead either to moral outrage or ideological dogmatism. This does neither, perhaps because the

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author, in contrast to most writers on the morality of nuclear weapons, knows arms control issues well and has himself been a senior government practitioner. Nye believes that deterrence can be "just," but he approaches nuclear weapons with utmost restraint and sets out principles for avoiding nuclear war. This is a probing, personal statement, the product of an original mind tempered by the realism that comes with knowledge of the facts.

THE FUTURE OF DETERRENCE. By George H. Quester. Lexington (Mass.): Lexington Books, 1986, 333 pp. $24.95.

George Quester has been one of the more innovative and prolific writers on nuclear strategy. This collection pulls together essays from out-of-the-way sources and is timely in that nuclear deterrence is under greater questioning today than ever before. One message is: don't tinker too quickly with what has worked in the past, e.g., nuclear deterrence, or adopt too freely alternatives of uncertain validity such as the Strategic Defense Initiative or no-first-use declarations.

HOW PEACE CAME TO THE WORLD. Edited by Earl W. Foell and Richard A. Nenneman. Cambridge: MIT Press, 1986, 257 pp. $13.95.

The *Christian Science Monitor* invited its readers to look 25 years ahead and describe how world peace had been achieved by the year 2010. The responses, partly given here (there were over 1,300), are imaginative, although inevitably some see peace as sprouting only after a terrible nuclear conflict while others focus on international diplomacy to avoid such a holocaust. Lincoln Bloomfield concludes this unusual and intriguing book with an essay on "Imagination and Responsibility: Dilemmas in Translating Creative Ideas into Action."

BLOCKING THE SPREAD OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS: AMERICAN AND EUROPEAN PERSPECTIVES. Gerard C. Smith, Chairman, U.S. Panel, and Johan Jørgen Holst, Chairman, European Steering Committee. New York: Council on Foreign Relations (with the Centre for European Policy Studies), 1986, 153 pp. $6.95 (paper).

This Council book presents the parallel reports of an American and a European panel that have studied approaches to nonproliferation of nuclear weapons over the past several years. The tone of both reports is sober and realistic. There are no grandiose solutions, but many sensible recommendations, both about the overall regime and six problem countries—Pakistan, India, Israel, South Africa, Argentina and Brazil. The Americans put more stress on comprehensive safeguards and sanctions while the Europeans emphasize the overall arms control context. By and large, however, there is impressive agreement between the two panels. Joseph S. Nye, Jr.

VERIFICATION: HOW MUCH IS ENOUGH? By Allan S. Krass. London and Philadelphia: Taylor & Francis (for SIPRI), 1986, 271 pp.

ARMS CONTROL VERIFICATION: A GUIDE TO POLICY ISSUES FOR THE 1980s. By William F. Rowell. Cambridge: Ballinger, 1986, 192 pp. $24.95.

Verification of arms control agreements presents difficult and complicated problems that are not getting any easier with the evolution of weapons technology. These two volumes lay out the issues, but the Krass book does

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the better job in dealing with the subtle and important political dimension of verification. How to measure adequacy and effectiveness has become a very controversial question, and arguments about verification often serve as surrogates for arguments about the appropriateness of arms control itself.

CHEMICAL WARFARE. By Edward M. Spiers. Champaign: University of Illinois Press, 1986, 277 pp. $24.95.

The reported use of chemical weapons in the war between Iraq and Iran serves as a reminder that this dimension of conflict should never be forgotten. This is a comprehensive and balanced book by a British defense specialist with scientific expertise. After reviewing the history of chemical warfare in this century, the author examines Soviet and NATO capabilities, finding that the Soviets are better equipped for such a conflict. Spiers makes some interesting observations as to why nuclear weapons can no longer be considered an adequate deterrent to chemical arms in the age of atomic parity, and is especially critical of the West European unwillingness to face up to this. He argues in favor of a reliable capacity to retaliate in kind and favors new binary munitions, but does justice to all sides in the debate.

OPERATION CORPORATE: THE STORY OF THE FALKLANDS WAR, 1982. By Martin Middlebrook. New York: Viking, 1986, 430 pp. $18.95.

This book about the Falklands conflict is a description of the events, not an analysis of the political or diplomatic dimensions. In this genre it is excellent, and makes for an exciting read. The account is almost wholly from the British side. An Argentine equivalent would be valuable.

General: Economic and Social

William Diebold, Jr.

ECONOMIC SECURITY AND THE ORIGINS OF THE COLD WAR, 1945–1950. By Robert A. Pollard. New York: Columbia University Press, 1985, 378 pp. $32.50.

This "post-revisionist synthesis" not only rebuts some of the more misleading interpretations of American policy that have been put forward in the last 20 years but, more important, pulls together original and secondary sources to describe what actually happened during the Truman years. There are a few errors, and a certain fuzziness about the connection between economic security as "the reliance upon economic power to achieve strategic ends" and the building of a multilateral economic system, but the fundamentals are clear and sound. The resulting picture is not so different from what many observers thought they saw at the time.

RISK AND OTHER FOUR-LETTER WORDS. By Walter B. Wriston. New York: Harper & Row, 1986, 243 pp. $19.95.

Strong opinions and clear, witty writing on banking, international finance, technological change, the proper deportment of government and business and quite a few other subjects make this a provocative and entertaining collection of essays.

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PROTECTION AND INDUSTRIAL POLICY IN EUROPE. By Joan Pearce and John Sutton, with Roy Batchelor. London: Routledge & Kegan Paul/The Royal Institute of International Affairs, 1985, 220 pp. £16.

Although the authors recognize the limits of classical trade theory in a world of imperfect competition and government intervention, they reject most of the arguments for protection as unlikely to enhance European competitiveness in the world or improve the integration of the European Community. They see little chance of agreement on a coordinated Community industrial policy but think protection is more likely to be provided for new than for old industries. Along the way are useful summaries of policies and attitudes in France, Britain, Germany and occasionally other countries. A very good book, refreshingly free from loose generalizations about "protectionism" and "free trade."

AGRICULTURAL POLICY AND TRADE: ADJUSTING DOMESTIC PROGRAMS IN AN INTERNATIONAL FRAMEWORK. By D. Gale Johnson, Kenzo Hemmi and Pierre Lardinois. New York: New York University Press, 1986, 132 pp. $35.00. A Report to the Trilateral Commission.

"It is politically naïve," say the authors, "to imagine . . . that international undesirability in itself" will cause the United States, Canada, Europe and Japan to make major changes in agricultural policies. They see a chance, though, that as governments try to reduce the costs of farm supports they could agree on some "mutual limitations" that would permit them to move toward more market-oriented policies together. Specific recommendations are accompanied by estimates of the effects on different countries and commodities. The experienced authors have squeezed a remarkable amount of information about agricultural conditions and policies into this excellent brief study.

BRITAIN AND THE MULTINATIONALS. By John Stopford and Louis Turner. New York: John Wiley & Sons, 1986, 282 pp. $24.95.

For many decades British companies were leaders in investing all over the world. More recently foreign investment in Britain has been large. Has the dual process helped or hindered the country in its long-run economic difficulties? There is no simple answer, as the authors of this first-rate book show by sifting through great quantities of not altogether adequate evidence. They tell many stories of the successes and failures of British firms in adapting to changes in politics, technology and the world economy. The only reasonable target for the future, they argue, is for both firms and country to be competitive on a global scale, and that limits the policy choices of any British government. A valuable work.

OPEC: THE FAILING GIANT. By Mohammed E. Ahrari. Lexington: University Press of Kentucky, 1986, 256 pp. $25.00.

The wave of books explaining OPEC's successes may soon be followed by another on OPEC-in-decline. Professor Ahrari of East Carolina University provides an excellent background along with tools for explaining what comes next. His interpretation of the OPEC economic alliance as one party in a bargaining process that depends heavily on the swing from buyer's to seller's markets and the attendant uncertainty is subtle and quite persuasive. The history goes up to about mid-1985, and there is a useful chronology.

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DEVELOPMENT STRATEGIES RECONSIDERED. Edited by John P. Lewis and Valeriana Kallab. New Brunswick (N.J.): Transaction Books/ Washington: Overseas Development Council, 1986, 190 pp.

One of our best development thinkers leads a good group of analysts through inquiries that focus largely on the "new orthodoxy" which emphasizes outward-looking and mostly neoclassical development strategies. This is a valuable exercise at a time when urgent issues, such as debts and the instability of governments, divert attention from the inescapable problems of defining and pursuing development.

ESSAYS IN DEVELOPMENT ECONOMICS. VOL. I: WEALTH AND POVERTY. VOL. II: DEPENDENCE AND INTERDEPENDENCE. By Jagdish N. Bhagwati. Cambridge: MIT Press, 1985, 2 vols. $37.50 each.

Much economic work of major significance appears in scattered articles, so it is valuable to have this large collection of pieces on national and international development from Professor Bhagwati of Columbia University, who has made so many contributions to thinking about growth as well as about international trade.

THE POVERTY OF 'DEVELOPMENT ECONOMICS.' By Deepak Lal. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1986, 153 pp. $17.50 (paper, $6.95).

Professor Lal of University College, London, argues that the laws of economics and the economic behavior of people are the same in developing countries as anywhere else. He excoriates *dirigisme* and a good bit of what has been advocated by many leading development economists, and vigorously endorses market-oriented policies.

WORLD ENOUGH AND TIME: SUCCESSFUL STRATEGIES FOR RESOURCE MANAGEMENT. By Robert Repetto. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1986, 147 pp. $16.00 (paper, $5.95). A World Resources Institute Book.

Summarizing the results of a 1984 World Resources Institute conference, this report sets out some sensible general principles of conservation and reasonably concrete proposals concerning economical ways to protect and utilize water, air, land, food and other natural resources. It stresses the need for concerted efforts by business, private citizens, governments and others, and their interests in making these efforts.

CHANGE AND CHALLENGE IN THE WORLD ECONOMY. By Bela Balassa. New York: St. Martin's, 1985, 484 pp. $29.95.

The prolific Professor Balassa of Johns Hopkins and the World Bank has here brought together 20 essays dealing with the ways developing and industrial countries have responded to the shocks of the world economy since the early 1970s. The papers are full of interesting data, bright ideas and well-argued analyses.

ECONOMIC NATIONALISM IN THE THIRD WORLD. By Peter Burnell. Boulder (Colo.): Westview Press, 1986, 294 pp. $30.00.

In making a systematic survey of a familiar subject, Mr. Burnell of Warwick University has pulled together a great deal of material and made useful analyses. He sometimes stumbles, though, when he tries to decide whether certain policies or measures constitute "real economic nationalism." His more frequent emphasis on its protean character is sounder.

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SHARED HORIZON: INTERVIEWS WITH LEADERS OF THOUGHT. By Altaf Gauhar. London: Third World Foundation for Social & Economic Studies, 1985, 257 pp. $15.00.

There are some fine passages and colorful bits in these 18 interviews from *Third World Quarterly*. Naturally, the "leaders of thought"—who are mostly political leaders—tend to talk about the same things, and some agree with one another, but the "shared horizon" does not produce shared views. Contributors include Amadou Mahtar M'Bow, Sean McBride, David Owen, Clark Clifford, Julius Nyerere, Raúl Alfonsín, Allan Boesak and others.

The United States

Gaddis Smith

THINKING IN TIME: THE USES OF HISTORY FOR DECISION-MAKERS. By Richard E. Neustadt and Ernest R. May. New York: Free Press, 1986, 329 pp. $19.95.

For generations Americans have described and deplored the ignorance of history displayed by policymakers or, what is worse, the misuse of historical analogies. Since the 1950s Professors Neustadt and May have been working individually through their writing and consulting on this subject; in the past decade they have been collaborators in a course at Harvard's John F. Kennedy School of Government focusing explicitly on "using history." This excellent book is a product of that course: case histories from both domestic and foreign policy areas and a set of precepts—what to ask about history and how to ask it. Professional historians, enjoying the luxury of unhurried reflection, might say that the book's "method" is no more than a systematic and common-sense statement of the obvious—but the authors demonstrate that the "obvious" has too often been ignored, with unfortunate results.

THE DREAM OF DELIVERANCE IN AMERICAN POLITICS. By Mona Harrington. New York: Knopf, 1986, 308 pp. $19.95.

This is a subtle and sophisticated exploration of how American political experience has fostered competing myths about the nation's capacity to solve all problems: the myth of salvation through grass-roots control, through disinterested experts, and through the voice of public opinion. The author sees all three myths as sharing the dangerous assumption that "right rules will contain the chronic tendency in human affairs toward the abuse of power." Her radical and sober view is that "the very structure and power of the industrialism that is at the base of our economic life" create threats to liberty and equality that cannot be solved by relying on the old myths.

INTERVENTION: HOW AMERICA BECAME INVOLVED IN VIETNAM. By George McT. Kahin. New York: Knopf, 1986, 576 pp. $24.95.

We are seeing a revival of interest in the Vietnam War and the appearance of some pathbreaking historical work. This study of the years 1954–1966 is one of the best, because of the way it illuminates the political culture of South Vietnam. Professor Kahin's tragic heroes are the Vietnamese Buddhists. He argues that the brutal destruction of their political power by

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the Diem regime, with American acquiescence, ended all hope of a viable middle between the reactionaries of Saigon and the communists.

BROTHERS IN ARMS: A JOURNEY FROM WAR TO PEACE. By William Broyles, Jr. New York: Knopf, 1986, 283 pp. $17.95.

In 1969 the author was a marine lieutenant in heavy combat in Vietnam. After a decade and a half as an accomplished journalist and editor in the United States, he made an extended visit to Vietnam in 1984. This enthralling book interweaves his memories of the war with an account of the Vietnamese, former enemies and "brothers in arms" with whom he talked during his visits to Hanoi, Saigon (hardly anyone calls it Ho Chi Minh City), and scenes of former battles. He received a very human and touching welcome, even while the Vietnamese were making it clear that they could not forget or forgive.

MORALITY, REASON, AND POWER: AMERICAN DIPLOMACY IN THE CARTER YEARS. By Gaddis Smith. New York: Hill and Wang, 1986, 237 pp. $17.95.

The author draws on memoirs of policy participants and a range of other nondocumentary materials to provide a clear and readable survey of the major foreign policy challenges faced by the Carter Administration. While not offering strikingly new interpretations, the study effectively underscores the steady shift in national mood and priorities that complicated Carter's domestic political environment, analyzes the personality and policy conflicts that steadily grew during the Carter years, and illustrates the evolution in emphasis from morality to power. He argues that Carter was unsuccessful in two of the three fronts critical for political success in foreign policy—successfully identifying himself with U.S. moral goals but failing to persuade the public that he had strengthened the economy of the nation or its military security. To some extent this was due to bad luck, poor timing, and complex and difficult foreign policy challenges, but the author firmly places much of the responsibility on the character and personality of the President himself. Paul H. Kreisberg

THE UNCERTAIN CRUSADE: JIMMY CARTER AND THE DILEMMAS OF HUMAN RIGHTS POLICY. By Joshua Muravchik. Lanham (Md.): Hamilton Press, 1986, 264 pp. $18.95.

This compact and useful monograph illuminates the problems that all who think about or try to implement human rights policy must confront: inevitable inconsistency, difficulties of definition, the comparative efficacy of carrots and sticks, and the uncertainty of measuring results. The author is a moderate neoconservative. He tempers a generally negative assessment of the Carter record with some praise.

MAYDAY: EISENHOWER, KHRUSHCHEV AND THE U-2 AFFAIR. By Michael R. Beschloss. New York: Harper & Row, 1986, 494 pp. $19.95.

This is popular history at its best: accessible and fascinating reading for those who know little about the subject; containing enough new material and insight to command the attention of serious scholars. Beschloss tells the story in concentric rings outward from the personal problems of pilot Francis Gary Powers, to the way foreign policy was conducted in the Eisenhower Administration, to the international context of 1960, and

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finally to the long-term, mostly unfortunate repercussions of a serious American blunder.

THE BOLD EXPERIMENT: JFK'S PEACE CORPS. By Gerard T. Rice. Notre Dame (Ind.): University of Notre Dame Press, 1985, 352 pp. $15.95.

This is the first study of the Peace Corps based on thorough archival research. The author deftly analyzes the various sources of the Peace Corps idea, the bureaucratic struggles surrounding the corps' birth, and the flaws, achievements, idealism and comedies of the first two years.

GRENVILLE CLARK, PUBLIC CITIZEN. By Gerald T. Dunne. New York: Farrar, Straus & Giroux, 1986, 260 pp. $19.95.

Grenville Clark (1882–1967) was an aristocrat of the New York bar in the tradition of Elihu Root and Henry Stimson. Although he never held public office, he exerted great influence as an organizer of elite groups, e.g., to promote preparedness during World War I and intervention in World War II. A philosophical conservative, he was a powerful liberal voice in defense of individual rights and is best remembered for his classic 1958 book, *World Peace Through World Law*. This concise and very well-written biography, based on the Clark papers at Dartmouth, is a scholarly work of admiration.

The Western Hemisphere

Robert D. Crassweller

CUBAN FOREIGN POLICY: CARIBBEAN TEMPEST. By Pamela S. Falk. Lexington (Mass.): Lexington Books, 1986, 336 pp. $29.00.

A finely crafted policy-oriented analysis of Cuba's foreign economic and political affairs, supported by contemporary interviews and by sensitive concern for historical development. The author does not attempt to balance social reform against personal injustice, believing that to be impossible. Instead, she develops with sound scholarship the theme that Cuba's fundamental foreign purposes have changed only "in scope and in allegiance" since 1898, remaining, as always, an expression of frustrated national identity. Autonomy and international influence have been and are the desiderata; thus, although current foreign policy adequately suits the revolutionary ideology, the latter does not necessarily determine foreign policy.

GRENADA AND SOVIET/CUBAN POLICY: INTERNAL CRISIS AND U.S./OECS INTERVENTION. Edited by Jiri Valenta and Herbert J. Ellison. Boulder (Colo.): Westview Press, 1986, 512 pp. $38.50 (paper, $20.00). A Special Study of the Kennan Institute for Advanced Russian Studies, The Woodrow Wilson International Center For Scholars.

An exhaustive examination of every facet of the recent Grenada crisis, based on analysis of the famous captured documents, which are reproduced here in an appendix of 228 pages. The volume consists of 12 essays and related discussions evolved from papers given at a conference in August 1984, with representation from academia, the media and research institutions. There is also a chapter of findings and recommendations, reflecting not a consensus but an exchange of ideas.

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LATIN AMERICA: DEPENDENCY OR INDEPENDENCE? Edited by Michael Novak and Michael P. Jackson. Washington: American Enterprise Institute, 1985, 186 pp.

Political, economic and social themes associated with the role of multinational corporations in Latin America are sketched against the background of political theory, social science, theology and finance. The papers, ten in number, and the discussions originated in the 1984 Summer Institute of the American Enterprise Institute. The contributors are all competent scholars and the collection is praiseworthy.

COPEI: IDEOLOGIA Y LIDERAZGO. By Ricardo Combellas. Caracas: Editorial Ariel, 1985, 339 pp. $8.00 (paper).

Ricardo Combellas has written a remarkable study of the Social Christian party Copei, one of the two leading political parties in Venezuela. The first of its kind ever written by a Venezuelan scholar, it is a significant book for those interested in the establishment and development of democratic party politics in Latin America. It explains the ideology and organization that have aided the expansion of Social Christian ideas in Latin, and particularly in Central, America. Luis Salomón Barrios

Western Europe

Fritz Stern

NEW JERUSALEMS: THE LABOUR PARTY AND THE ECONOMICS OF DEMOCRATIC SOCIALISM. By Elizabeth Durbin. Boston: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1985, 320 pp. $32.00.

A study of how some of the leaders of the Labour Party in the prewar period revised its traditional program to make it economically sound and sophisticated, non-Marxist and cognizant of Keynes. The author's father, Evan Durbin, a prominent and admirable man tragically drowned at a young age, was, along with Hugh Gaitskell, a major figure in designing a program that hoped to achieve a socialist economy by parliamentary means without weakening the economy or arousing the propertied opposition to violence. In Thatcherite England—and elsewhere—their hopes seem discredited or anachronistic but their efforts to prepare economically sound plans for a better society in the economically depressed and class-ridden England of the day still carry a message, as does the example that social planning with visionary goals requires the most penetrating assessment of economic theory and practice, and of political realities.

HISTORY, TRUTH, LIBERTY: SELECTED WRITINGS. By Raymond Aron. Edited by Franciszek Drau. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1986, 384 pp. $27.50.

Representative selections from Aron's books and essays and four articles of a largely sociological character are translated here for the first time. The collection is enriched by a personal memoir by Edward Shils and marred by countless misprints. The essays—on the intelligibility of history, on Marx and Tocqueville, on the nature of modern society and war—attest to Aron's extraordinary erudition, intelligence and concern with explicating the past while instructing the present. The book also contains some of his essays on international politics in the nuclear age, including his defense of "the

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morality of prudence." A man of the right who understood Marx and the moral justification of socialism; a man of peace who understood Clausewitz and sought to assess the sources and conduct of modern war. This is a good introduction to the range and depth of Aron's work.

THE REVOLUTION WITHIN THE REVOLUTION: WORKERS' CONTROL IN RURAL PORTUGAL. By Nancy Gina Bermeo. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1986, 263 pp. $28.50.

A splendid study of land seizure and subsequent workers' control in southern Portugal during the early stages of the 1974 Portuguese revolution. The book is grounded in empirical inquiry and informed by theory, though the author is admirably critical of all received opinion. The seizure of land sprang from specific economic conditions and was only after the fact exploited by the Communist Party and later hobbled by the rivalry of left-wing parties. A sophisticated book, written with exceptional lucidity and a sense of drama, a work that transcends the bounds of its subject and demonstrates the great potential of the scholarly monograph.

AGGRESSIVE USA? AMERIKANISCHE SICHERHEITSPOLITIK, 1945–1985. By Kurt R. Spillmann. Stuttgart: Klett-Cotta, 1985, 245 pp.

A useful summary of America's strategic policies from containment to SDI, with particular attention to the changes in morale and weaponry from the Carter to the Reagan Administrations. The implications for Europe's own defense are emphasized.

SURVIVAL IN AUSCHWITZ and THE REAWAKENING. By Primo Levi. New York: Summit Books, 1986, 384 pp. $19.95.
MOMENTS OF REPRIEVE. By Primo Levi. New York: Summit Books, 1986, 144 pp. $14.95.

The first book combines in one volume Primo Levi's two World War II classics, first published in Italian soon after the war. This is how it was in Auschwitz in 1944, day after endless day, hour after hour. Levi delineates the "concentration camp" personality, passive and cunning, echoing Bruno Bettleheim's almost identical observations in his memoir of Dachau, *The Informed Heart.* In a lean, uninflected style, Levi conveys the dream-like atmosphere of the camp, the unreality. The gas chambers are near, but remote. Then the Red Army is near, but it too is remote. Cold, hunger and exhaustion obliterate all thought, and all feeling except cold, hunger and exhaustion. *The Reawakening* charts Levi's incredibly circular return to Italy via Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union. Here people and landscapes come vividly alive in a bizarre, often comical series of events and human encounters; a truly remarkable tale.

The second volume, *Moments of Reprieve*, is new and consists of a series of sketches of people Levi remembers from Auschwitz, from the quiet Italian laborer who saved his life with gifts of food to the chilly German coworkers in the chemical laboratory where he was lucky enough to be given work (which also saved his life). Interesting but fragmentary, it is best read alongside *Survival* as a sort of addendum. Together these books constitute a record of man's suffering and resilience in extremity that can scarcely be equaled. L. D.

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STRANGERS IN THEIR OWN LAND: YOUNG JEWS IN GERMANY AND AUSTRIA TODAY. By Peter Sichrovsky. New York: Basic Books, 1986, 165 pp. $14.95.

The life stories of 13 Jews, all born after 1945, all now living or having lived in Germany or Austria. The author coaxed them out of their own evasiveness. Their lives embrace a vast range of experiences, but evoke a collective loneliness: they live among people who by hostility or excessive sympathy or just embarrassment remind these Jews that they are different, that they are strangers. Not many Jews live in these surroundings: "more Jews perished in a single day's transport under the Nazis than are now living in the German Federal Republic." Persuasive accounts, properly puzzling—but how representative are they?

LIVING WITHIN THE WALL: WEST BERLIN, 1961–1985. Edited by Richard L. Merritt and Anna J. Merritt. Durham (N.C.): Duke University Press, 1985, 239 pp. $32.50.

Articles and ensuing discussions—the outgrowth of an Aspen symposium dealing with Berlin since the Wall, its legal and political status, its likely development. Despite ameliorative agreements, both international and German-German, and despite the extraordinary rapprochement between the two Germanies, West Berlin remains a vulnerable spot, not least because of its own troubled economic, demographic and spiritual existence. The book is informative, candid and worrisome.

GERMAN HISTORY IN MARXIST PERSPECTIVE: THE EAST GERMAN APPROACH. By Andreas Dorpalen. Detroit: Wayne State University Press, 1985, 543 pp. $45.00.

A thorough, fair-minded review of East German historiography, its organization, ideology, its achievements and deficiencies. The D.D.R. began in the 1950s to portray itself as the sole heir of a long progressive tradition in the German past; Dorpalen makes clear that the D.D.R. historians have often had a useful, stimulating effect on their freer but time-bound colleagues in the Federal Republic. A useful compendium, illustrative also of basic political trends within the D.D.R.

A WIDENING ATLANTIC?: DOMESTIC CHANGE AND FOREIGN POLICY. By Ralf Dahrendorf and Theodore C. Sorensen. New York: Council on Foreign Relations, 1986, 107 pp. $5.95 (paper).

In separate essays, a European sociologist and an American lawyer, both with experience in public life, consider whether several decades of social, economic and political change have undermined the alliance between Western Europe and the United States created in the first postwar years. Professor Dahrendorf provides an interesting analysis of the "Europeanization of Europe" and the "Americanization of America." Mr. Sorensen examines some of the main fears Europeans have about the U.S. and the "democratization of American foreign policy." Both arrive at quite positive conclusions about the durability of the alliance but call for adjustments in the way things are done. This book is a contribution to the Council on Foreign Relations' ongoing study of Europe and America.

William Diebold, Jr.

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EUROPEAN PEACE MOVEMENTS AND THE FUTURE OF THE WESTERN ALLIANCE. Edited by Walter Laqueur and Robert Hunter. New Brunswick (N.J.): Transaction Books (with the Center for Strategic & International Studies, Georgetown University), 1985, 450 pp. $34.95.

A collection of exceptionally strong essays on the future of the alliance, which some judge to be "mortally ill." Henry Kissinger's proposal for NATO reform is reprinted, with its recommendation of the appointment of a European as SACEUR. Essays on individual peace movements, theological issues and church policies are splendidly informative and useful even at a time when the peace movements seem in decline. There are several analyses of the German mood and conditions. Altogether a valuable volume, even if a bit detailed and predictable in places, providing a sound survey of current difficulties and possibilities within the alliance.

PEACE AND SURVIVAL: WEST GERMANY, THE PEACE MOVEMENT, AND EUROPEAN SECURITY. By David Gress. Stanford (Calif.): Hoover Press, 1985, 266 pp. $15.95.

An American-trained Danish historian, now at the Hoover Institution, probes the political views of the German peace movement and of what he calls the "nationalist neutralism" beyond the peace movement in the context of their historical and cultural assumptions. The book, well informed and with a pleasingly broad philosophical focus, is nevertheless more of a polemic against these groups than a balanced study of the growing distancing of Europeans from American policies. The animus is clear, as is the danger of writing instant history: "The abandonment of the Atlanticist line by the SPD is, without question, the most dramatic and portentous development in West German politics since the inauguration of the Ostpolitik of the social-liberal coalition in 1969." An example of facile and mischievous judgments.

The Soviet Union and Eastern Europe

John C. Campbell

THE STRUGGLE FOR THE THIRD WORLD: SOVIET DEBATES AND AMERICAN OPTIONS. By Jerry F. Hough. Washington: Brookings, 1986, 293 pp. $32.95 (paper, $12.95).

What this book does better than any other is to summarize and analyze the vast Soviet academic literature on world affairs and to relate it to the actualities of Soviet foreign policy. The author shows that these "scholarly" articles and books are not just propaganda; they constitute a running debate on events in the outside world, and they are too little understood or heeded in American thinking about the Soviet Union (Washington being one of the last bastions of Stalinist orthodoxy). The Third World necessarily has a prominent place in the exposition, but the book also covers historical and changing Soviet views and policies on relations with the West, economic development, political systems and revolutionary strategy. The suggestions for U.S. policy, which Hough sees as following directly from his study of the Soviet side, are directed to issues now current, and are sure to be controversial.

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THE SOVIET PROBLEM IN AMERICAN-GERMAN RELATIONS. Edited by Uwe Nerlich and James A. Thomson. New York: Crane, Russak, 1985, 440 pp. $37.50.

Policy toward the Soviet Union lies at the heart of American-German relations, which in turn are crucial to NATO and the security of the West. Divergent outlooks and policies on the part of the U.S. and the Federal Republic—evident in the early 1980s over Afghanistan, the Soviet pipeline and other matters—are of great potential danger unless kept within bounds set by the common vital interests of both countries. These papers, prepared under the joint sponsorship of RAND and the Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik, represent sober and rational analyses of the problem, the best yet published. The volume also includes, as background, several excellent papers on recent developments in the U.S.S.R. and in Soviet policy toward the West.

THE GORBACHEV ERA. Edited by Alexander Dallin and Condoleezza Rice. Stanford (Calif.): Portable Stanford, Stanford Alumni Association, 1986, 183 pp. $16.95 (paper, $9.95).

A series of lectures on the state of things in the Soviet Union and prospects for the future at this time of the long-awaited generational change in leadership. Much of the material is elementary exposition, but the authors and editors are experienced Russia-watchers (they include, for example, George Breslauer, Gail Lapidus, Timothy Colton and Marie Lavigne) whose assembled facts and considered views present a generally accurate, balanced, but by no means monotone picture.

THE SOVIET UNION: THE INCOMPLETE SUPERPOWER. By Paul Dibb. Champaign: University of Illinois Press, 1986, 293 pp. $26.95.

Variations on a familiar theme—and a valid one—that the U.S.S.R. is a global power in one dimension, the military, and falls short in others. Paul Dibb is an Australian scholar well versed in the Soviet Union and the Pacific area. His assessment of Soviet strengths and weaknesses is based on a wealth of evidence: he looks at economic, security and other questions primarily as they appear to Moscow, takes account of the interpretations of others, and pictures a superpower with enormous problems that spell decline but not necessarily disaster.

SECURITY IMPLICATIONS OF NATIONALISM IN EASTERN EUROPE. Edited by Jeffrey Simon and Trond Gilberg. Boulder (Colo.): Westview Press, 1986, 325 pp. $29.50.

The dozen papers that make up this book find more than a dozen ways of looking at Eastern Europe's history, current problems and international significance, going well beyond the efforts of the editors, and of the U.S. Army War College which sponsored the exercise, to wrap up the book's subject in a neat package centered on security. Much of it will be, for the initiated, tedious; for the general reader, too detailed. However, there is valuable material and interesting reading here, particularly on the role of the military in the U.S.S.R. and in other Warsaw Pact states. The list of contributors includes some of the leading lights in the field such as Lincoln Gordon (on the economy), Walter Connor (on social change), Vernon Aspaturian (on Soviet military) and Andrzej Korbonski (on Poland).

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MOSCOW AND THE POLISH CRISIS: AN INTERPRETATION OF SOVIET POLICIES AND INTENTIONS. By Sidney I. Ploss. Boulder (Colo.): Westview Press, 1986, 182 pp. $29.50.

The author's interpretation is based on classic Kremlinology, subjecting the Soviet press and other published material to minute examination in the light of expert knowledge of the Soviet system, of past practice and of leading personalities. He claims for this method better results in judging Soviet policy and predicting Soviet actions than Western governments derive from their usual intelligence sources, and makes a good case in following the Polish crisis of 1980–81 when Washington was on occasion taken by surprise. But Western governments, of course, have had their experts practicing Kremlinology for a half-century, although perhaps not as skillfully as Ploss (who is now a Soviet analyst in the State Department). *In any event, the published material leaves many points uncertain,* as his text indicates.

FREEDOM AT A PRICE: AN ENGLISHWOMAN'S LIFE IN CZECHOSLOVAKIA. By Rosemary Kavan. London: Verso/NLB, 1986, 280 pp. (New York: Schocken Books, distributor, $13.50.)

Reading this honest and finely written autobiography, one is drawn deeply into the life and political evolution of a remarkable person: as the wife of a communist political activist in the early postwar years in Czechoslovakia; as a believer in a socialism quite incompatible with a system that lived on repression and staged show trials (of which her husband became a victim); as a supporter of the movement that led to the Prague Spring, and as a defender of freedom during the long night of "normalization" after 1968, until her only choice was illegal escape from her adopted to her native country.

THE POWER OF THE POWERLESS: CITIZENS AGAINST THE STATE IN CENTRAL-EASTERN EUROPE. By Václav Havel and others. Edited by John Keane. Armonk (N.Y.): Sharpe, 1985, 228 pp. $35.00.

The *pièce de résistance,* on which the other contributions are essentially elaboration and commentary, is the title essay by Václav Havel. In the post-totalitarian state, as he calls it (the term describes his native Czechoslovakia under the "normalization" that followed 1968 but applies to all of Eastern Europe), he finds a profound crisis of human identity brought about by "living within a lie," and real political significance in the individual's moral choice for truth and in the creation of an independent life for society even though the system of bureaucratic coercion continues. It is a notable fact that all the contributors, early adherents of Charter 77, are distinguished men of letters in Czechoslovakia. The essays, newly translated, were written several years ago.

THE FORGOTTEN HOLOCAUST: THE POLES UNDER GERMAN OCCUPATION, 1939–1944. By Richard C. Lukas. Lexington: University Press of Kentucky, 1986, 300 pp. $24.00.

Much of this book is about Poles and Jews as victims of Nazi policies of genocide. The author sets out to correct what he sees as tendentious and distorted versions of history that present the tragedy of the Jews as *the* Holocaust, and have made much of Polish anti-Semitism. He goes thoroughly into the evidence, but the tone is at times polemical, and we may

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expect the controversy to continue. The rest of the book, more than a mere chronicle of German atrocities, covers with a sure hand the main aspects of Poland's wartime experience—resistance, the Home Army, the underground, collaborators, the role of the communists—and concludes with the Warsaw Uprising.

THE HOLOCAUST IN HUNGARY: FORTY YEARS LATER. Edited by Randolph L. Braham and Bela Vago. Boulder (Colo.): East European Monographs, 1986, 235 pp. (New York: Columbia University Press, distributor, $25.00.)

Contributions by scholars from Hungary, Israel and the United States make this the most comprehensive and reliable volume in English on the fate of the Hungarian Jews in World War II, with background material on anti-Semitism in Hungary before the war and some attention to events since. It is an honest and objective effort, not so much to recount what happened, which is well known, but to explore the causes and to assess the responsibility of the Nazis, of Hungary's prewar and wartime governments and of Hungarian society.

TITO'S FLAWED LEGACY: YUGOSLAVIA AND THE WEST SINCE 1939. By Nora Beloff. Boulder (Colo.): Westview Press, 1986, 287 pp. $23.00.

In this "basic reassessment" of Tito and Titoism, an experienced and respected journalist, for many years with the London *Observer*, sets out to demolish a number of "myths" allegedly created by the regime. They have to do, principally, with the glorification (and falsification) of Tito's character and career, the aims and exploits of the Partisans in World War II, the significance of the break with Stalin, the Yugoslav role in the Nonaligned Movement ("nonaligned against the West"), the supposed federal solution of the nationalities problem, and the highly touted but unworkable institutions of socialist self-management. Much of what she says is well founded, but the result is not such a shattering revelation as she seems to think, and in her fervor she often overstates her case, even to the point of creating counter-myths. Western policy toward Yugoslavia—beginning with Churchill's decisions in World War II—has been based not on lies propagated by the communist leaders or on misunderstanding of Yugoslav domestic and foreign policies, but on calculations of national and Western interest.

HONECKER'S GERMANY. Edited by David Childs. Winchester (Mass.): Allen & Unwin, 1985, 201 pp. $25.00.

Concentrating on developments in the German Democratic Republic since Honecker took over from Ulbricht, and drawing on a stable of experts, David Childs has put together a useful handbook that supplements and brings up to date his book, *The GDR: Moscow's German Ally* (1983). The contributions vary considerably in length and quality; Stephen Frowen's on the economy is among the better ones, those on the intellectuals and literary works are of special interest, and the editor's own piece on East Germany and the United States is disappointing.

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The Middle East

John C. Campbell

CAMP DAVID: PEACEMAKING AND POLITICS. By William B. Quandt. Washington: Brookings, 1986, 426 pp. $32.95 (paper, $12.95).

With the Camp David meeting serving as the climax, this book is a detailed study of U.S. policy toward the Arab-Israeli conflict throughout the entire Carter Administration. With the author's earlier volume, *Decade of Decisions*, it completes an authoritative account of 15 crucial years that should be a standard work. Quandt writes as a participant in the process and as a thoughtful, proven scholar, an expert on international diplomacy and on the Middle East. He concedes that new facts and interpretations may be forthcoming from the Arab or the Israeli side—most of the Americans involved (notably Carter, Vance and Brzezinski) have had their say—but if there are any gaps in the story, they are hard to find.

ENCOUNTER WITH REALITY: REAGAN AND THE MIDDLE EAST (THE FIRST TERM). By Nimrod Novik. Boulder (Colo.): Westview Press (with the Jaffee Center for Strategic Studies, Tel Aviv University), 1986, 106 pp. $15.00 (paper).

An Israeli scholar's summary treatment and critique of U.S. policy in the Middle East since 1960. He is well informed and reasonably objective, although the "realities" he describes are tinged with Israeli views and interests. Novik is now an adviser to Prime Minister Shimon Peres.

1986 REPORT: DEMOGRAPHIC, ECONOMIC, LEGAL, SOCIAL AND POLITICAL DEVELOPMENTS IN THE WEST BANK. By Meron Benvenisti. Jerusalem: The West Bank Data Base Project, 1986, 102 pp. (Jerusalem: The Jerusalem Post/Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, distributors.)

CONFLICTS AND CONTRADICTIONS. By Meron Benvenisti. New York: Villard Books/Random House, 1986, 210 pp. $15.95.

Meron Benvenisti, a former deputy mayor of Jerusalem and now director of the nonofficial West Bank Data Base Project, presents the latest data (covering the 1984–85 period) on the situation in that territory, but he does not confine himself to statistics. His survey of political developments leads him into editorial comment and conclusions on the policies of Israel's major parties and leaders, on tension and violence between Arab and Israeli in the West Bank, and on the prospects for negotiated peace. Roughly the same conclusions appear in expanded form, with the author's reflections on the past and future, in *Conflicts and Contradictions*. A product of the traditional mainstream of Zionism but now a maverick, Benvenisti takes no comfort in the record of his own generation, the sons and daughters of the founders of Israel, and is coldly realistic—and therefore pessimistic—on the subject of Palestinian-Israeli relations, for which Labor, Likud and the Palestinian leadership all are assigned a large measure of responsibility.

1949: THE FIRST ISRAELIS. By Tom Segev. New York: Free Press, 1986, 379 pp. $19.95.

This book created a stir when first published in Israel, as it gives what might be called the seamy side of the first years of Israel's independence, a contrast to many of the Zionist ideals and to the common idealized picture

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of that heroic period. The author, a journalist and historian, has delved into recently available archival material to document his account of such issues as the negotiation of the armistice accords, the flight of Arab refugees and the treatment of the remaining Arab minority, attitudes toward the new and mostly oriental Jewish immigrants, the struggle between the orthodox and the secular, and the erosion of personal and civic standards. Some members of the founding generation (e.g., Sharett, Eshkol, Meir) appear of rather less than heroic stature.

RUSSIA AND ARABIA: SOVIET FOREIGN POLICY TOWARD THE ARABIAN PENINSULA. By Mark N. Katz. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1986, 279 pp. $30.00.

One conclusion that emerges from this study, at least implicitly, is that the U.S.S.R. has had no policy toward the Arabian peninsula, but rather a series of policies, changing as circumstances change, toward the eight states located there. It is excellent on the two Yemens, where Moscow has been more heavily engaged; less informative on Saudi Arabia and the Persian Gulf states; but on these, of course, there is much less of a record even though they are in many respects more important to Soviet, as also to Western, interests. The book does not overplay, but certainly does not overlook, Soviet expansionism. It tends to confirm what might be called the balanced conventional wisdom on the subject, and that, in view of the impressive research, is in itself a significant conclusion.

THE VANISHED IMAM: MUSA AL SADR AND THE SHIA OF LEBANON. By Fouad Ajami. Ithaca (N.Y.): Cornell University Press, 1986, 222 pp. $17.95.

Musa al Sadr was born and educated in Iran, made his mark on Lebanon as a charismatic religious and political leader, disappeared while on a visit to Libya in 1978, and lives on as a powerful symbol for the Shia community. Fouad Ajami, a distinguished American scholar with roots in southern Lebanon, is admirably qualified to write this book, and he has succeeded in drawing a striking portrait of the man against the background of the millennial Islamic culture and the murky present-day politics of the Middle East.

Asia and the Pacific

Donald S. Zagoria

ASIAN POLITICAL INSTITUTIONALIZATION. Edited by Robert A. Scalapino, Seizaburo Sato, and Jusuf Wanandi. Berkeley: Institute of East Asian Studies, University of California, 1986, 312 pp. $20.00.

This is a pioneering effort by a group of American and Asian political scientists to assess the degree of "political institutionalization" in East and South Asia—a process defined as a regularized, legal and peaceful transfer of power. Scalapino concedes that the quasi-authoritarian systems characteristic of much of East Asia remain essentially unstable. He sees a conflict between a politically authoritarian state and a pluralist society with a vigorous private economy encouraged by the state. But he and his colleagues are cautiously optimistic that this gap can be bridged by greater political openness, including greater roles for legislatures, civilian governance, and

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more meaningful forms of citizen participation. The chapters on individual countries are of generally high quality. The volume provides a useful framework against which to assess recent turbulence in the Philippines and South Korea and the prospects for political stability in the region.

ASIAN ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT—PRESENT AND FUTURE. Edited by Robert A. Scalapino, Seizaburo Sato, and Jusuf Wanandi. Berkeley: Institute of East Asian Studies, University of California, 1985, 241 pp. $20.00.

This is an exceptionally rich and stimulating collection of essays on the various routes to development, communist and non-communist, that are being taken in East Asia. The communist states—China, North Korea and Vietnam—stand at a crossroads, with the search for reform under way in all of them, most dramatically in China. Will China continue on its present path and undertake systemic reform that will substantially deviate from the Soviet Union? Robert Dernberger believes that it is premature to proclaim the death of centralized planning and controls in China. Many of the reforms are tentative and experimental, and the leadership itself is divided about the proper course to take. As for the non-communist newly industrializing countries, Edward K.Y. Chen says that it is a misconception on the part of many Western economists (including Milton Friedman) that the Asian NICs represent the dreamland of the classical economists. Even in Hong Kong, the government is active at both micro- and macrolevels and directly intrudes by setting up private enterprises. What distinguishes the Asian NICs from other developing countries, says Chen, is the effective implementation of export-promotion policies, brought about by an efficient, growth-oriented government and a harmonious government-business relationship.

CHINA TAKES OFF: TECHNOLOGY TRANSFER AND MODERNIZATION. By E. E. Bauer. Seattle: University of Washington Press, 260 pp. $20.00.

This book captures the reactions of a Boeing engineer in post-Mao China. He concludes that the advances in technology, even though spectacular on some fronts, still represent only the thinnest of veneers in a peasant society, and that the transformation of China into a highly technological country could take the next three generations.

LAOS: KEYSTONE OF INDOCHINA. By Arthur J. Dommen. Boulder (Colo.): Westview Press, 1985, 182 pp.

Formerly a journalist, with wide experience in Southeast Asia, Arthur Dommen is the United States' leading expert on Laos. This book is a well-balanced and broad survey of Laotian history, culture and recent experience under Vietnamese domination. Dommen reports that there are 6,000 Vietnamese civilian advisers attached to the Laotian government ministries and that security is maintained by some 800 Vietnamese secret police. One estimate places the number of Laotian Communist Party members who have been "reeducated" for holding anti-Vietnamese views at 2,500; a huge bust of Ho Chi Minh dominated the proceedings of the Third Congress of the Laotian Communist Party in 1982. Dommen says that Laos faces a "not negligible" security threat, partly from anti-communist elements who never

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left Laos and partly from exiles who seek to return. Pledges of support for the resistance have come from China and, at times, from Thailand.

ZIA'S PAKISTAN: POLITICS AND STABILITY IN A FRONTLINE STATE. Edited by Craig Baxter. Boulder (Colo.): Westview Press, 1986, 122 pp. $16.50 (paper).

This is a very competent collection of essays seeking to evaluate the stability of the present military government in Pakistan. The conclusion by Robert LaPorte is that Zia still commands support from most of the Pakistani elite. The dynamic economy—six percent growth per year in recent years—has helped him, as has the fact that millions of Pakistani workers earn foreign exchange in the Persian Gulf states and remit a substantial part of their earnings. The Soviet invasion of Afghanistan has been a unifying factor, and has led to considerable financial support of Pakistan from foreign countries, including the United States, the Gulf states and several European countries. Finally, Zia's efforts to provide limited political participation have appealed to at least a portion of the urban classes. Still, most of the authors hedge their bets in various ways and are particularly wary of the effects of an economic downturn.

Africa

Jennifer Seymour Whitaker

THE POLITICS OF AFRICA'S ECONOMIC STAGNATION. By Richard Sandbrook. New York: Cambridge University Press, 1986, 180 pp. $10.95 (paper).

This lucid exploration of Africa's crisis focuses on the absence of well-defined economic classes in Africa and the dynamic operation of ethnic groups there. Within this political-economic context, Sandbrook demonstrates, regimes characterized by personalist leadership have almost everywhere presided over the deterioration of African economies. Readable and concise, the study illuminates the economics much less than the politics of Africa's crisis, but it is from within the latter, arguably, that the chief remedies must originate.

ECONOMIC CRISIS IN AFRICA: AFRICAN PERSPECTIVES ON DEVELOPMENT PROBLEMS AND POTENTIALS. Edited by Adebayo Adedeji and Timothy M. Shaw. Boulder (Colo.): Lynne Rienner, 1986, 290 pp.

This collection brings a stunning array of African expertise to bear on the economic dilemmas of Africa. Focusing on the Lagos Plan, the authors make a persuasive case for strong regional links as a sine qua non for reducing dependency. They also explore the reasons why so little progress has been made heretofore in establishing regional links, and in several instances display considerable skepticism about the desirability of aid. The best among these first-rate essays include Adebayo Adedeji's, G.E.A. Lardner's and S.K.B. Asante's five-year assessments of the Lagos Plan, Amir Jamal on aid and self-reliance, and George M. Kimani on industrialization.

CRISIS AND RECOVERY IN SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA. Edited by Tore Rose. Paris: OECD Development Centre, 1985, 335 pp.

A group of scholars from Britain's Institute of Development Studies and France's Centre d'Études et de Recherches sur le Développement Interna-

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tional survey the causes of Africa's economic crisis and discuss remedies in a broad range of sectors. The book's strength, however, lies not in its often general and tentative prescriptions but in its skeptical scrutiny of current common wisdom on "policy reform."

THE ROAD TO ZIMBABWE, 1890–1980. By Anthony Verrier. London: Jonathan Cape, 1986, 364 pp. £16.

From Britain's imperial heyday through its brief and grudging resumption of responsibility before finally relinquishing it in Rhodesia, the British were, according to Verrier, guilty of colonialist transgressions and more recently implicit white-settler biases. Though his air of revelation in unveiling the "real truth" about rather well-known historical events sometimes seems unfounded, Verrier's account of the two-month cease-fire and election campaign leading to Zimbabwe's independence is riveting to read while illuminating an extraordinary political passage: perhaps in spite of himself, he shows that while Britain's Tory government undoubtedly hoped and planned for Bishop Muzorewa's election, the probity of British institutions triumphed handily over murkier intentions.

KAFFIR BOY: THE TRUE STORY OF A BLACK YOUTH'S COMING OF AGE IN APARTHEID SOUTH AFRICA. By Mark Mathabane. New York: Macmillan, 1986, 352 pp. $19.95.

Despite the South African government's creation of a virtually impenetrable border between black and white lives, this searing autobiography breaches that boundary, drawing readers into the turmoil, terror and sad stratagems for survival in a black township. Now a college graduate living in the United States, the author looks back to his childhood—at midnight police raids that sent his mother fleeing through back-alley outhouses and his father crawling to bribe the police; at the squalor and hunger of domestic life lived at the shifting margins of legality; at the absolute insecurity of a world where changing rules serve to heighten the harassment integral to control. Humanity and strength, often stunted and warped, also surprisingly grow straight up through the cracks, as in the author's own quest for education and for prowess at the white sport of tennis—and in his eloquence and pride.

NELSON MANDELA: THE MAN AND THE MOVEMENT. By Mary Benson. New York: Norton, 1986, 268 pp. $16.95 (paper, $7.95).

In this biography, the figure of Nelson Mandela satisfies our longing for a pure heroic figure: profoundly dignified, eloquently intelligent. His commitment to justice for his people has changed its form at times, but never its direction. The history of South Africa's liberation movement that frames his life serves as a clear, simple reference to the central events and personages in that struggle since the 1940s. When the current struggle is seen in historical perspective, the sense of waste—of time, talent, goodwill, and many, many individual lives—becomes overwhelming. The movement looks very different now, but basic black aspirations have not changed over all these decades.

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

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